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nal that addresses the development of accounting thought and 
practice. AHJ embraces all subject matter related to accounting 
history, including but not limited to research that provides an 
historical perspective on contemporary accounting issues.
 Authors may find the following guidelines helpful.
1. Authors should provide a clear specification of the research 
issue or problem addressed and the motivation for the study.
2. Authors should describe the method employed in the re-
search, indicating the extent and manner in which they intend 
to employ the methodology. Manuscripts are encouraged that 
draw on a variety of conceptual frameworks and techniques, in-
cluding those used in other social sciences.
3. Manuscripts that rely on primary sources should contain a 
statement specifying the original materials or data collected or 
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mental factors.
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sation to particular factors, we encourage authors to address 
and evaluate the probable influences related to the problem or 
issue examined.
7. Authors should clearly state all their interpretations of re-
sults, and the conclusions they draw should be consistent with 
the original objectives of and data used in the study. Interpreta-
tions and conclusions should be clearly linked to the research 
problem. Authors also should state the implications of the study 
for future research.
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author(s) .
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NOTE FROM THE CO-EDITORS
2009 Manuscript Awards
We are pleased to announce the following winners of the annual 
AHJ Manuscript Awards for Volume 36 (2009) as judged by the 
editorial board. Monetary awards of $500 for the winner and 
$250 each for the runners-up have been dispatched to the recipi-
ents.
WINNER: Norman Macintoch, “‘Effective’ Genealogical 
History: Possibilities for Critical Accounting 
History Research”
RUNNERS-UP: Igance De Beelde, Natalie Gonthier-
Besacier, and Alain Mikol, 
“Internationalizing the French Auditing 
Profession”
 Robert Russ, Gary Previts, and Edward 
Coffman, “Corporate Governance in 
the 19th Century: Evidence from the 
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company”
Congratulations to the recipients for outstanding pieces of work. 
For the second consecutive year, every article in the two issues 
received at least one vote.
Due to financial exigencies, the Academy of Accounting Histo-
rians announces the 2010 awards will be $300 for the winning 
article and $100 for each of the two runners-up. However, the 
prestige and the plaque will remain the same.
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The CrédiT LyonnAis in FrAnCe 
(c. 1871-1918): UsinG CAsh FLoW 
AnALysis To Assess risk in BAnkinG
Abstract: In the absence of accounting rules, financial reports and 
disclosures were of little use to shareholders and stakeholders before 
World War I. To offset the unreliability of financial information, sev-
eral banks, including the Crédit Lyonnais, implemented a system of 
accounting analysis that, in essence, anticipated modern financial-
analysis tools based on funds statements and cash-flow statements. 
This paper, based on the Crédit Lyonnais archives, sets out to explain 
the purpose of this method, to present the different concepts em-
ployed, and to show how they interact. The relevance of this model is  
assessed through two case studies.
INTRODUCTION
After the failure in France of a number of Saint-Simonist1 
initiatives, such as Laffitte’s Caisse Générale du Commerce et de 
l’Industrie in 1837 and the Pereire brothers’ Crédit Mobilier from 
1852 onwards, mixed banks (banks combining both commercial 
and investment-banking activities) emerged at the same time as 
large department stores. They would be called “savings banks” 
before World War I, having been labeled on occasion with the 
rather pejorative term of “financial bazaars” [Bigo, 1947, p. 182]. 
1 The French social philosopher and reformer Claude Henri de Rouvroy, 
Comte de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), was one of the founders of modern industrial 
socialism and evolutionary sociology. Indeed, Auguste Comte, who is widely seen 
as the father of sociology, was one of his secretaries. Saint-Simon denounced the 
privileges of noble birth and saw the nobility essentially as “men of leisure” (oisifs), 
idle hornets (frelons) who exploit a mass of “workers” (the bees). He argued for 
the idea of creating a new society, one that relied notably on re-organizing the 
economy and credit and one in which industrialists, thinkers, and artists were to 
lead the nation. His arguments won over a significant vocal fringe of engineers, 
mostly graduates from the École Polytechnique, persuaded by his ideas of renewal 
of the governing elite.
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Notably during the Second Empire but also up to the inter-war 
period, they were the main players involved in structuring the 
credit system in France.
The Crédit Lyonnais (CL) was the epitome of a success that 
was if not collective at least pluralistic since other so-called sav-
ings banks such as the Comptoir d’Escompte (1848), Crédit In-
dustriel et Commercial (1859), the Société des Dépôts et Comptes 
Courants (1863), the Société Lyonnaise de Dépôts (1863), the So-
ciété Générale (1863), and the Société Marseillaise de Crédit (1865) 
can also be added to the list. The CL’s early move away from 
direct investment in industry forced it to become the savings 
bank par excellence, and its subsequent history demonstrates the 
significance of this decision. From this constraint, it was able 
to draw its strength – the small unitary margins generated by 
commercial banking operations required the bank to implement 
a high-performance organizational structure in which informa-
tion had to be centralized to enlighten rational decision making 
and to limit risk. For such everyday banking business, Henri 
Germain, the founder and chairman of the CL until the turn of 
the 20th century, would put accounting at the heart of his infor-
mation system.
The CL’s withdrawal from the sector of direct investment 
went together with the birth of its Service des Études Financières 
(SEF) (the Department of Financial Analysis). On the issue of 
financial brokering, in which the CL played a leading role, as-
sessing the risk of insolvency2 did not yet rely on quantitative 
and statistical analysis methods such as “credit rating,” but in-
stead on financial and accounting analysis tools. In this context, 
the SEF’s main purpose was to draft technical and/or financial 
studies for numerous departments requesting them, such as 
Securities Management, Risks, Interbank Relations, Securities 
Issuance, to enable them to use sector-specific information and 
accounting data provided by companies to measure company 
economic viability and to assess the risks the bank was assum-
ing. The SEF also carried out economic monitoring, including 
macroeconomic studies, sector-specific studies, and data col-
lection. Since it reported directly to general management, its 
strategic function would always ensure it remained independent 
from other departments.
2 For more in-depth study of the issue of risk assessment at the CL, see Praquin 
[2003, 2005]. It should be noted that this paper does not consider the use of ac-
counting techniques for the management of CL itself. For a recent study of this, 
see Pezet and Sponem [2008].
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More specifically, this service set up a system of “decon-
structing” accounts disclosed by companies with the purpose of 
restating them. This analysis of financial statements constituted 
one of the major reasons for this service to exist; the goal was to 
reduce the risk of asymmetrical information tied to the window-
dressing that most companies engaged in at that time in western 
countries such as Britain [Edwards, 1980], France [Lemarch-
and, 1992], Germany [Spoerer, 1998], Spain [Bernal Lloréns, 
2000], and the U.S. [Dicksee, 1927; Michael, 1996]. This tool 
for analyzing annual statements relied on an intricate system of 
tables designed to establish concordance between the earnings 
disclosed by companies and the cash flows they generated. This 
cohesive set of tools predated the methods of corporate financial 
analysis that were to be implemented in France from the end of 
the 1950s onwards. 
This paper therefore pursues two aims. The first is to show, 
both in general terms and through two case studies, how a prof-
itable financial institution came to implement risk-assessment 
tools. The second is to highlight the fact that historical research 
enables us to understand how some accounting and financial 
concepts, however much they may be perceived today as in-
novative, were actually envisioned in bygone eras before being 
forgotten due to the lack of appropriate diffusion.
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CL
The history of the birth and development of the CL is inex-
tricably tied to the personality of its founder, Henri Germain,3 
who was to leave his mark on the bank until retiring from busi-
ness life. The first 20 years were marked by an uncertainty that 
weighed heavily on the strategic direction given to the CL. After 
an unfruitful period of direct investment in companies, Germain 
took the decision to orientate the bank definitively towards 
short-cycle activities.
1863-1882: An Uncertain Strategy for Assets: The composition of 
the first Board of Directors was significant in terms of both the 
3 Born in 1824, Germain studied law. In 1856, he took on a position as a bro-
ker and perfected his knowledge of the business world by working in a Lyon silk-
making business owned by the Saint-Simonist Arlès-Dufour. His second marriage 
was to a Vuitry, the daughter of the former governor of the Banque de France, 
former minister, and president of the State Council. At 40, he founded the CL. 
Elected as a député on several occasions from 1869 onwards, he was prevented 
three times from becoming a minister by James de Rothschild’s veto. He died in 
1905.
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multiple influences they exerted on the CL at the outset and the 
ambiguity of the strategy with which Germain wished to endow 
it. Among the board members were Saint-Simonists, arguing 
for a new social order to be built on industrial development and 
wealth sharing, who rubbed shoulders with more conservative 
bankers and industrialists. What they had in common was that 
they all belonged to a business class faced with a banking sys-
tem that they judged to be archaic and unable to satisfy their 
financing needs. Local bankers offered insufficient financial 
soundness, and the Banque de France declined to part from its 
traditional role as discount broker and would only underwrite 
certain securities – government securities, shares, and French 
railway bonds. Some hoped to obtain easier cash loans while 
others sought to find ways of underwriting and circulating the 
bond loans they issued. 
From this plethora of expectations was born a mixed 
bank, similar to the main competitors previously mentioned. 
 Germain’s convictions differed according to whether his 
focus was on assets or liabilities. On the liability side, from 
its creation onwards, the focus of the CL was invariably to try 
to attract small investors by offering good rates of interest as 
the bank sought popularity as a savings bank. In addition, it 
proposed demand deposits, fixed-term deposits, commercial 
paper, and interest accounts reserved for banking and business 
clients. Germain proved to be still more inconsistent with regard 
to assets. The CL began by becoming involved in industrial 
investments in the hope of making quick capital gains. This 
reflected a rationale typical of economic development in the 
Second Empire when large investments made large profits. The 
risk tied to the amount of capital invested was associated with 
the possibility of a yield significantly higher than in current 
banking operations. However, Germain did not wish to relive the 
disastrous experience of the Pereire brothers’ Crédit Mobilier.4 
He remained prudent and dedicated the majority of assets to 
discount operations which were less fruitful but much safer 
owing to the spreading of risk and the short-cycle nature of this 
activity.
4 These brothers founded the first French conglomerate. Also Saint-Simonists, 
they had built their businesses (rail and maritime transport, property, banking, 
and insurance) by relying on a bank, the Crédit Mobilier, that was in charge of is-
suing and circulating the bonds necessary for financing these investments. Falling 
out of favor, and unfortunate in a number of property deals, they lost the support 
of the political powers and went bankrupt. 
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From 1870 onwards, Germain’s turning away from all di-
rect industrial investment forced him to invent another form 
of banking and to create a model that stood for the soundness 
and liquidity of its investments. This shift from a mixed bank to 
what would later be called a savings bank was completed in the 
aftermath of the stock market crash of 1882.
1882-1914: Success in Choosing a Banking Specialization: The 
progressive disengagement from the industrial sector was a suc-
cess for the CL. From the end of the 1870s, it became “the lead-
ing French publicly-traded bank” [Bouvier, 1961, p. 68] until the 
end of World War I. While its competitors were still embroiled 
in industrial “adventures,” such as the Société Générale with its 
sulphur, guano, and loans businesses in Sicily and in Peru, or 
the Comptoir d’Escompte de Paris’ backing of speculation in cop-
per, Germain’s bank took advantage of this period of slower eco-
nomic growth to strengthen its network in France and abroad. 
From 110 branches and offices in 1882, it expanded to 257 by 
1903. From 1884 onwards, it offered new services to its clientele, 
such as rental of safe boxes, and by the turn of the century, it 
had also launched a significant property-building program in 
Lyon and Paris.
In other words, the choice of specializing in current op-
erations proved to be profitable in the long term. This special-
ization occurred mainly through the management of accounts, 
short-term operations (loans, overdrafts, seasonal loans), and 
banking intermediation (selling shares and bond issues to its 
clients). However, such an orientation could only be successful 
at the price of constant vigilance, which specifically meant find-
ing an accounting tool that performed ever better and setting up 
specialized services such as the Service des Etudes Financières 
(SEF). The latter was responsible for studying the quality of re-
quests for banking intermediation that various companies made 
to the CL. In order to assess better these proposals, it imple-
mented a system of financial analysis, the history of which is 
outlined below. The CL’s strategy proved to be effective especially 
when compared to other banks. Its profit margins and dividend 
payouts were significantly higher that those of its competitors 
(Figure 1).
The CL’s growth ensured regular increases in its profits 
which rose at the same pace as figures in the main entries of its 
balance sheet (Figure 2). A comparison of progress in the main 
liabilities (current accounts in credit, demand deposits) and in 
assets (commercial portfolios, current accounts in debit) with 
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et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2010, Vol. 37, no. 1 [whole issue]
Published by eGrove, 2010
Accounting Historians Journal, June 20106
the rise in profits, whether disclosed or “original,”5 is fairly tell-
ing. The first observation is logical – the progression of assets 
is in line with liabilities. The second observation proves to be 
much more interesting in that following the crash of the Union 
Générale in 1882,6 profits experienced regular growth, strongly 
correlating to that of the main entries in the balance sheet. 
In other words, the decision to increase its geographic 
scope in France and abroad enabled the CL to stimulate not 
5 The “original” profits are provided by Bouvier et al. [1965, p. 239]. They are 
defined in the following way: “the mass of profits is understood over each finan-
cial year as an ‘original’ mass including: profits paid out (dividends, directors’ 
fees), profits in reserve, diverse provisions and amortizations on dubious debtors, 
insofar as these last two entries are signalled” (p. 219). We can see that in the 
framework of a semi-logarithmic graph, “instruments par excellence for compar-
ing rhythms of variation” [Saly, 1997, p. 107], they present hardly any difference 
with disclosed profits. Yet, it seemed interesting to show them insofar as they 
could have provided additional insight given the considerable arithmetic variance 
that exists with the disclosed net incomes.
6 The Union Générale was established in 1878 to compete specifically with the 
CL and, more generally, “Jewish” finance. It aimed to attract mainly “Catholic” 
savings and succeeded in obtaining the support of the French clergy. It experi-
enced rapid growth, often criticized by its detractors. Numerous abuses and ac-
counting manipulations brought it to bankruptcy in 1882. This bankruptcy trig-
gered the first French stock-market crisis and brought about a series of economic 
and social troubles. 
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FIGURE 1
Dividend and Profit Rates for the Crédit Lyonnais, 
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only the flow of savings but also the flow of net incomes. The 
quasi- indexation of low unitary profits on the growing mass of 
resources (i.e., liabilities) mechanically generated an equally 
increased accounting net income.
THE WORK OF THE SEF
In September 1871, Germain came up with the idea of an 
office, unique in its way and never equaled [Kaufmann, 1914, p. 
353]: 
The Comptoir National also set up, a few years ago, a 
financial analysis department. The Crédit Lyonnais’ 
department was used as a model. However, with only 
 limited staff, it cannot be compared, even remotely, 
with its much larger rival. A body with this centralizing 
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FIGURE 2
The Case of the Crédit Lyonnais: Trends in the 
Main Entries in the Balance Sheet Compared
to Profits Made (1863-1913)
Sources: All the entries except that of the “original” profits come from graphs 
published by the CL on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary [Brochure du 
cinquantenaire du Crédit Lyonnais: 1863-1913, archive hc14]. The “original” 
profits are provided by the work of Bouvier et al. [1965, p. 239]. They are defined 
in the following way: “The mass of profits is understood over each financial year 
as an ‘original’ mass including: profits paid out (dividends, directors’ fees), profits 
in reserve, diverse provisions, and amortizations on dubious debtors, insofar as 
these last two entries are signalled” [Bouvier et al., 1965, p. 219]. We can see that 
in the framework of a semi-logarithmic graph, “instruments par excellence for 
comparing rhythms of variation” [Saly, 1997, p. 107], they hardly present any 
difference with disclosed profits. Yet, it seemed interesting to us to show them 
insofar as they could have provided additional insight given the considerable 
arithmetic variance that exists with the disclosed net incomes.
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feature does not exist at the Société Générale. It leaves 
each department to decide what information to acquire 
and the data that it needs.
Even though the issue of assessing risk was a concern wide-
ly shared by the whole banking sector at that time [Bonin, 2000], 
what is striking here is the importance of the role played by the 
SEF in the development of the CL [Bigo, 1948; Bouvier, 1961].
The SEF was an independent and autonomous service. De-
pending on the case, its studies were released in single unified 
documents that either explicitly or implicitly discriminated be-
tween the technical and the financial parts. One of the greatest 
challenges the SEF encountered was managing to break away 
from the window-dressing carried out by companies that dis-
closed their accounts to the CL.
Role and Purpose of the SEF: This service was responsible for 
collecting and analyzing economic and financial intelligence. In 
the public arena, the context was favorable since financial data 
and economic statistics7 were developing and communication 
infrastructures (the telegraph and the railway) could enable 
their rapid circulation. It was the moment for the CL to create 
added value by developing its know-how in centralizing, sort-
ing, and organizing disparate data sets in order to draw quality 
information from them and to be the first to act on “big business 
opportunities” and to generate thereby “huge profits” [Meeting 
of the Board of Directors, November 5, 1889, cited by Flandreau, 
2003, p. 259; see also Bouvier, 1961, p. 290]. Also, it would later 
enable the bank to target investments for its large clientele using 
first-hand intelligence, as stated in the Brochure du cinquante-
naire du Crédit Lyonnais (1863-1913): “The SEF is working for 
both our clientele and for all of the services and branches of the 
Crédit Lyonnais” [CL Archives, hcl4, p. 48].
The SEF periodically carried out in-depth studies that it 
sometimes supplemented with reports drafted on more specific 
points. These studies had several purposes. They gave the CL 
7 In addition to the numerous newspapers born with the Second Empire and 
affiliated to powerful moneymen (Mirès’ Le journal des chemins de fer, the Pereire 
brothers’ Le journal des actionnaires, La semaine financière, which was indirectly 
tied to the Rothschilds), a more independent press also developed, such as the 
Messager de la Bourse, the Journal des économistes, or, much later in 1873, Leroy-
Beaulieu’s L’économiste français. From the mid-19th century onwards, economic 
statistics developed in the form of congresses (Berlin in 1863, Budapest in 1878, 
etc.) or studies, with the notable backing of Napoléon III.
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a chance to reduce its risks by knowing the financial quality of 
both current and prospective clients in greater depth. They also 
gave it an opportunity to improve the management of its clien-
tele’s credit lines by increasing, maintaining, or reducing the 
outstanding payments yet to be made. But, most importantly, in 
the framework of the CL’s intermediation activities, these studies 
enabled the bank to guarantee high-quality securities to its clien-
tele of savers and investors. Specifically because of this financial 
analysis service, the CL was widely recognized as a bank of the 
highest order and soon won the trust of its peers. It often led 
banking syndicates and found no difficulty gathering financial 
partners around the table to float companies on the stock mar-
ket and sell shares to the public. Companies also benefited from 
these studies because obtaining intermediation from the CL was 
for them an additional guarantee that the operation would move 
ahead. 
Germain had always planned for the SEF to be an indepen-
dent service so that it would not be subject to external pressures 
with respect to any findings in the studies it would issue. The 
chairman-founder of the CL understood that it was important 
to keep apart the functions of analyzing and decision making. 
The SEF therefore worked on its own or provided analysis at the 
specific request of other departments in the bank but was never 
the decision maker. Evidence of how watertight this division was 
between the SEF’s analysis and decision making by the other 
departments can be found in the archives. Although it is pos-
sible to establish the purposes of SEF studies either by studying 
them directly or by reading other research [Flandreau, 2003], 
it proved impossible to discover the extent to which the SEF’s 
findings influenced decision making by the other departments 
or services receiving these studies. However, two factors suggest 
that they did play a major role. First, Germain laid great empha-
sis on this service. Second, the periods of the bank’s success and 
its subsequent decline also corresponded to the periods when 
the SEF was at first considered irreplaceable but subsequently 
progressively neglected.
Technical Studies: With respect to its banking intermediation 
activities, for which the SEF was mobilized, the CL mainly dealt 
with mining and industrial companies that needed to raise con-
siderable funds to finance their investments. Railway companies 
had no need for financial intermediation since they received 
a state guarantee in 1840 underwriting the issuance of their 
shares. This guarantee ensured the public’s trust and therefore 
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they were able to sell their bonds directly to their clientele at 
ticket offices in train stations.
The purpose of the so-called technical studies was to de-
scribe the conditions affecting the supply-chain and business 
activities of the different entities in a given group. The goal was 
to place a company in its competitive environment by high-
lighting historical details relating to the different stages of its 
development by providing data on the geographical locations 
of its factories and their accessibility, by assessing the quality of 
different supply sources, and by analyzing the successive invest-
ments undertaken. 
The purpose of the section dealing with production was to 
shed light on the production process as a whole, from the min-
ing of raw materials to the marketing of finished products. The 
SEF did not lack the elements of comparison as it produced 
data and statistics on both the company under scrutiny and its 
competitors. The SEF was in a position to refer to sector-specific 
information gathered from the annual public reports published 
by the Ingénieurs des Mines and to compare them with data 
disclosed, it appears, in a company’s accounting of its internal 
costs. On this point, however, we should be cautious because the 
precision of certain calculations may lead us to assume that the 
only possible source was the company itself. Yet, at other times, 
precise data are missing either because the CL had not received 
them or the company was unable to provide them. As we will 
see later, the bank analyzed the accounting for net income using 
gross operating profit without knowing how it had been reached. 
These data therefore essentially appear to stem from excellent 
knowledge of the sector and timely investigations within the 
company itself as a number of reports about on-site visits testify. 
These data allow us to suggest that cost accounting and financial 
accounting were totally decoupled. In the event that precise data 
were lacking, the auditor would extrapolate from past indica-
tors.
Financial Studies: The financial studies contained a descriptive 
part drawing together the various elements that formed their 
basis, the considerable work of restating accounting data that 
department staff conducted upstream. These financial reports 
detailed how the main accounting items were established (ac-
quisitions, sell-offs, content), described the accounting methods 
used (measuring inventories, amortization policy), and assessed 
the pertinence of dividend payouts by comparing them with the 
profits generated. The reports concluded with a valuation of 
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the share price that was calculated, depending on the case, by a 
measurement (specific to the SEF) of the company’s assets, by 
capitalizing dividends, or by simulating forced bankruptcy.
Yet, the most notable feature during this turn-of-the-century 
period of transition resided in the considerable work of restating 
and analyzing accounting data disclosed on a company’s balance 
sheet, income statement, and corresponding reports. By first de-
constructing and then reconstructing the financial statements 
provided by companies, the analysts at the CL sought to forge 
their own opinion on the “veracity” (the term used at that time) 
of the net income disclosed by comparing the company’s figures 
with net incomes reached using their own methods. 
The dual aim of the SEF was to break away from the uncer-
tainties associated with the disclosed accounts and to implement 
a homogeneous method of restating accounting data that offered 
several advantages – standardizing processes for producing re-
stated data, generating economies of scale, ensuring soundness 
in decision making, minimizing risk, and creating internal tech-
nical competencies. 
Issues Relating to Disclosed Accounts: The lack of homogeneity 
in corporate accounting practices constituted the major chal-
lenge facing the SEF. This situation arose due to the following 
phenomenon. In the absence of any accounting standards, the 
lack of standardization of key concepts, such as those relating 
to calculated cash flow8 or to the recognition of rules defining 
assets as opposed to expenses, raised difficulties in interpret-
ing the same economic situation. In order to enable translation 
into accounting terms, this situation led to the use of numerous 
accounts that worked differently. In other words, assets might 
be charged indiscriminately either to the balance sheet or the 
income statement, and depreciations might or might not be 
recorded according to the ultimate configuration that company 
boards sought to give to their financial statements. 
More specifically for the CL, it was statements of invest-
ments (whether assets or expenses) that posed the greatest 
difficulty for interpretation. The SEF had little information at 
its disposal that enabled it to know the criteria that a company 
8 This is stretching the current classical distinction between calculated ex-
penses and paid expenses to cover all accounting movements that do not result in 
a monetary flow, owing to the facts that amortizations, provisions, and reserves 
fulfil analogous functions and that the accounting distinctions conceptually es-
tablished today did not exist at that time.
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was following in improving, transforming, or acquiring an in-
vestment and whether such an investment was an asset or an 
expense. Echoing this issue was the question of how expendi-
ture on fixed assets was amortized. The methods most often 
encountered were industrial amortization expenses, depletion of 
a reserve account created for this purpose, and assets charged to 
other reserve accounts or to accounts made of matured bonds. 
The corollary of this was the deduction of depreciation from the 
fixed-asset account in question. 
Nevertheless, by examining reports disclosed with annual 
statements, CL analysts were able to identify the different types 
of accounting used by companies to state the fall in value of 
their investments. Above and beyond the existence of statutory 
amortization (most commonly either a rate of one fifth or a fixed 
amount, both recorded as a drop in the gross operating profit), 
companies turned to other ways of accounting for amortizations 
that evaded disclosure in the profit-and-loss account. Thus, the 
Compagnie des Forges et Aciéries de la Marine et d’Homécourt 
did not hesitate to multiply and blend the different options that 
were open to it. From 1856 to 1860, it set up a reserve amortiza-
tion fund that was both charged and depleted at the same time 
over its financial years. Subsequently, this account remained 
relatively inactive until the 1880s when once again it began to 
be depleted. In 1867, it added an insurance fund that, according 
to CL annotations, did not undergo any transactions other than 
in 1869 and in 1872. Furthermore, being able to charge bond 
reimbursements to the profit-and-loss account created de facto 
supplementary reserves that could be used for future amortiza-
tions. This was the case from 1869 to 1887 and then from 1908 
to 1919. Reserves could also be merged. 
Faced with the impossible task of formulating an exact idea 
of what fixed-asset and stockholder-equity accounts contained, 
the SEF developed a statement that, although unable to provide 
precise information on asset purchases and sales (charged to 
fixed-asset accounts at sale price), enabled the SEF to know 
the variations in fixed assets between one financial year and 
another.
 
THE SEF METHOD: THE WORK OF RESTATING ACCOUNTS
Until the inter-war period, the diversity of accounting prac-
tices made it difficult for a third party to utilize accounts dis-
closed by companies. The SEF therefore set out very early on to 
conduct technical and financial studies which, thanks to an ac-
counting and financial method, allowed it to formalize a certain 
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number of restatements so as to measure better the net incomes 
of companies with which the CL wished to maintain or develop 
a business relationship.
To compensate for the lack of reliability in disclosed ac-
counts, the CL set up a coherent system of financial analysis 
based on two financial concepts, excess working capital and 
gross operating profit, which hinged on the key concept of “new 
works” (travaux neufs). However, the relevance of this model 
depended on prior work on restating disclosed accounts using 
formalized statements with a number of articulations.
A Key Concept: Calculating “New Works”: The CL performed most 
of its financial brokerage business with industrial companies 
that were required to reinvest relentlessly in order to remain 
competitive. These investments, named “new works” by the SEF, 
weighed heavily on the profitability of these companies which, 
to improve the financial picture portrayed in their operating 
statement, cut amortization expenses by transferring them, in 
all or in part, onto their balance-sheets accounts. The goal of 
the analysts at the CL was therefore to acquire a reliable and 
homogeneous performance indicator. The intent was to break 
away from window-dressing that might alter the impact of “new 
works” on net income.9 Building such an indicator presupposed 
having already identified and isolated all the accounting items 
that contribute to making up these “new works.” 
“New works” were therefore calculated on the basis of the 
variation in net fixed assets to which were added all the decreas-
es that the company had experienced during the financial year. 
These were added in the form of asset sales or amortizations 
charged to the different items of equity (profits, reserves, capital, 
amortized bonds). The calculated figure reached constituted the 
“new works in the financial year” (travaux neufs de l’exercice).
The “new works in the financial year” could then either be 
charged in total to gross operating profit in order to attain, fol-
lowing other restatements, the profits and losses for the period 
9 The SEF auditors did not fail to inform Germain of the impact of new works 
on the accounting income. In a letter dated March 4, 1902 addressed to the chair-
man of the CL, Lucien Rolland d’Estape clearly states, with respect to the Com-
pagnie des Hauts-Fourneaux, Forges et Aciéries de la Marine et des Chemins de Fer: 
“I have compared turnover with gross profit, from which overheads have been 
deducted, but not with the net operating profit, so that the percentage would be 
free from the accidental variations that arise from the difference, often signifi-
cant from one year to the next, in the amount of new works” [CL Archive, deef 
23828].
21
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2010, Vol. 37, no. 1 [whole issue]
Published by eGrove, 2010
Accounting Historians Journal, June 201014
according to the SEF method. They could also be used to com-
pare the profits disclosed by the company and the profits calcu-
lated using the SEF method.
In other words, analysts at the CL rejected all capitalization 
of “new works” and treated them as definitive expenses. In this 
way, they broke away from the accounting dualism (charging to 
the profit-and-loss account and/or to the balance sheet) that was 
being exploited by companies. Consequently, they could develop 
their own accounting for net income (indifferently called profits 
and losses or total net profits), calculated on the basis of varia-
tions in overall cash flows (called excess working capital) which 
was subsequently compared with the gross operating profit.
Yet, “new works” were not just intermediary amounts; they 
too were subjected to analysis in the reports. They were gener-
ally used to assess the level of investment carried out during a fi-
nancial year, and their impact was accounted for in the analysis 
of the amount of profits disclosed. 
Financial Concepts – Variation in Excess Working Capital and 
Gross Operating Profit: Analysts at the CL were interested in 
knowing their clients’ performance and thereby assessing the 
profitability of their companies. However, to achieve this end, 
they had to possess reliable measurement indicators and, better 
still, by deploying alternative calculation processes, to be able 
to cross-check their figures by reaching identical net-income 
results. For these reasons, as already stated, the SEF set out to 
measure net income using two different concepts – variation in 
excess working capital and gross operating profit. 
Variation in excess working capital requires a brief detour 
to look at the underlying notion, namely “working capital,” a 
term coined during the 19th century but employed in different 
[Batsch, 1995, p. 15] or even contradictory [Lemarchand, 1993, 
pp. 366, 569] ways. Within the CL, this expression (still com-
monly found in the form of “revolving fund” in the 1870s) ex-
clusively denoted current assets that, in addition to inventories, 
accounts receivable, and cash accounts, also generally included 
the portfolio of shares and bonds. 
An essential sign of the asset liquidity in which the CL was 
particularly interested, the analysis of working capital constitut-
ed a significant part of the comments found in the reports. After 
each constituent item was broken down in detail and justified as 
to its makeup and measurement, the report concluded with an 
assessment of its reliability and liquidity. The underlying idea 
was to ensure that once fixed assets were covered by sufficient 
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reserves, the working capital exceeded current liabilities, itself 
composed of the “floating” debt (i.e., revolving debt) and, less 
commonly, the “consolidated” debt (i.e., bonds payable). Shorn 
of inventories, and sometimes of shares and bonds, the excess 
working capital then became “immediate available assets” 
(short-term liquidity), as shown in Figure 3.
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FIGURE 3
A System of Accounting Restatements
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 The aim of the diagram is to show that the SEF calculated 
the performance of a company based on its capacity to generate 
cash flows. The particularity of the system is that potential net 
cash flows are calculated on the basis of the fictive liquidation 
of immediately available assets and liabilities. In a historical 
context where liquidity was rare and the banking system un-
derdeveloped, the CL, which was mainly a short-term lender, 
sought to ensure that its clients could face their short-term com-
mitments, even in the most difficult situations (i.e., bankruptcy). 
Furthermore, fixed assets were considered as being difficult for 
the CL to mobilize. For this reason, it accorded them little im-
portance and sought to “neutralize” them by ensuring only that 
they were covered with sufficient reserves. To mark clearly this 
conceptual difference between the long and the short terms, the 
diagram distinguishes between these two elements, whereas the 
CL only focused on the short term. Calculation of this liquidity, 
performed in successive stages, was accompanied by an assess-
ment of the overall situation which, to foster comparison, was 
reported in tonnage produced or per business operation.
Measured by its variation and after restatement of opera-
tions having no impact on the operating statement (sales of fixed 
assets, increases in capital, and dividend payouts), the excess 
working capital constitutes an interesting indicator of a compa-
ny’s cash flow in that, with its very mode of calculation free from 
potential window-dressing carried out on the profit-and-loss 
account, represents sound liquidity flows capable of confirming 
the reliability of disclosed profits. 
Net income calculated on the basis of the variation in excess 
working capital is also measured using the gross operating profit 
disclosed in the company’s accounts. However, since the CL did 
not dispose of any information regarding how it was made up 
(disclosed profit-and-loss accounts shifted seamlessly from turn-
over to gross profit), calculations on the basis of gross operating 
profit had only one purpose. That was to ensure the coherence 
of the whole financial-analysis system by obtaining a net-income 
figure identical to the one determined using the variation in ex-
cess working capital. The discretionary character of profit-and-
loss account disclosure at that time, the limited confidence the 
CL had in its reliability, and the clear preference for the balance 
sheet owing to its capacity to measure the company’s solvency 
meant that the former received much less comment in the re-
ports.
Analysis Statements – Possible Articulations and Cross-Checking: 
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It would appear that this coherent and complete system of fi-
nancial and accounting analysis emerged with the creation of 
the SEF in 1871. The first studies based on summary statements 
date from the early years of that decade. Although the archives 
consulted do not always provide a totally identical number 
of statements for each company (either because some were 
deemed unnecessary or because others have been lost or were 
left unfinished for lack of information), their composition varied 
little from one company to the next. This may be seen as a sign 
that there was a real desire to standardize analysis beyond the 
particular choices made by each company. 
The following statements served as a basis for the SEF’s 
work:
•	 Presenting	 the	 balance	 sheet,	 operating	 statement,	 and	
profit-and-loss account, as they were disclosed by a com-
pany, but adapted to an internal CL matrix which, nota-
bly, allowed working capital to be measured and excess 
working capital easily calculated.
•	 Drafting	 intermediary	 statements	 (investment	 expendi-
ture, calculation of net profit using excess working capi-
tal, and a linking statement) ensuring the link between 
the company’s accounts and those assessed by the CL 
on the one hand and, on the other, profits calculated on 
excess working capital and operating profits.
•	 Drafting	 the	 revised	balance	 sheet,	 operating	 statement,	
and profit-and-loss account calculated by the SEF in the 
previous two steps. 
This three-stage, account-restatement procedure was based 
on significant levels of theoretical thinking. In addition to cross-
checking consistency, the fundamental relationships that the CL 
established between net profit and excess working capital should 
be highlighted. A breakdown of these two concepts, with respect 
to modern techniques of financial analysis based on the funds 
statement and developed by the French Plan Comptable Général 
in 1982, illustrates the relevance of this approach (Appendix I).
In other words, the SEF succeeded in reaching a profit 
figure based solely on cash flows while ensuring that this result 
could be compared with the figure disclosed by the company us-
ing its linking statement. This method enabled the CL to make a 
clean break from the variety of ways used to account for invest-
ments whose impact on the disclosed profit it could not control. 
However, it should be noted that although analysts at the CL 
effectively succeeded in building a coherent system for examin-
ing accounts, they were still limited in their ability to  comment 
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on variations arising from one financial year to another without 
ever putting them into the perspective of a conceptual frame-
work as has been done in this analysis. The concordance they 
established was aimed more at ensuring the coherence of the 
system and the reliability of the net profit figure than at con-
stituting a tool for analyzing variations in corporate financing. 
Furthermore, this net-profit figure, free from the uncertainties 
tied to the variety of methods used to account for investments, 
was not developed any further in the commentaries.
In fact, their goal was two-fold. From an organizational 
viewpoint, it was a question of seeking to break away from the 
plethora of accounting practices in order to formalize common 
methods at the CL. From a technical viewpoint, it was a ques-
tion of isolating the flows of operating liquidity10 (variation in 
excess working capital) from the major impact of internally fi-
nanced investments so that the reliability of the net-profit figure 
calculated on the basis of balance-sheet items could be verified. 
This paper has sought to push this reasoning to its logical 
conclusion in order to test the relevance of the model and to 
show that in the final analysis, such theoretical thinking proves 
to be very close to current tools of analysis such as the funds 
statement or cash-flow statement.
MEASURING NET INCOMES: THE IMPACT OF 
RESTATEMENTS
The next step is to measure the impact of restatements car-
ried out by the SEF on disclosed net incomes. The interest of 
measuring this impact is to ensure that the main cause of vari-
ance between earnings disclosed by companies in a business re-
lationship with the CL and the results calculated by the SEF are 
due to the different ways of stating investments (“new works”). 
To do this, four types of calculation have been carried out:
(i) a comparison between the annual levels of profit de-
termined by the SEF and the annual levels of profit 
disclosed by companies. The aim is to show the impact 
of the accounting statement relating to “new works” on 
the level of earnings. 
(ii) the same comparison using a moving average over nine 
10 The term “operating” should be understood in its broadest sense; that is, 
free from the impact of investment expenditure and not compared with other 
forms of income (e.g., financial or extraordinary) which would make no sense at a 
time when modern distinctions were completely unformalized.
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years.11 The aim is to determine whether the variances 
smooth out over time and do indeed stem from the ac-
counting statement relating to “new works.”
(iii) a comparison (SEF vs. company) between the variance 
in amortizations and the variance in profits in order to 
ensure that it is indeed the accounting statement in-
cluding the “new works” that has an impact on the net 
income disclosed by companies
(iv) the same comparison using a moving average over nine 
years
The present analysis was carried out using case studies 
based on the annual accounts of two companies, one of which, 
the Société de Vezin-Aulnoye, had a precarious financial balance 
that tended to worsen at the turn of the 20th century. The other, 
the Compagnie des Hauts-Fourneaux, des Forges et Aciéries de la 
Marine et d’Homécourt, maintained sustained growth up to the 
eve of World War I. However, due to a lack of data over time, 
only the first calculation could be carried out in the case of the 
Société de Vezin-Aulnoye.
With regard to the comparison of annual profits, we can 
observe that short and stable periods present fewer variances 
between disclosed profits and those calculated by the CL as 
testified by the regularity of the figures reached during the 
years 1884-1890. In contrast, over a short and turbulent period 
(financial difficulties facing the Société de Vezin-Aulnoye or con-
junctural growth12 for the Compagnie d’Homécourt over the pre-
vious decade), the CL method tended to increase the variances 
between the figures calculated by the SEF and those disclosed 
by the company (Figures 4 and 5).
The differences observed were significant. The variance 
between profit figures calculated by the CL and disclosed profit 
amounted to 67% for the Société de Vezin-Aulnoye from 1889-
1890 to 1901-1902, and 306% for the Compagnie d’Homécourt 
over the years 1907-1919. Whereas companies, such as Vezin-
Aulnoye, could limit industrial amortizations (i.e., those that the 
11 In order to avoid superimposing the graphs and to facilitate their reading, 
the moving average is calculated on the basis of half of the average lifespan of 
investments carried out by the companies. 
12 “Repercussions from the international crisis were only felt at the end of 
1907 and the industrial recession was only slight....Europe remained unaffected 
by the American slowdown of 1910-1911.... Industrial production would exceed, 
in 1913, the 1908 level by 32%; the increase rose to 58% for the steel industry, 65% 
for the mechanics industry while production of potash doubled” [Flamant, 1976, 
pp. 329-331].
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company recorded in its profit-and-loss accounts) to reduce the 
impact on their bottom line of a conjuncture or unsuccessful 
management, CL’s restatement of “new works” had the effect 
of erasing the smoothing effect caused by amortizations of the 
disclosed accounts and of increasing the variances between the 
two forms of net incomes. Conversely, periods of strong growth, 
such as that experienced by the Compagnie d’Homécourt be-
tween 1916 and 1919, were used by the companies to increase 
their amortization expenses and therefore to reduce their net 
incomes, with the effect of stimulating the net profit calculated 
by the SEF. In other words, during stable cycles, disclosed net 
incomes and the CL’s net incomes were similar, whereas in tur-
bulent periods they seemed to diverge significantly. 
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In this sense, the SEF-implemented statements constituted 
effective alarm indicators for risk because they enabled the SEF 
to state the real level of a company’s activity based on its cash 
flow rather than on its disclosed earnings, the object of much 
manipulation. The CL could then adjust its commitments (short-
term operations and financial intermediation) with a better un-
derstanding of its clients’ financial situations. 
Over the longer term, the SEF restatements had a minor 
impact, and the figures calculated on both sides tended to bal-
ance out (Figure 6). The cumulated profits calculated by the CL 
differ from the figures disclosed by the Compagnie d’Homécourt 
by only 5%, whereas the extreme variances were 0.64% in 1878 
and 119% in 1918. Such a mild impact is logical because both 
the method of amortizing “new works” used in the disclosed 
accounts and the CL’s method of charging them globally had, 
in the end, an identical effect on profit levels. Moreover, this 
method offered little of interest to a managerial approach of 
forecasting risk and preferring liquidity. What mattered most 
to the CL was the predictability in the short and, in due course, 
medium term. 
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The last interesting element to analyze is the impact of re-
stating “new works” on the net income. To this end, it suffices 
to compare for each financial year the variance in amortiza-
tions with the variance in net profit. Indeed, if the two variances 
have a similar movement, it means that the main source of 
divergence between the two forms of net income arises from the 
restatement (amortizations or “new works”) of investments. The 
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first is calculated by measuring the difference between disclosed 
amortizations and amortizations calculated by the CL (potential 
amortizations and “new works”); the second by deducting from 
the disclosed profits those calculated by the CL.
In the stable short term, variances in amortizations are 
shown to be close to variances in profits, but the difference rises 
in periods of instability, regardless of whether they were profit-
able like in the period 1916-1919 for the Compagnie d’Homécourt 
(Figure 7). Over the longer term, as measured using rolling 
averages, the variances balance out (Figure 8). Differences in 
amortizations (6%) are not far at all from those in profits (5%). 
FIGURE 7
Comparison of Variance in Amortisations 
with Variance in Net Profits
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This close correlation confirms that the issue of “new works” 
constituted the main source of concealment of profit or loss by 
companies. For the CL, it was therefore important to know the 
impact of these investments on its clients’ earnings since a low 
level of cash flow could be an indication of a lower performance 
and of an increased risk of failure. This type of information gave 
it a competitive advantage as it could better select its clients, re-
duce its risks, and improve its financial performance.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper confirms the importance that companies have 
always given to cash flows to estimate the viability and reality 
of an economic activity [Lemarchand, 1992]. It also enables us 
to shed new light on the expectations of a creditor bank. Faced 
with a plethora of uncontrollable accounting practices, the bank 
pushed its rationale to its limit, considering any investment 
as an expense, by building a technical system that enabled the 
CL to verify the sincerity and the regularity of the accounts 
submitted for its inspection (cross-checking the net income by 
two methods). It also satisfied the preference for liquidity for 
which it had consistently argued. By implementing this type of 
accounting restatement, the SEF succeeded in achieving the first 
goal set by the founder of the CL – detecting as effectively as 
possible the risk of insolvency of any company seeking to build 
a business relationship with this top-tier bank. This study also 
shows that the issue of financing constitutes a central pillar of 
measuring and controlling the real performance of a company 
and demonstrates how close the CL method was to the modern 
concept of “free cash flow” (operating cash flow – capital expen-
ditures – dividends paid out).
Reliance on such account analysis fell after the war. We 
might assume that the development of medium and long-term 
bank financing and the fall in corporate internal financing from 
the inter-war period were the causes of this decline. However, 
this argument does not apply directly. In many countries, funds 
statements emerged very early on by whatever means companies 
financed their activities. 
In the U.S., the funds statement emerged as early as 1863, 
taking on numerous forms until 1925 when these converged 
in the concept of variation in working capital [Rosen and De-
Coster, 1969]. This form then developed towards the statement 
of changes in financial position [APB 19, 1971] and then the 
cash-flow statement [SFAS 95, 1984]. In France, the first funds 
31
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2010, Vol. 37, no. 1 [whole issue]
Published by eGrove, 2010
Accounting Historians Journal, June 201024
 statements appeared at the end of the 1950s taking multiple 
forms until the Plan Comptable Général of 1982 which high-
lighted the relation between net global working capital (working 
capital + amortizations and provisions + long-term liabilities 
– gross investments), working-capital requirements (inventories 
+ creditors – debtors), and cash and cash equivalents [Hoarau, 
1995]. On an international level, this change mirrored the one 
seen in the U.S. where the statement of changes in financial po-
sition of 1977 was replaced on January 1, 1994 by the cash-flow 
statement.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note a recurrence of the 
same issues among those who instigate such tools [Hoarau, 
1995]. In the first phase, they seek to highlight the risk of liquid-
ity. In the second phase, their goal is to account for the set of 
movements that affect the financial situation by focusing more 
specifically on the issue of structural financing. In the third 
phase, they return to the issue of measuring solvency, this time 
through a more in-depth analysis of cash flows split between 
operations, investments, and financing.
The tool implemented by the CL and described in this pa-
per arose from the first phase. However, it is interesting to note 
that its technical construction is close to tools implemented in 
France in the second phase. Furthermore, the CL may be seen 
as a long-forgotten forerunner in the French context, whereas 
this type of tool had already seen relatively widespread use in 
the U.S.
Yet, at the dawn of the 21st century, it is surprising to hear 
echoes of concepts confidentially developed within the CL more 
than a century before: “ ‘We have observed significant divergen-
ces between cash flow caused by operations and disclosed net 
incomes, which sounds the alarm for potential profit manipula-
tion,’ explains the company [Weiss Ratings] that has studied 
7,000 companies” [Fay, 2002, p. 3].
The European Commission [1997, p. 8] shares this position: 
This additional angle of observation [cash-flow state-
ments] is deemed very useful by most users and pre-
parers, because it is not influenced by accruals and 
matching and therefore does not involve conventions 
and estimates. It may also enhance the comparability 
of the reporting of operating performances by different 
enterprises, as it eliminates most of the effects of us-
ing different account treatments for the same transac-
tions and events.The joint use of cash flow statements, 
balance sheets and profit and loss accounts also helps 
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users in better evaluating the changes in net assets of 
an enterprise and its financial structure (including its 
liquidity and solvency), as well as its ability to affect the 
amounts and timing of cash flows in order to adapt to 
changing circumstances and opportunities. Morevover, 
this may allow a better assessment of the quality of the 
profits reported. 
However, it should be noted that de-consolidation op-
erations today enable unfavorable movements of cash flow to be 
concealed. Yet, the first consolidated statements only appeared 
at the end of the 19th century in the U.S. In France, several 
scholars commented on consolidation during the inter-war pe-
riod, but the first practices only became manifest in the 1950s. 
In the absence of (de)consolidation, the method used by the SEF 
proved to be very effective for assessing cash-flow movements in 
the balance sheets it analyzed.
One final question remains – why did the CL method disap-
pear? The most probable motive for the SEF’s gradual move 
away from accounting and financial-restatement tables was the 
fact that the tax administration stipulated as a precondition for 
deducting amortizations from taxable income that amortiza-
tions be recorded as expenses. This might also explain why other 
countries have continued to use funds statements when they 
were not employed in France until the 1950s. From that point 
forward, the financial interest of paying lower taxes trumped 
the rationale of concealing “new works.” Blended accounting 
(charging to reserves, amortizing bonds, recording assets as ex-
penses, etc.) disappeared in favor of a normalization of account-
ing through fiscal criteria [Praquin, 2006]. 
Focused squarely on measuring the significant impact of 
“new works” on economic and financial performance, SEF 
analysts unfortunately did not recognize the theoretical scope of 
their analytical framework which exceeded the restrictive limits 
it had been assigned. Historical research therefore enables us to 
bring these anonymous precursors of financial analysis out of 
the shadows and to pay our respects to the contemporary rel-
evance of the concepts they developed.
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APPendiX i
Measuring Cash Flows: From the CL (1870s) to the  
French Plan Comptable Général, 1982
C.L.: ∆ ex. W.C. + [D.P.F.Y. – I.C. – S.F.A. + N.W.] = G.o.P. – [V.A. – V.I. + B.Y.] = T.n.P.
C.T.: ∆ WCr + ∆ nT – ∆ GNWC = CFoA – V.A.
(Excluding external 
financing and cash flows 
from operating activities)
Where:  C.L.: Crédit Lyonnais C.T.: current transposition 
 ∆ Ex. W.C.: Variation in excess working capital.
 D.P.F.Y.: Dividend paid out during the financial year I.C.: Increase in Capital
 S.F.A.: Sale of fixed assets  N.W.: New Works
 G.O.P.: Gross operating profit V.A.: Various amortizations
 V.I.: Various inflows B.Y.: Bond yields
 T.N.P.: Total net profit  WCR: Working Capital
   Requirement
 GNWC = Global Net Working Capital NT: Net Treasury
 CFOA = Cash flows from operating activities
Comments: 
1. Entries in bold type bring out the basic points highlighted by the concepts of the Crédit 
Lyonnais or by the French Plan Comptable Général 1982. 
2. Insofar as:
•	 The current financing statement includes variations in long-term external financing, 
which was virtually nonexistent during that era due to the preference for internal 
financing, except in several industrial sectors; the comparison above is totally pos-
sible. Also, the Crédit Lyonnais sometimes “relegated” this external financing to the 
excess working capital; so it was already balanced out. 
•	 Calculated expenditure and products are virtually nonexistent and cash flows from 
operating activities and total net profit tend to be confused. 
3. In France, there is a formula to analyse the financial balance of any company which is:
•	 (Inventories + Accounts receivable) – Accounts payable = Working Capital Require-
ment (WCR).
•	 Treasury in assets – Bank overdrafts = Net Treasury (NT).
•	 (Equity + Long Term Liabilities) – Fixed Assets = Global Net Working Capital 
(GNWC)
 Then: WCR + NT = GNWC.
4. Variations in WCR and in NT are equal to the variation in GNWC; by deducting this 
same variation from GNWC (excluding external financing), with deduction of cash flows 
from operating activities, cash flows logically match up to operating activities. The sole 
purpose of this tautology is to show that the Crédit Lyonnais was handling concepts that 
were very close to ‘ours’ but with very different outcomes – measurement of liquidity and 
of the inflowing income and not calculation of a financial balance based on the excess of 
stable resources (that is liabilities). 
Notes on calculations:
Detail of the calculation: the breakdown is carried out using the “calculation of net profits 
through the SEF method” [Excess Working Capital]”  and the “profit and loss account set 
up according to the SEF method”  from which the net accounting incomes are equal:
: ∆ Excess Working Capital (∆ Ex. W.C.) – Statutory royalties and gratuities + Dividend 
paid out in the financial year (D.P.F.Y.) – Increase in the capital (I.C.) – Sale of fixed assets 
(S.F.A.) + New works carried over as an increase in fixed assets (N.W.F.A.) = Total net profit 
(T.N.P.)
: (Gross) operating profit (G.O.P.) – New Works charged to Expenses (N.W.E.) – Various 
amortizations (V.A.) + Various inflows (V.I.) – Bond yields (B.Y.) – Statutory royalties and 
gratuities = Profits and losses = Total net profit (T.N.P.).
Which enables us to write:
ð ∆ Ex. W.C. + D.P.F.Y. – I.C. – S.F.A. + N.W.F.A. = G.O.P. – N.W.E. + [–V.A. + V.I. – B.Y.]
We may also write:
ð ∆ Ex. W.C. + D.P.F.Y. – I.C. – S.F.A. + N.W.F.A. + N.W.E. = G.O.P. + [–V.A. + V.I. – B.Y.]
ð ∆ Ex. W.C. + [D.P.F.Y. – I.C. – S.F.A. + N.W.]        = G.O.P. + [–V.A. + V.I. – B.Y.]
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Abstract: Reforms to the civil list in the late 18th century in England 
sought to deny the Crown opportunities to use its civil-list funds and 
sinecures to buy influence in Parliament and, thereby, diminish con-
stitutional protections for liberty. Among the most important reforms 
were tighter accounting requirements for civil-list spending, includ-
ing that for the secret services. The unique nature and purpose of the 
home and foreign secret services, which were the responsibility of 
the Crown and paid from civil-service funds, resulted in accounting 
controls which depended upon additional measures to provide Parlia-
ment with greater control over spending and enhanced accountability. 
These enhancements to accountability were especially important at 
a time of almost continual war between England and France in the 
decades spanning the close of the 18th century, resulting in significant 
increases in spending on the foreign secret service.
INTRODUCTION
The history of English public-sector accounting from the 
“Glorious Revolution” in 1688 has been dominated by the need 
to ensure the financial authority of Parliament. In the late 18th 
century, during a remarkable period of public-sector reform, 
the constitutional intent of making the executive financially 
 accountable to Parliament for the expenditure of monies ap-
propriated by Parliament was confirmed as the essential, undi-
minished reason for the unprecedented reforms to government 
accounting associated with the civil list. Binney [1958, p. v] 
has referred to the last two decades of the late 18th century as 
a period of “unique interest and importance” in the history of 
British public finance for this period “witnessed the first draw-
ing back of the curtain concealing from parliamentary and 
public view the design and action of the financial machine.” 
The American War of Independence (1776-1783) and the almost 
continuous war with France from 1792 until 1815 were particu-
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larly important in prompting reform of civil-list accounting and 
audit reforms which provided the basis for subsequent enduring 
reforms in the 19th century. 
Until the financial crisis created by the American War of 
Independence, Parliament took little interest in the civil admin-
istration of the “King’s Executive,” most notably accounts of 
expenditure from the civil list, which provided for the financial 
needs of the monarch, both personal and those of his executive 
government [Chester, 1981, p. 34]. Unlike the civil list, parlia-
mentary control over military spending through a stricter ac-
counting and appropriation regime had been among the most 
important constitutional outcomes of the Glorious Revolution. 
The War of Independence exposed for the first time since then 
the extent to which the Crown used the civil list as a potent form 
of patronage and, thereby, allowed the Crown to threaten liberty 
by extending its influence in the House of Commons. 
In a recent paper, Funnell [2008] has examined the process 
by which widespread apprehension caused by the increasing ar-
rogance of the Crown confirmed the belief at the end of the 18th 
century that there was an intimate dependency between a rigor-
ous, parliamentary-controlled accounting for executive spending 
on the civil list and the preservation of liberties fundamental to 
the English Constitution. Although Funnell’s study provides a 
detailed rendition of the motives for the civil-list reforms and 
the accounting consequences of the reforms for most forms of 
civil-list spending, absent is any mention of the secret services, 
the peculiar purpose of which might have been expected to have 
very different accountability requirements. The main aim of 
the present paper is to meet this omission by highlighting the 
changes to accounting for secret-service funding during the time 
that William Pitt1 was prime minister (1783-1801, 1804-1806) 
which were coincident with the comprehensive reform of the 
civil list that began in the early 1780s and with later ongoing 
hostilities with France. In particular, this paper is concerned 
with a curious, yet understandable, paradox at the time in 
Parliament’s position on accounting for secret-service monies 
when compared with the improved accounting for other civil-list 
spending, resulting in a less rigorous regime of formal account-
ing controls and a greater reliance on professions of honesty. 
1 In this paper, “William Pitt” signifies the British prime minister often re-
ferred to as William Pitt the Younger to distinguish him from his father, William 
Pitt the Elder, also a prominent politician in the 18th century, later known by his 
title as the Earl of Chatham when elevated to the peerage. 
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The overriding need to shield from overt public scrutiny those 
who protected the nation’s interests by engaging in clandestine 
activities, sometimes at the risk of their lives, meant that Parlia-
ment was prepared to treat the secret services as a special case, 
which might permit a very different set of accountability con-
trols and acceptable behaviors. However apposite Parliament’s 
position may have been at the time, rarely has this been without 
its critics. Namier [1963, p. 176], for one, referred to how:
Legends naturally surround all ‘secret service’; its very 
name inspires fear and distrust and stimulates men’s 
imagination – it is believed to be wise and wicked, ef-
ficient and powerful. In reality the most common char-
acteristic of political secret service at all times is its stu-
pidity and the unconscionable waste of money which it 
entails. Where its task is to obtain ‘intelligence,’ it most 
frequently produces tales which could not stand five 
minutes’ cross-examination in a law court.
The present article, which deals with an exceptional period 
in the history of public-sector accounting and accountability 
at the end of the 18th century, is the first in the accounting his-
tory literature to examine the tensions between the peculiar and 
required mode of operation of secret services and the need to 
ensure accountability and transparency for the monies required 
of these services. The growing body of public-sector accounting 
history has been overwhelmingly concerned with accounting 
methods used in central government and audit, notably in times 
of war [for example, see Funnell, 1994; Black, 2001; Edwards et 
al., 2002]. The great freedom allowed the Crown in the spending 
of secret-service funds from the civil list and the absence of an 
effective means to ensure that spending on the domestic and 
foreign secret services would be controlled in total and account-
ed for systematically was a major concern of the promoters of 
the reform of the civil list in the late 18th century. Any spending 
by the Crown allowed to go unchecked represented a potential 
threat to liberty, none more than spending on secret services. 
Indeed, a prominent part of the Civil Establishments Act 1782 
[22 Geo. III, c. 822], the centerpiece of the achievements of the 
economic reform movement championed by Edmund Burke 
2 “An act for enabling his Majesty to discharge the debt contracted upon his 
civil list revenues; and for preventing the same from being in arrear for the future, 
by regulating the mode of payments out of the said revenues, and by suppress-
ing or regulating certain offices herein mentioned, which are now paid out of the 
revenues of the civil list.”
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and the basis of subsequent government accounting reforms 
[see Funnell, 2008], was devoted to innovations that limited total 
spending for some parts of secret-service spending and tightened 
the means by which those directly spending the funds would be 
made accountable. Particularly notable as a form of accounting 
control was the statutory reliance upon the swearing of oaths. 
In the absence of accounts supported by documentary evidence, 
these oaths fulfilled a highly effective, supplementary role in 
the accounting process. While oaths were certainly not a new 
feature of government, or indeed of the administration of law, 
Parliament’s reliance upon them in the context of accounting for 
secret-service spending recognized especially both the necessary 
imperfections of the secret-service accounts and the religious 
imperative in accountability relationships at the time.
In the first section that follows, a brief outline is provided of 
the evolution of modern secret diplomacy and the importance 
of the English secret service in the late 18th century, a time of 
considerable international instability and threat for England. 
The civil-list reforms in the late 18th century are then examined 
to identify the very different approach that was implemented 
for reforming the control of, and accounting for, secret-service 
spending. Most of the details of secret-service spending in the 
18th century that survive, and upon which this research relies, 
are to be found preserved at the British National Archive, Kew, 
in Home Office (H.O.) accounts, Foreign Office (F.O.) accounts, 
Treasury (T) documents, and those from the Audit Office (A.O.). 
THE ORIGINS AND ORGANIZATION OF  
THE ENGLISH SECRET SERVICE
The English secret service in the late 18th century was the 
product of a long period of evolution that owed much to the 
practices of other countries, in particular Italy. From the Italian 
city states during the Renaissance arose the features of intel-
ligence gathering that were to define the modern intelligence 
services throughout Europe. Although the need for information 
about one’s enemies or potential enemies had always been im-
portant in any military success as far back as ancient times, not 
until the 14th and 15th centuries did this intelligence gathering 
reach a sophisticated and truly effective form in the Italian city 
states of Venice and Genoa, a form that was quickly mimicked 
by most other major European states [Thompson and Padover, 
1963]. The Venetians had realized that the best way to create 
and maintain the means to gather reliable information was to 
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establish permanent embassies in neighboring states [Thomp-
son and Padover, 1963, p. 17]. Not until the 16th century did 
England under Henry VIII (1509-1547) follow the Italian exam-
ple and establish permanent embassies in the major European 
states [Bleiweis, 1976, pp. 2-3]. 
Most historians trace the origins of the modern English 
secret service to the reign of Elizabeth I (1558-1603) and her 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Francis Walsingham 
(1534-1590). In 1573, Walsingham was appointed to the power-
ful Privy Council and in this capacity, notes Haynes [1994, p. 
25], contributed “mightily” to the foreign affairs of England. 
Walsingham took office in the late 16th century at a time when 
the major European states were seeking to expand their influ-
ence and territory and, therefore, were prone to conflict. The 
17th century inherited this instability and became a century of 
almost continual wars, commercial and political. 
In response to the considerable international pressures 
during Elizabeth’s reign, Walsingham created, for the times, 
a formidable intelligence network, with intelligence gathered 
mainly from sources in Holland, France, and Germany. Plowden 
[1991, p. 55] believes that so sophisticated and comprehensive 
was Walsingham’s intelligence-gathering network that it is “no 
exaggeration to say that very little went on in Catholic circles … 
during the 1570s and 1580s” that did not come to Walsingham’s 
notice. Ambassadors were for Walsingham the most important 
official source of information, providing reports of court gossip, 
major political events, and official meetings [Bleiweis, 1976, p. 
39]. Unofficial sources were the largest, most diverse but least 
reliable group of “intelligencers,” which included English liv-
ing abroad, soldiers, sailors, businessmen, artists, and students 
[Bleiweis, 1976, pp. 16-18; Haynes, 1994, p. 12]. One 17th cen-
tury contemporary [quoted in Thompson and Padover, 1963, 
p. 60] wrote that diplomats should nurture their spies because 
“Well-chosen spies contribute more than any other agency to the 
success of great plans … And there is no expense better designed 
… than that which is laid out upon a secret service, it would be 
inexcusable for a minister of state to neglect it.”
Despite the historical importance of intelligence gathering 
for state security, not until 1582 did Elizabeth’s “spy master” 
Walsingham have a regular budget. Initially it was set at £750, 
rising to £2,000 in 1588. Still, this was never sufficient for Wal-
singham to meet the need for regular, reliable foreign intelligence 
from mainly Catholic France. Despite his frequent supplications 
for more money, he often had to use his own money to keep his 
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intelligence operations functioning, eventually bankrupting him 
and his family [Plowden, 1991, p. 55; Haynes, 1994, p. 12]. 
Intelligence gathering was later raised to even more so-
phisticated levels under John Thurloe who became Secretary 
of State in 1652 during the dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell. 
Thurloe was convinced that the best agents were those who 
were motivated by money and that the essential requirement of 
an effective intelligence service was “a good purse” [Thompson 
and Padover, 1963, p. 92]. As a dictatorship surrounded by nu-
merous domestic and foreign enemies, often working together, 
an efficient intelligence-gathering system was essential to the 
maintenance of Cromwell’s authority. Thus, Cromwell spent on 
average more than £70,000 a year to garner both domestic and 
foreign intelligence, none of which he formally accounted for. So 
effective were his secret services that Samuel Pepys concluded 
that “Cromwell carried the secrets of all the princes of Europe 
at his girdle” [quoted in Thompson and Padover, 1963, p. 83]. 
Although England was almost continually in a state of prepara-
tion for war in the century that followed the dictatorship and the 
restoration of the monarchy, not until the wars with France did 
England under William Pitt the Younger again fully appreciate 
the benefits of an effective secret service.
As effective and comprehensive as Cromwell’s secret ser-
vices were, the spending on them while Pitt was prime minister 
represented a very different scale of operation and sophistica-
tion. From almost the outbreak of revolution in France in 1789 
until the end of hostilities in 1815, England was either at war 
with France or believed that it needed to be ready for war. In 
addition, when Pitt became prime minister, England had only 
recently lost the American colonies, its hold over India was 
being threatened by widespread administrative abuses, and 
rebellion had been growing in Ireland. When war with France 
did break out in April 1792, Britain quickly established an ex-
tensive, well-funded espionage center in neutral Switzerland to 
coordinate the collection of intelligence under the direction of 
William Wickham. France, Pitt warned England, had directed its 
hostilities “against the very essence of your liberty, against the 
foundation of your independence … against your constitution 
itself” [House of Commons, November 10, 1797, in Pitt, 1806, p. 
172]. So successful was intelligence gathering in the time of Pitt, 
that it is sometimes credited with a critical role in expanding 
and consolidating the British Empire [Thompson and Padover, 
1963, p. 158]. Table 1 below shows that between 1785 and 1792, 
spending on all parts of the secret service increased signifi-
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cantly when England joined with her European allies against the 
French. Annual outlays for the secret service in these years aver-
aged £24,000 [Mitchell, 1965, p. 256]. There was a particularly 
significant rise in foreign-service spending after 1794 as war 
began to envelop Europe. 
TABLE 1
Charges Incurred and Paid for Secret Service Money,  
1775-1798
Year
Sums issued to 
the Secretaries 
of State (mainly 
for foreign-secret 
service)
Sums issued to 
Treasury (mainly 
for home-secret 
service)
Sums issued to 
Post Office (for 
home-secret 
service)
Total
£ £ £ £
1775 11,250 34,000 7,249 52,499
1776 9,000 39,000 6,263 54,263
1777 9,000 57,000 7,139 73,139
1778 9,000 51,000 7,159 67,159
1779 7,250 62,000 7,239 76,489
1780 8,362 37,000 7,139 52,501
1781 6,750 40,000 7,875 54,625
1782 15,225 31,000 3,569 49,794
1783 35,500 8,000 0 43,500
1784 7,006 3,000 0 10,006
1785 31,878 6,000 0 37,878
1786 25,727 96,000 0 121,727
1787 98,050 10,000 0 108,050
1788 212,851 10,000 0 222,851
1789 32,154 10,000 0 42,154
1790 26,221 10,000 0 36,221
1791 22,244 10,000 0 32,244
1792 14,992 10,000 0 24,992
1793 39,585 10,000 0 49,585
1794 49,335 10,000 0 59,335
1795 173,068 10,000 0 183,068
1796 183,194 10,000 0 193,194
1797 223,222 10,000 0 233,222
1798 175,000 10,000 0 185,000
Source: “An Account of the Charges Incurred and Paid for Secret Service Money, 
1774-1798,” House of Commons Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth Century, Vol. 
121, July 4, 1799.
43
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2010, Vol. 37, no. 1 [whole issue]
Published by eGrove, 2010
Accounting Historians Journal, June 201036
 Apart from the continued reliance upon traditional sources 
of information, the Post Office in the 18th century, as Table 1 
demonstrates, was an especially effective means of collecting 
information about domestic and foreign matters until the 1780s, 
when the funding arrangements for secret services changed dra-
matically. The importance of the Post Office as a source of intel-
ligence, both domestic and foreign, was established in 1710 with 
the passage of An Act for establishing a General Post Office for all 
her Majesty’s Dominions [12 Anne c. 10]. The act gave the Post 
Office a monopoly over all movement of mail. There was to be 
only “one General Letter Office and Post Office … erected within 
the City of London, from whence all Letters and Packets … may 
be sent into any Part of the Kingdom … or to North America, 
the West Indies, or to any other of her Majesty’s Dominions …” 
[12 Anne c. 10, Section II]; control was to be absolute. These 
exclusive rights gave the Post Office the ability to monitor al-
most all the mail entering, leaving, and moving around England. 
The act also allowed the Principal Secretaries of State, and only 
them, to delay and open any mail [12 Anne c. 10, Section XL]. 
Irrespective of the source of information, Namier [1963, p. 176] 
regarded all secret-service spending in the early modern period 
as a waste of money. With the primary function of the secret ser-
vice to buy corruption, it was to be expected that it would only 
be successful in purchasing the services of individuals whose 
services were unlikely to be worthwhile. Secret-service spending 
created a “mutual benefit society for pseudo-political parasites” 
with a financial interest in fomenting fear and exaggeration 
[Namier, 1963, p. 176].
The unique nature of the secret service and its growing im-
portance, cost, and sophistication in the 18th century were rec-
ognized when it came time in the closing decades to reform the 
civil list and accounting for civil-list expenditures, with several 
main sections of the Civil Establishments Act concerned exclu-
sively with the secret services. 
REFORM OF THE CIVIL LIST AND THE SECRET SERVICES
Throughout the 18th century, the relationship between 
Parliament and the executive was one of an overdeveloped de-
sire to ensure a separation of their respective powers. Only by 
“destroying the equilibrium of power between one branch of the 
legislature and the rest” would the constitution be threatened 
[Bentham, 1776, p. 73]. Parliament did not want to know how 
the King spent his money from the civil list on the royal house-
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hold or on the civil government; Parliament only wanted to be 
certain that limits were placed on the level of civil-list spending 
[Funnell, 2008]. It was the King’s government and it was ac-
cepted as the King’s constitutional right to govern as he saw fit 
[Chubb, 1952, p. 9; Blackstone in Roseveare, 1969, p. 87]. The 
civil-list funds were therefore accepted as a means of reducing 
any constitutional friction between the Crown and Parliament 
[Cromwell, 1968, p. 5]. The high ideals of the constitution, how-
ever, did not prevent the Crown from regularly attempting to 
influence Parliament through the use of honors and sinecures 
associated with the civil list, which Castlereagh observed were 
“more likely than any others to secure parliamentary influence” 
[quoted in Foord, 1947, p. 499]. 
The cost of the royal household and of departments of state 
was to be met primarily from the Crown’s hereditary sources of 
income. In addition, Parliament granted monarchs additional 
funding at the beginning of their reigns, which constituted the 
civil-list funds. The intention of Parliament was to ensure that 
the Crown had sufficient income to meet all its needs, both the 
personal needs of the sovereign and for carrying out executive 
functions. In return, the Crown was expected to live within its 
income, except during periods of emergency such as wars. The 
reality was somewhat different. Even in the absence of war, 
Parliament was frequently called upon to vote amounts to cover 
large accumulated deficits in the royal budget. However, it was 
war, and the Crown’s indebtedness that war inevitably produced, 
which provided Parliament with unchallengeable opportunities 
to examine the financial affairs of the Crown when additional 
funding from Parliament was sought, none more so in the 18th 
century than the American War of Independence [see Funnell, 
2008]. 
The American War of Independence was a watershed in not 
only refashioning England’s standing as an imperial power but 
also in the changes that it produced in government finances. The 
mounting cost of the war and the Crown’s growing indebtedness 
and influence in Parliament soon raised concerns about the way 
in which the war was being managed, about whether the money 
taken from a small and wealthy elite was being used effectively 
and appropriately. From this spreading discontent arose the 
economical reform movement, popularized by Edmund Burke’s 
speech in the House of Commons on February 11, 1780 [Parlia-
mentary History, XXI, cols. 1-73]. Earlier Burke [Parliamentary 
History XX, December 7, 1779, col. 1,257] had criticized spend-
ing on the war and for domestic purposes as: 
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Lavish and wasteful to a shameful degree. Oeconomy, 
the most rigid and exact oeconomy, has become abso-
lutely necessary … Amidst the many and various mat-
ters that require reformation … before this country can 
rise superior to its powerful enemies; the waste of pub-
lic treasure requires instant remedy … 
While financial concerns most immediately and directly 
created the economical reform movement, these were also 
symptomatic of a more fundamental and far more serious 
worry. The vast sums involved in the war against the American 
colonies allowed the Crown to purchase greater influence in 
Parliament with the granting of profitable, war-related contracts 
and sinecures [Watson, 1960, pp. 232, 247]. According to one 
member of the House of Commons, in no other period of history 
did contracting abuses “flourish in such rank extravagance. At 
no other period were they so detrimental to the public service” 
(observations made in the House of Commons, as quoted in 
[Porritt, 1963, p. 218]). A leader of the economical reform move-
ment, Christopher Wyvill, warned that the war had resulted in 
“the national substance … fast waning away by the profusion 
of expence in this rash and unfortunate war; and the influence 
of the Crown fed by that very prodigality, and increased in full 
proportion to it, is now swollen to a most alarming magnitude” 
[quoted in Harling, 1996, p. 34]. 
Allowing the Crown to buy influence by the granting of 
sinecures undermined the independence of both public officials 
and weakened the constitution [see Burke in Cromwell, 1968, 
p. 6]. The Crown’s influence during the War of Independence, 
observed the pre-eminent constitutional authority William 
Blackstone, had become “most amazingly extensive” [Black-
stone quoted in Foord, 1947, p. 484; Funnell, 2008]. Charles Fox 
referred to this influence of the Crown as the “one grand domes-
tic evil, from which all our other evils, foreign and domestic, 
have sprung. … To the influence of the Crown we must attribute 
the loss of the … thirteen provinces of America …” [quoted in 
Ayling, 1972, p. 287]. Dunning’s resolution in the Commons that 
“the influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing, and 
ought to be diminished” [Parliamentary History XXI, April 6, 
1780, cols. 340-388; Watson, 1960, p. 232; Ayling, 1972, p. 283] 
helped to precipitate the beginning of the end of the more outra-
geous abuses of royal patronage. Deficiencies in accounting for 
civil-list expenditures, including for the secret services, and the 
threat that this posed to liberty also prompted Dunning [Parlia-
mentary History XXI, April 6, 1780, col. 367, also col. 691; see 
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also Foord, 1947, p. 491] to call upon the House:
To examine into and to correct abuses in the expendi-
ture of the civil list revenue. … If the public money was 
faithfully applied and frugally expended, that would re-
duce the influence of the Crown; if, on the other hand, 
the influence of the Crown was restrained within its 
natural and constitutional limits, it would at once more 
restore that power which the constitution had rested in 
that house – the inquiring into and controlling the ex-
penditure of public money … 
Enactment of the remarkably innovative Civil Establish-
ments Act [22 Geo. III, c. 82] in 1782, which owed its existence 
to the commitment, political standing, and brilliance of Edmund 
Burke, provided for the elimination of many sinecures which 
had been used to enhance the Crown’s influence in Parliament 
[see Funnell, 2008]. It also established a more formal regime of 
accounting for civil-list funds, thereby enhancing Parliament’s 
financial authority over the executive. More immediately, it in-
troduced a number of iconoclastic reforms to control the level of 
spending on the secret services and to enhance significantly par-
liamentary surveillance through improved accounting require-
ments centered on the Treasury. 
The highly influential Lord Shelburne believed at the time 
that publicity through better accounting was the only sure way 
to avoid the abuses that now plagued the executive and the civil 
list. He sought to ensure that all matters that involved expendi-
ture should be open to public view, although, significantly, not 
those pertaining to the secret services [Binney, 1958, p. 268]. Ac-
counting for the secret services had always been haphazard and 
at the discretion of the Crown. When upon leaving the Treasury 
in 1766, Lord Rockingham asked how to close the secret-service 
accounts, he was informed by the Duke of Newcastle, one of 
his predecessors, that when he had provided the secret-service 
accounts to George II, “the late King used to burn them in the 
presence of the person who was concerned” [quoted in Namier, 
1963, p. 173]. Only rarely when the Crown sought additional 
funds to meet mounting deficits would Parliament be able to 
see something of what had been spent on the secret services and 
how it had been spent. Accordingly, the secrecy that normally 
surrounded the civil list was to be found in an exaggerated form 
with the accounts for the secret services, which allowed the 
Crown great discretion in the use of money for secret service or 
other purposes, including corrupting Parliament. Use of secret-
service funds to buy influence in Parliament had a long his-
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tory, especially at election time. In one election, cited by Namier 
[1963, p. 203], the not inconsiderable sum of £1,000 was paid 
out of the secret-services money of the civil list to the Duke of 
Argyll and additional monies paid to another 24 candidates. In 
addition, between elections, considerable sums were spent out 
of the secret-service funds to assist the government in gaining 
influence in boroughs.
ACCOUNTING FOR SECRET-SERVICE SPENDING  
AND THE 1782 ACT
Spending Limits: The Civil Establishments Act has been de-
scribed by Reitan [1966, p. 335] as the act that finally ended 
the struggle over the nation’s finances between Parliament and 
the executive. Pitt was later to remind Parliament that it should 
never take for granted its financial authority for “the general 
principle which constituted the chief security of our liberties 
… [was still] the power of controlling the public expenditure” 
[House of Commons, December 8, 1796, in Pitt, 1806]. The 
overriding intentions of the act to give greater publicity to the 
financial affairs of the executive and to control spending on the 
civil list were clearly established in the preamble with the need 
for “introducing a better Order and Oeconomy in the Civil List 
Establishments, and for the better Security of the Liberty and 
Independency of Parliament.” 
Until Burke’s reforms, there was no protocol for determin-
ing the amounts to be spent on the secret services, which were 
organized according to domestic or foreign activities. This 
changed notably in the case of the home secret-service spending 
when, in response to repeated abuses and the absence of reliable 
accounts which permitted these abuses, Burke was able to in-
troduce statutory limits to spending. The 1782 act required “for 
preventing … all Abuses in the Disposal of Monies issued under 
the Head of Secret Service Money” for monies spent “within 
this Kingdom,” that the home secret service, was not to exceed 
£10,000 in any one year [22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section XXIV]. At the 
same time, in an effort to tighten control over the issue of secret-
service monies, the new act no longer allowed the Post Office to 
be a conduit for these monies. This is clearly seen in Table 1 
above where, after 1782, all secret-service funding for the Post 
Office ceased. The Post Office would still remain a very effective 
means of collecting intelligence throughout England and in ob-
taining intelligence by intercepting communications to and from 
foreign representatives in England. 
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Burke made it clear that he did not want to threaten the 
effectiveness of the home secret service but, consistent with the 
main purpose of the act, he did want to limit the total spend-
ing in any one year and deny the Crown any discretion in the 
amounts to be spent. Should the total spent on the home secret 
service need to increase beyond the amount now set by legis-
lation, this would now have to be considered by Parliament 
since any increase in spending required an amendment to the 
controlling legislation. Thus, the total spent on the home secret 
service was to be limited, indeed fixed, and better controlled by 
Parliament. Although it served an important role during periods 
of major social unrest, of which the 1790s are notable, the home 
secret service under Pitt, as before, never assumed any great 
importance. Indeed, there are very few references to agents in 
its employ in extant ministerial papers and other official docu-
ments from the late 18th century. Rarely did its agents work 
full-time in gathering information [Ehrman, 1983, p. 137]. Ac-
cordingly, spending on the home secret service was insignificant 
when compared to that which had for some time been spent on 
the foreign secret service. Spending on the foreign secret ser-
vice, often in states which were potentially and actively enemies 
of England, was also far more difficult to control with certainty, 
especially in times when war threatened to erupt at anytime. 
Where it was not possible easily to limit the level of spend-
ing “by reason of the uncertain quantity of the service,” such 
as in a time of war, Burke’s Act required that any spending for 
the service be confined “to its line”; that is, all spending for the 
service must be accounted for in the one type of appropriation 
and not distributed between votes or types of appropriations 
which would provide the Crown with the opportunity to hide 
spending and to deceive Parliament. He sought to reassure 
Parliament that he did not seek “to stop the progress of expense 
in its line, but to confine it to that line in which it professes to 
move” [Parliamentary History, February 14, 1780]. This had the 
great advantage of allowing Parliament to be certain that, while 
the level of spending may not be within its full control, the ap-
propriation accounts would guarantee that it was aware of the 
extent to which spending had occurred. For this to be effective, 
a more prominent role for the Treasury was required.
The Accounting Role of the Treasury and the Secretary of State: To 
enhance further the control of all secret-service spending and 
accounting, from 1783 on, all secret-service monies would be 
issued only through the Treasury, to whom the person receiving 
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the monies would be accountable and from whom he would 
receive his discharge. No longer would secret-service monies be 
paid out of civil-service monies without the express permission 
of the Commissioners of the Treasury [22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section 
XXVIII]. The Treasury was also required to keep detailed ac-
counts of all parts of the civil-service receipts and spending and 
to strike an annual balance for each element [22 Geo. III, c. 82, 
Section XXXV]. At the head of the Treasury were the five Lords 
Commissioners, with the First Lord specifically authorized to 
pay monies out of the fund provided for secret services [Binney, 
1958, p. 170]. In addition to now controlling all accounting and 
audit for civil-service monies, the Treasury was the authorized 
body to commence any legal actions for the recovery of any 
amounts for which a discharge had not been given. 
Complementing the greatly enhanced role of the Treasury 
in accounting, the 1782 act stipulated that the authority to use 
the money appropriated to the foreign secret service was now to 
be restricted to only three senior public officials who, ultimately, 
would be held accountable to Parliament through the Treasury 
for the monies given into their charge. Accordingly, the 1782 
act required that the payment of any monies from the civil-list 
revenues for the foreign secret service was to be only through 
one of the Principle3 Secretaries of State at the Foreign Office 
and the Home Office or the First Commissioner of the Admiralty 
[22 Geo. III. c. 82, Section XXV]. Thus, for example, the follow-
ing information concerning use of civil-service funds for the 
foreign service was still being sent to the Treasury decades later 
in September 1830: “£432/13/- received by Earl of Aberdeen, 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and spent on Foreign 
Secret Service and for which I am accountable under Civil List 
Act of 22 George III c. 82” [A.O. 119/118]. Each of the newly au-
thorized officials would be charged by the Treasury with secret-
service monies and required to submit accounts to the Treasury 
at predetermined intervals to receive their discharge or quietus. 
Consistent with the wider reform of accounting for civil-service 
spending and, in particular, to provide greater transparency 
and accountability for monies given to senior officials, the Civil 
Establishments Act also prohibited the long-standing practice of 
allowing secret-service monies paid to the Principle Secretaries 
of State to be disguised as part of their salary. Thus, in 1769, for 
example, £3,000 was paid to each of the two Principle Secretar-
ies of State, the Secretary for Home Affairs and the Secretary 
3 “Principle” is the correct historical spelling for the period.
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for Foreign Affairs, from secret-service monies as part of their 
salaries [Namier, 1963, p. 192]. After the 1782 act, secret-service 
monies would now be clearly identified as salary, a fee, or an al-
lowance. 
Most of the money provided through the Treasury to the 
three senior approved officials subsequently would be made 
available to English ambassadors and senior officers in the 
armed services who, in turn, would be charged to account for 
this money to one of the Secretaries of State or the First Com-
missioner of the Admiralty. Previous to the 1782 act, secret-
service monies were given to a number of ministers who would 
dispense the money to their informants or officials, mostly am-
bassadors, as they saw fit. For this money, they neither expected 
nor required any receipts or other documentary evidence to 
verify how the money was spent, only that it was received by the 
ambassador and had been spent for the purposes authorized. 
The greatly enhanced role for the Treasury in accounting for 
secret-service monies required by the 1782 act also extended to 
the audit of the accounts. Audit was put on a more permanent 
and regular footing in 1785 with the creation of five Commis-
sioners for Auditing the Public Accounts and their office, the 
Board of Audit4 [25 Geo. III c. 52], which was placed very firmly 
under Treasury control [see 25,Geo. III, c. 52, sections VIII, XI, 
XIV, XVIII, XIX, XXI]. In particular, the Treasury continued to 
be responsible for executing the commissioners’ oath of office 
[s. IV], appointing audit staff, and for determining all conditions 
associated with their employment [s. V]. The 1785 act marked 
“in the strongest manner the intention of the legislature that 
… [the Board] should be strictly subject to the controls of the 
Treasury” [1810 Committee on Public Expenditure, Fifth Report, 
p. 388]. In practice, the 1810 Committee on Public Expenditure 
[Fifth Report, p. 398] found that this meant that: 
the decision of the Auditors is in no instance final; but 
the Lords of the Treasury exercise complete authority 
with regard to all the articles of an Account … [The] 
special jurisdiction of the Treasury is constantly and 
habitually necessary to the final settlement and passing 
4 The first Board of Audit, appointed on July 5, 1785, consisted of, in addition 
to the five commissioners, two of whom were Controllers of Army Accounts, two 
Inspectors General on £500 per.annum, and 16 clerks earning between £80 and 
£300 per annum. By September 1785, an extra seven junior clerks, a solicitor, 
an office keeper and two messengers had been appointed. The office was further 
expanded in 1787 and remained at a total complement of 43 until into the 19th 
century [Establishment Rolls, Board of Audit 1785-1799, National Audit Office].
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of the greater part of the Public Accounts which are ex-
amined by the Commissioners of Audit. 
In another attempt to promote the wise management of in-
dividual civil-list revenues and to ensure that the necessary ser-
vices would be provided without the Crown accumulating debts 
which at regular intervals had required Parliament to grant ad-
ditional funding, the 1782 act placed a limit of £900,000 on the 
civil list. Very controversially, the act also provided for payments 
to be made in a prescribed, unvarying order from the eight 
classes specified for the appropriation of civil-list revenues. The 
latter condition was intended in particular to reduce discretion 
in how secret-service monies were spent. Where discretion by an 
official of the Crown was able to be exercised over the civil-list 
money appropriated by Parliament, Burke sought a new “plan of 
arrangement” to prevent this discretion being abused. In Burke’s 
view, it was not “safe to permit an entirely arbitrary discretion 
even in the First Lord of the Treasury himself; it will not be safe 
to leave with him a power of diverting the public money from 
its proper objects, of paying it in an irregular course…” [Par-
liamentary History, February 14, 1780]. Removing the ability of 
the Crown to choose how to spend secret-service monies would 
enhance the ability of Parliament to make the executive account-
able by establishing in the act “a fixed and invariable order in all 
… payments, which it shall not be permitted to the First Lord 
of the Treasury, upon any pretence whatsoever, to depart from” 
[22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section XXIV]. Only when the costs of each 
higher-ranked service had been fully provided for could the next 
class of expenditures be paid. 
Not surprisingly, the first priority of payments from the civil 
list was the pensions and allowances of the royal family. This 
was followed in the second class by payments for allowances 
and pensions of senior government and parliamentary officials, 
such as the Speaker of the House of Commons, and judges. 
Payments to England’s ambassadors and foreign consuls, which 
included secret service payments, formed the third class in the 
civil list. Cleverly, to encourage Commissioners of the Treasury 
and the Chancellor of the Exchequer to take seriously their 
new responsibilities for the civil list, their salaries and other 
remuneration were provided for in the eighth and final class [22 
Geo. III, c. 82, Section XXXI]. Thus, not until all other demands 
on the civil list had been met, would these officials receive any 
payments. In 1786, with a total of £900,000 now fixed for civil-
service spending and when spending for the first seven classes 
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of civil spending totaled £897,000, there was only £3,000 left 
available for the Commissioners of the Treasury. Outcomes such 
as this, notes Watson [1960, p. 248], made it very unlikely that 
corruption and bribery by the Crown would be allowed to occur 
on any appreciable scale and, at the same time, encouraged a 
much more closely policed accounting regime. In addition, the 
act prohibited any amounts unpaid to the Commissioners of the 
Treasury being treated as arrears, providing another powerful 
incentive to watch spending closely [22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section 
XXXII; Binney, 1958, p. 271]. Should any amount be unpaid, the 
arrear “shall be wholly lapsed and extinguished, as if the same 
had not been payable” [22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section XXXIII]. Ac-
counts of spending in the order prescribed were to be kept by 
the Treasury and made available to both Houses of Parliament 
when required [22 Geo. III, c. 82, Section XXXV]. 
Oaths and Accounting for a Quietus: While clear lines of account-
ability for secret-service monies were established by the 1782 
act, when it came to accounting for these after funds had left 
the hands of the Secretaries of State and were given to agents 
in the field, a very different set of accounting practices prevailed 
to that required for all other parts of the civil list, thereby rec-
ognizing the peculiar nature of secret-service expenditure. The 
juxtaposition of secrecy and access to large sums of money 
with few formal accountability controls over agents in the field 
of service recognized that accounting for secret-service spend-
ing on the frontline was expected to be very different from that 
of other civil-list spending. Certainly it was unlikely, given the 
nature of the process of gathering information from individuals 
who would wish that their identities remain known only to their 
immediate contacts, that there was the opportunity to obtain 
detailed receipts for expenditures in a similar manner to that of 
other government services. Burke recognized that the fluidity 
and unpredictability of international politics, hence the need for 
intelligence gathering and the need to keep secret the identities 
of those gathering intelligence for England, meant that a very 
different way of exercising accountability and of obtaining ac-
counts was required. 
Ambassadors, consuls, or commissioners representing Eng-
land in another country, or any commander-in-chief or other 
senior commander of the navy or land forces receiving secret-
service monies from the Secretaries of State, would be expected 
to provide receipts for the money received, although these were 
in aggregate only. Unlike the more stringent accounting require-
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ments now required for all other civil-list monies, these receipts 
were required to state only that the money had been received 
for the “purpose for which the same hath been issued” [22 Geo. 
III, c. 82, Section XXV]. The Secretaries of State and the First 
Commissioner of the Admiralty would receive their discharge or 
quietus from the Treasury once the necessary receipts had been 
received and given to the Treasury. Crucially, they had to swear 
an oath in person before the Barons of the Treasury, testifying 
to the veracity of the accounts based upon these receipts. These 
receipts from ambassadors and others had to be provided to 
the Exchequer within three years of the money being issued 
to obtain a quietus. The receipts for monies received from the 
Secretaries of State and the First Commissioner of the Admi-
ralty which formed the basis upon which a charge was created 
against officials in foreign postings, were sufficient, once the 
handwriting had been verified, to “acquit and discharge the 
said Secretary or Secretaries, or First Commissioner of the Ad-
miralty, in their said Account at the Exchequer” [22 Geo. III, c. 
82, Section XXV]. The accounts for secret-service monies, with 
receipts for spending, now required to be submitted by Secretar-
ies of State to the Treasury, and thence to the Audit Office, were 
in the form of the traditional charge-and-discharge accounts. In 
Figure 1 below, the account and the oath which accompanies 
it is typical of foreign secret-service accounts provided after 
Burke’s Act in 1782 and after refinements contained in 45 Geo. 
III, c. 76 in 1805.
Should it be necessary for the Secretaries of State or the 
First Commissioner of the Admiralty to use money issued for 
foreign secret service for domestic purposes, an acquittance 
would be granted if they swore the following oath [22 Geo. III, c. 
82, Section XXVII] before the Barons of the Exchequer:
I A.B. do swear, That the Money paid to me for Foreign 
Secret Service, or for Secret Service in detecting, pre-
venting, or defeating, treasonable, or other dangerous 
Conspiracies against the State…, has been bona fide, ap-
plied to the said Purpose or Purposes, and to no other: 
and that it hath not appeared to me convenient to the 
State that the same should be paid Abroad. So help me 
GOD. 
In 1805, soon after the union of Britain and Ireland, a 
similar provision was included in civil-list legislation for secret-
service payments by Commissioners of the Lord High Treasurer 
in Ireland to the Under Secretary for Civil Affairs in the Office 
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of the Chief Secretary. To enhance parliamentary control over 
secret-service payments for rebellious Ireland in “detecting, pre-
venting or defeating treasonable or other dangerous Conspira-
cies against the State,” an acquittance was to be granted for the 
Under Secretary who had been given the secret-service money 
after making an oath very similar to that required of officials in 
England. Unusually, and recognizing the fraught conditions in 
Ireland, receipts or other documentation were not required, only 
that the Under Secretary affirmed by oath before the Barons of 
the Exchequer in Ireland that the money given to him had been 
“bona fide applied to such Purposes” as approved and that the 
spending of the money for these purposes had been approved 
[45 Geo III, c. 76].
For the officials, most often an ambassador, who had paid 
foreign agents, for which documentary evidence would have 
been most unusual, a quietus would be given if within one year 
of arriving back in England, they either returned any money 
FIGURE 1
General Account of the Monies issued and received  
by the Right Honourable Earl Bathurst, late His Majesty’s 
Principle Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, under the 
Head of Secret Service from 1st November 1809 to the 14 
March 1810
Charge Discharge
£ £
By Balance received 
from the Right 
Honourable George 
Canning
397.19.4 Expended by William 
Hamilton as per receipt
24,067.9.3
By Exchequer Issues 
during said period
30,000.0.0 To Foreign Ministers 168.5.8
To pay the fees thereon 768.10.0 Deducted at the 
Treasury and Exchequer 
for Fees
768.10.0
Balance transferred 
to M. Willerby as per 
Receipt
6162.4.5
£31,166.9.4 £31,166.9.4
“The Right Honourable Earl Bathurst, this Accountant maketh oath that the 
above Accounts to the best of his knowledge and belief are true and just” (25 June 
1812).
Source: A.O. 3/949
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received to the Exchequer or made the following oath [also see 
A.O. 19/118] before the Barons of the Exchequer: 
I A.B. do swear, That I have disbursed the Money, in-
structed to me for Foreign Secret Service, faithfully, 
according to the Intent and Purpose for which it was 
given, according to my best Judgment, for his Majesty’s 
Service, So help me GOD. 
No further documentation was required. The discharge was 
given by the Treasury through the Upper Exchequer, or Exche-
quer of Accounts, which had the authority to summon before 
it most officials who performed the role of public accountant; 
that is, the individual held accountable by Parliament for money 
spent by the executive. The Upper Exchequer also recorded the 
details of the accounts of the public accountants. Once the qui-
etus had been given by the Upper Exchequer, this was the final 
authority. No matters could again be raised in relation to the 
accounts and monies nor could they be challenged by the courts 
[Binney, 1958, p. 189]. 
In most cases when no documentation was provided by 
the sources of intelligence who ultimately received the secret-
service monies, whether full-time spies or unofficial agents for 
whom anonymity may have been a matter of life and death, the 
oaths required of accountable officers associated with the secret 
services assumed great importance. The oath in effect at times 
substituted for the documentary evidence which was required 
when accounting for other civil-list spending and mirrored 
oath taking in the courts and elsewhere. The oath that accom-
panied the accounts fulfilled an important auxiliary role in the 
accounting process by providing Parliament and the Treasury 
with an additional assurance that the accounts were a “true 
and just” rendition of how the secret-service money had been 
used. The practice of taking an oath to attest to the veracity of 
accounts and the fidelity of actions was very widespread, to be 
found wherever an account of any significance was to be given. 
Indeed, swearing an oath and relying upon the integrity of the 
authorized officials was an essential accounting control. Thus, 
inspectors of accounts working on behalf of the Board of Audit 
also were required to take an oath [Commissioners for Auditing 
the Public Accounts, 1786]:
...not to permit, suffer, or conceal, any fraud whatsoever 
in any accounts intrusted to your care. In all Accounts...
you shall see that they are carefully and faithfully exam-
ined, drawn, and prepared for Auditing; giving therein 
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to no Accountant any allowance but such as shall be 
duly and regularly vouched and allowable according to 
the custom, method, and rules of the Exchequer. 
The influential Lord Shelburne in the late 18th century 
was far less convinced of the efficacy of oaths as an accounting 
control, preferring instead the rendering of accounts in a public 
 forum, with the one notable exception of secret-service accounts. 
He observed [quoted in Binney, 1958, p.269] that he had:
...found by experience that this is the grand principle of 
economy and the only method of preventing abuses; far 
better than oaths or any other checks which have been 
devised. Instead, therefore, of oaths there should be an 
obligation to print at the end of the year every expendi-
ture and every contract, except in cases of Secret Ser-
vice, which may be subject to checks of another nature.
Unlike the present, an oath had far greater social signifi-
cance in the 18th century. The right to take an oath was both a 
mark of social position and provided a clear indication of the 
legal status of the matter for which the oath was made. Also, as 
much as the legal importance of the oath and its role as an ad-
ministrative device, the ritual of taking an oath impressed upon 
persons the importance of what they were about to do. Most 
obviously taking an oath in court, in a form which has some 
religious significance, when giving evidence has long been the 
means by which courts are able to impress upon those involved 
the importance of their actions and statements; indeed, their 
very life might be in danger for a false declaration [Binney, 1958, 
p. 269]. In the 18th century, a time when everyone was expected 
to have a strong religious belief, the ritual of the taking an oath 
was in effect a solemn appeal to God testifying to one’s truthful-
ness, which symbolized the expectation that any lies would not 
escape unpunished for to swear a false oath was to imperil one’s 
soul. 
CONCLUSION
Given that the overriding concern of the civil-list reforms af-
ter 1782 was to protect the liberties of all Englishmen, any part 
of government which was allowed to continue to operate with a 
high level of secrecy and, thus, was a potentially potent means 
to threaten liberty was especially important. Even though pro-
found accounting and accountability changes were made to the 
civil list after 1782, notably the appointment of commissioners 
for auditing the public accounts, the treatment of secret-service 
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spending in the Civil Establishments Act recognized that these 
reforms had their limits when it came to clandestine operations 
for which the giving of formal accounts for monies spent may 
be incommensurate with the clandestine nature of the services 
performed. The considerable opportunity that this allowed for 
abuse in the spending of secret-service funds did not escape the 
attention of Burke. Thus, the 1782 act contained a number of 
significant clauses which were concerned with the amounts to 
be spent on the secret services and, as a means to ensure that ac-
countable individuals could be clearly identified, the procedure 
by which the money would be spent and accounted for. The pro-
visions of the act that were related to the secret services sought 
to compensate for the unavoidable paucity of secret-service ac-
counts by limiting the authority for secret-service spending to a 
very few senior offices and relying upon their integrity. 
The concerns of this article have been limited to a period 
of time when the beginnings of modern systems of financial 
accountability for governments were established and were be-
ginning to be more fully appreciated. Thus, the article provides 
the opportunity to prompt accounting historians to examine the 
subsequent evolution from the early 19th century of accounting 
for the secret services in Britain and other democratic states, 
although recognizing the obvious significant impediments that 
may be present to gaining access to information. These difficul-
ties in and of themselves would prove the value of attempts to 
investigate whether and how secret services have been made 
accountable, but especially in the most chaotic and extreme 
political circumstances such as war when there is a well-
 demonstrated tendency for governments to become dangerously 
arrogant and the protections that mechanisms of financial ac-
countability have provided for individual citizens are shown to 
be insufficient. The surprising, ongoing silence in the literature 
about the accountability of the secret services contradicts their 
significance in times of war or other national military emergen-
ces, such as the 21st century “war against terror” by the U.S. and 
its allies, but especially the threat that abuses by insufficiently 
accountable secret services can have for the liberty of citizens 
in democratic states. The potency of this threat and the alac-
rity with which governments may be tempted to jeopardize the 
liberty of individuals, either for reasons of political self-interest 
or supposedly in the national interest, have been exposed many 
times throughout the war-ravaged 20th century and now into 
the 21st century. An enhanced understanding of accounting for 
secret services would also complement the work by researchers 
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such as Chwastiak [1999, 2001, 2006] and Gallhofer and Haslam 
[1991], who have exposed the importance of accounting in jus-
tifying war, providing opportunities for the military industrial 
complexes in states such as the U.S. and Britain to gain extrava-
gant financial benefits from war and in excusing the excesses of 
war.
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FINANCIAL REPORTING IN 1920:
THE CASE OF INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES
Abstract: This study uses the 1920 Moody’s Analysis of Industrial 
Investments to assess the extent of financial reporting by U.S. indus-
trial companies. The reporting of an income statement and a balance 
sheet, as well as the amount of disclosure in both of these statements, 
is examined empirically to determine which economic factors influ-
ence this reporting. The results show that corporate-governance, op-
erating, and financing factors all significantly influence the reporting 
of financial statements and the extent of disclosure within those state-
ments. However, the significant factors vary across the two financial 
statements and the two decisions considered (reporting a particular 
statement and the amount of disclosure within the statement to re-
port). All factors are shown to influence significantly the decision to 
report both a balance sheet and an income statement and the amount 
of information to report in a balance sheet. The decision regarding 
the amount of information to report in an  income statement is only 
influenced by corporate-governance and operating factors.
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the formation of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) and accounting standard-setting bodies, financial 
reporting for U.S. industrial companies was not regulated at 
the federal level. Companies were free to choose their own re-
porting policies. Financial reporting focused primarily on the 
balance sheet [Kittredge, 1901; Sprague, 1901; Gilman, 1939; 
Skinner, 1987; Kendig, 1993]. However, a number of companies 
did report income statements although few details of income 
components were included [Lee, 1979; Morris, 1984; Baldwin 
et al., 1992]. This study will examine empirically the factors 
Acknowledgments: We thank the editor and reviewers for their helpful com-
ments. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Business History Con-
ference and the International Academy of Business and Public Administration 
Disciplines Conference. We benefited from helpful comments by participants. Any 
errors remain our own.
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that influenced these companies to disclose financial statements 
voluntarily and the amount of disclosure contained within those 
statements.
Coombs and Edwards [1995] developed a model for disclo-
sure as a function of the market for disclosure and regulation. 
This market included investor demand for information for deci-
sion making and firms supplying disclosure to attract capital. 
The role of regulation in this model is to ensure that the supply 
of disclosure does not fall short of demand. The authors note 
that regulation has taken on an increasing role during the 20th 
century. This model, then, recognizes the need for regulation to 
ensure adequate disclosure.
Bartlett and Jones [1997] examine motivations for voluntary 
disclosure in an environment where securities regulation exists. 
The paper concludes that the amount of voluntary disclosure is 
primarily attributable to the philosophy of the chairman of the 
Board of Directors (BD) and the chief financial officer (CFO). 
They found the main reasons to provide voluntary disclosure 
were to meet social pressure, to demonstrate responses to social 
pressure to prevent regulation, and to manage the corporate im-
age. These same motivations for voluntary disclosure may also 
exist in an era prior to securities regulation.
Merino and Neimark [1982] report that, in the late 19th 
century, U.S. businesses promised more voluntary disclosure to 
reduce the lack of competition and centralization of economic 
power when faced with political threats. This increase in vol-
untary disclosure was not adequate, and federal legislation was 
proposed annually from 1903-1914 and occasionally from 1919-
1930. The increase in voluntary disclosure that did occur was a 
response to social pressure to prevent regulation. 
Prior to 1897, most industrial securities were traded 
through the use of trust certificates.1 After 1897, stock in indi-
vidual companies was marketed but issued through promoters 
who gave shareholders confidence in the quality of the invest-
ment. (The promoters often were selling watered securities of 
little value, but the public was unaware and had faith in the 
promoters.) By 1902, shares of industrials were regularly traded 
on exchanges [Navin and Sears, 1955] which required investors 
1 Trust certificates represented ownership in a trust. The trust itself owned the 
corporations. These trusts were put together by financiers who chose the com-
panies to include in the trust, making ownership in a trust seem less risky than 
buying individual stock. Ownership in a trust certificate then would be similar to 
buying shares today in Berkshire Hathaway because of Warren Buffett’s proven 
expertise in picking investments.
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to perform their own analyses of companies or to rely on rating 
agencies for investment advice.
Therefore, during the early 20th century, the demand for 
public financial information came from investors. This market 
required a plentiful supply of securities, expert advice from 
investment intermediaries, and useful financial information 
[Bryer, 1993]. The first two of these requirements existed by 
1920. However, the existence of useful financial information was 
a debated issue. 
Michael [1996] reports investor dissatisfaction with disclo-
sure in the U.S. as early as 1900. Kohler [1926] expresses dis-
satisfaction with published financial information for analysis. 
This paper indicates that less than 20% of balance sheets could 
be considered useful for analysis. Senatra and Frishkoff [1984] 
echo the same concerns. While using reports from 1925, they 
could not perform adequate financial-statement analysis given 
incomplete income-statement information. Couchman [1928] 
criticizes the balance sheet only reporting model of the day for 
not showing users where an organization is going. This paper 
concludes that a statement that shows the results of operations 
is necessary to assess the investment potential of a company. 
Edwards [1989a] notes that the criticisms of accounting in 
the U.K. in 1920-1930 were excessive summarization, failure to 
prepare consolidated statements, failure to publish a profit-and-
loss account, and excessive use of secret reserves. Many of these 
same deficiencies existed in U.S. reporting as the British model 
was closely followed. The first three of these criticisms relate to 
financial-statement disclosure.
These papers indicate that there was social pressure during 
the years around 1920 to promote voluntary disclosure by com-
panies. Merino and Neimark [1982] also note the existence of 
threatened regulatory action. Further, Hawkins [1963] indicates 
that between 1920 and 1927, the Investment Bankers Associa-
tion of America sought, through voluntary actions, to standard-
ize the information regarding industrial securities presented to 
the public and called for both a balance sheet and an income 
statement, again providing evidence that companies of the day 
were considering these social pressures in their disclosure deci-
sions. 
Taken together, this literature shows that the 1920 era 
was a time when social pressure for increased disclosure and 
threatened legislative or regulatory action were present in both 
the U.S. and the U.K. This situation created an environment 
in which both the models proposed by Coombs and Edwards 
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[1995] and Bartlett and Jones [1997] would suggest that com-
panies would logically react by increasing voluntary disclosure. 
Yet, the empirical reality is that many companies continued to 
provide minimal financial-statement disclosure. Other com-
panies did seem to respond to the calls for increased disclosure 
and put out considerable amounts of information. As a result, 
the supply of financial information was very company specific 
and primarily relates to the philosophy of the BD chairman and 
the CFO as posited by Bartlett and Jones [1997]. Merino et al. 
[1994] provide some era-specific evidence by discussing the dif-
ferences in reporting style and the use of audits by companies 
controlled by J.P. Morgan and John D. Rockefeller. Perhaps other 
economic factors in the operating environment of the company 
may have influenced the decision of these policy makers within 
the company to choose a particular level of disclosure.
What motivated a company to issue financial statements 
during this era of voluntary disclosure? By becoming aware of 
the economic factors in the operating environment of firms that 
voluntarily disclosed financial information, the development of 
financial reporting in the U.S., as well as the need for and effect 
of accounting regulation, can be increasingly understood.
Barton and Waymire [2004] assert that the quality of finan-
cial reporting is a function of information costs in securities 
markets, contracting and control conflicts among stake holders, 
competitive and political costs, and available alternative in-
formation. For firms traded on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) in 1929, the results indicate that the quality of financial 
disclosure increased if the firm operated in a technology-based 
industry, had recently issued common equity, or was highly 
levered. The quality of financial disclosure decreased with the 
age of the firm, if the firm issued dividends, or if the firm was 
regulated. The study concludes that the quality of financial dis-
closure increases with economic incentives to provide informa-
tion to investors.
Archambault and Archambault [2005] find that regu-
lated utilities typically reported income statements in the 1915 
Moody’s Analyses of Investments (Moody’s). They also report that 
industrial companies that are listed on a stock exchange were 
more likely to issue both income statements and balance sheets 
than were unlisted companies. The conclusion of that study was 
that regulation, either externally imposed as in the case of rail-
roads and utilities or self-imposed as in the case of listed compa-
nies, increased disclosure. That study focused on the regulatory 
component of Coombs and Edwards’ [1995] disclosure model.
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The current study uses a similar approach and data set as 
Archambault and Archambault [2005], but examines a different 
issue. The focus of the current paper is on the motivations for 
companies to disclose information voluntarily. Industrial com-
panies are chosen as the sample because the companies did not 
have any external regulatory pressure for disclosure. Therefore, 
this study seeks to develop a more complete understanding of the 
motivation to report financial information for industrial firms, 
focusing on the supply of disclosure component in the Coombs 
and Edwards disclosure model. To examine this issue, the paper 
will concentrate on various economic factors faced by companies 
in their operating environment to determine if these factors help 
explain the variation in disclosure during this time period.
This study utilizes a sample of 200 industrial firms ran-
domly selected from the 1920 Moody’s. This sample represents 
an earlier stage of financial reporting in the U.S. than that 
studied by Barton and Waymire [2004]. In addition, this study 
includes listed and unlisted firms, which is a broader, more gen-
eralized sample than firms listed on the NYSE only. The current 
paper focuses on incentives to disclose a balance sheet and/or 
an income statement. Barton and Waymire [2004] concentrated 
primarily on overall financial-reporting quality but did report 
weak results in explaining balance-sheet transparency. Thus, this 
study extends our knowledge of influences on financial reporting 
in the early 20th century by extending the time period back and 
by broadening the types of firms examined.
The factors considered in this investigation are corporate-
governance, operating, and financing factors. Both the decision 
to report a statement, either the income statement or the bal-
ance sheet, and the extent of disclosures within the statements 
will be examined.
Developing a better understanding of what disclosure oc-
curred and the influential economic factors leading companies 
to choose more extensive disclosure will help us understand 
the historical development of accounting and the role regula-
tion plays in ensuring full disclosure. The efficient operation of 
capital markets relies on sufficient disclosure to prevent finan-
cial manipulation, to provide investors with enough financial 
information to make resource-allocation decisions, and to allow 
equal access to important information [Benston, 1973]. The re-
sults indicate that there were a number of important factors that 
influenced disclosure. However, the results also indicate that 
some companies did not experience the economic circumstances 
that promote voluntary statement disclosures. 
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Income-statement reporting is shown to be positively as-
sociated with corporate-governance, operating, and financing 
factors. Companies that seek broader ownership by having 
shares traded on an organized exchange, companies that have 
increased complexity in terms of international operations and 
larger size, and those that met capital needs by issuing debt or 
equity securities in the past three years or have their equity secu-
rities rated by Moody’s are more likely to issue an income state-
ment. Companies with an insider-focused, corporate- governance 
structure as measured by the portion of the BD that are officers 
are less likely to issue an income statement. Companies with 
high debt-to-asset ratios were also found to be less likely to issue 
income statements.
Balance sheets are more likely to be issued by companies 
seeking broader ownership by trading common shares on an or-
ganized exchange, having complex operations with international 
activity, and issuing additional capital (both debt and equity) 
within the last three years. Financing factors were also shown 
to reduce the likelihood of issuing a balance sheet. Companies 
with rated bonds were negatively associated with balance-sheet 
issuance. 
The amount of disclosure was shown to be positively re-
lated to having traded shares and operating factors of increased 
complexity and size. Total disclosure was negatively influenced 
by insider-focused corporate governance. The extent of balance-
sheet disclosure showed similar results. Additional positive 
influences for balance-sheet disclosure are having bond and eq-
uity ratings and having higher return on assets. The amount of 
income-statement disclosure was associated positively only with 
the complexity of operations and negatively with the lack of an 
independent BD and company age. 
By finding a number of economic factors associated with 
voluntary statement reporting, the paper provides a link to the 
supply of voluntary financial-statement information beyond 
corporate-governance philosophy as documented in Bartlett and 
Jones [1997]. However, the paper also finds that, consistent with 
the Coombs and Edwards’ [1995] model of disclosure and regu-
lation, not all firms possess the economic circumstances that are 
associated with increased voluntary financial reporting. 
The next section of the paper discusses the literature and 
develops hypotheses concerning the relationship between vari-
ous firm characteristics and disclosure levels. This is followed 
by a section that will discuss the data and methodology used to 
determine which economic factors are significantly associated 
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with disclosure levels. The results of those tests are then ana-
lyzed. The last section provides a summary and conclusion.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Separation of ownership and management is thought to cre-
ate a need for financial disclosure [Berle and Means, 1968]. Fi-
nancial reporting did not exist before corporations and financial 
markets [Parker, 1986]. Therefore, growth in the corporate form 
of business created a demand for financial-statement disclosure. 
A market in industrial corporations formed by 1902 [Navin and 
Sears, 1955]. Hawkins [1963] reports that the sources of change 
in financial-statement reporting were the public responsibility 
of managers, the criticism of financial reporting, government 
regulation, and development of generally accepted accounting 
principles. These sources are all related to the business environ-
ment. As noted earlier, these social pressures can give rise to 
an increased demand for financial-statement disclosure. How-
ever, companies determine the supply within the constraints 
of government regulation. A number of economic factors in 
the operating environment of a company may influence the 
corporate-governance team of a company regarding the amount 
of financial information it decides to supply. Table 1 presents the 
factors that will be considered in this study and their expected 
effect on the financial statements. 
TABLE 1
Hypothesized Factors Influencing Financial Disclosure
Hypothesis Construct
Balance Sheet 
Effect
Income Statement 
Effect
Corporate-Governance Factors:
H1 Listing Status + +
H2 Board Control - -
H3 State of Incorporation + +
Operating Factors:
H4 Complexity + +
H5 Longevity - -
H6 Profitability +
H7 Size + +
Financing Factors:
H8 Securities Rating + +
H9 Securities Issuance + +
H10 Leverage + +
H11 Dividends + +
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Corporate-Governance Factors: When a new firm comes into 
 being, choices exist regarding its form of organization. Since 
all of the companies in this study are corporations, a demand 
is created for financial information. The amount of disclosure 
demanded by an owner increases as the owner becomes further 
removed from the operations of the corporation. This dispersion 
of ownership is another choice a company faces. A company 
that remains closely held by a few dominant shareholders could 
supply fewer disclosures than a widely held corporation with 
thousands of shareholders. One of the easiest ways to achieve 
dispersed ownership is to list the company’s shares on an orga-
nized exchange. This listing comes with a set of requirements 
that must be met to receive the privilege of listing. These require-
ments exist, in part, to provide investors with the information 
they need to make informed investment decisions. Thus, a cor-
poration, in choosing to list on an exchange, is voluntarily choos-
ing to supply more financial disclosure. The increased disclosure 
may be required by the exchange or may be volunteered by the 
corporation to attract investors. This study will use the listing 
status of a company to proxy for the economic circumstance of 
increased ownership dispersion. As an example of the imposed 
disclosure requirements of organized exchanges, the NYSE re-
quired in 1900 newly listed companies to issue an annual report 
disclosing a balance sheet and income statement, to hold an an-
nual meeting, and to distribute proxy statements [Gross, 2002]. 
The literature also supports the relationship between increased 
disclosure and listing status. Archambault and Archambault 
[2005] report that pre-regulation firms listed on stock exchanges 
were more likely to disclose an income statement and a balance 
sheet. Singhvi and Desai [1971] found increased disclosure for 
firms trading on public exchanges relative to those traded over-
the-counter. Therefore, firms that desire increased ownership 
dispersion by listing shares on an organized exchange are ex-
pected to have more financial-statement disclosure. 
H1: Firms that trade on an organized exchange are 
more likely to issue financial statements and will pro-
vide more disclosure within those statements.
Another economic factor that may influence disclosure 
choices is the composition of the BD. The BD is the sharehold-
ers’ representative and is to make decisions about the company’s 
operations. Because the composition and philosophy of the BD 
varies widely among companies, its composition will be used as 
a variable to test one aspect of governance.
68
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 37 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/9
61Archambault and Archambault, 1920s Financial Reporting
Management-controlled firms may be in a better position to 
limit disclosure costs by practicing the “British Secretive Model” 
with minimal disclosure and a balance-sheet focus [Michael, 
1996]. Bryer [1993] notes that in the early 20th century, the BD 
in British companies regularly limited public disclosure but pro-
vided auditors and shareholders with internal information be-
yond the published financial statements. Guy and Leung [2004] 
report that firms with a CEO also serving as the BD chairperson 
have less voluntary disclosure. Disclosure decreases with in-
creased managerial ownership [Eng and Mak, 2003]. This prob-
ably also occurs because managers have access to additional 
information and owner-managers have an incentive to keep that 
information private so that they can be the ones to earn higher 
returns on that insider knowledge. Firms with a more indepen-
dent BD membership have smaller abnormal accruals [Klein, 
2002]. Firms with outside BD members are more likely to issue 
earnings forecasts [Ajinka et al., 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 
2005].
The literature, then, indicates that including more outsiders 
on the BD increases the amount of external disclosure. This can 
result from a reduced management incentive to act on insider 
information and a stronger external-shareholder focus result-
ing from more independent BD members. These findings are all 
consistent with the expectation that, as the number of officers 
on the BD increases, the reporting of income statements and 
balance sheets should decrease.
H2: Firms with a higher proportion of officers on the 
BD are less likely to issue financial statements and will 
provide less disclosure within those statements.
Another factor influencing the governance of the corpora-
tion is the set of laws that govern its existence. A corporation is 
a citizen of the state in which it seeks incorporation. This state 
is chosen by the BD. Most companies incorporate in the state 
where it is headquartered, but some choose another state when 
the BD seeks a set of laws (governance restrictions) that better 
suit the corporation’s needs. 
New Jersey enacted corporation laws during the late 1800s 
that attracted a large number of firms from other states [Stoke, 
1930]. Delaware and several other states enacted similar laws 
in the early 1900s before World War I [Grandy, 1989]. States 
competed against each other by offering lower tax rates and 
more liberal laws. Dodd and Leftwich [1980] compare two ex-
planations for firms changing their state of incorporation – the 
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s tockholder-exploitation hypothesis asserts that firms change 
in order to extract wealth from the stockholders, and the cost-
avoidance hypothesis stresses that the change enables the firm 
to minimize the cost of production, investment, and financing 
activities. This paper reports positive abnormal returns before 
and around the announcement of the change in venue of in-
corporation and concludes that the results do not support the 
stockholder-exploitation hypothesis. Jagannathan and Pritchard 
[2008] find that Delaware corporations have higher-quality di-
rectors and CEOs. Barton and Waymire [2004] predict that firms 
incorporated in Delaware will provide higher-quality financial 
reporting due to a more intensive monitoring by shareholders. 
However, they find an insignificant effect on reporting. Since 
Delaware and New Jersey were leaders in enacting laws with 
the purpose of attracting incorporations, this study will test cor-
porate governance by grouping companies incorporated there 
separately from those incorporating in other states.
H3: Firms that choose to incorporate in Delaware and 
New Jersey are more likely to issue financial statements 
and will provide more disclosure within those state-
ments.
Operating Factors: While all companies in the sample are indus-
trial companies, other operating factors besides industry could 
create economic circumstances that would lead to differences 
in the financial-statement disclosures a particular company will 
make. The operating factors considered in this study are com-
plexity of operations (firms with subsidiaries and international 
operations), longevity of the entity (the number of years the 
company has existed), profitability of operations (return on as-
sets), and size of the entity (total assets).
The more diverse and complex an entity’s operations be-
come, the more information users need to evaluate those op-
erations. One way to measure complexity is by the number of 
subsidiaries. Also, as a company expands operations to global 
markets, operations become more complex. Zarzeski [1996] 
finds that disclosure needs increase with the number of subsid-
iaries and with foreign operations. To attract more resources 
and inform investors, more disclosure is needed as the complex-
ity of operations increases.
H4: Firms that have more complex operations are more 
likely to issue financial statements and will provide 
more disclosure within those statements.
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The longevity of the firm may also influence disclosure 
policy. As a firm ages, it proves the viability of its business 
model, operating capabilities, and management expertise. A 
newer firm needs to disclose more information about these 
issues to the financial markets to establish its viability as a 
going concern. Chen et al. [2002] note that younger firms are 
more likely to disclose balance sheets voluntarily along with 
quarterly earnings announcements. Wasley and Wu [2006] 
report that young firms voluntarily disclose good news in 
cash-flow forecasts to signal economic viability. Barton and 
Waymire [2004] also report a negative relation between age 
and financial-reporting quality. These results suggest that 
young firms are expected to be more likely to disclose balance 
sheets and income statements to help users better assess the 
firm’s viability.
H5: Firms that have been in existence longer are less 
likely to issue financial statements and will provide less 
disclosure within those statements.
Financial statements are the means for a company to 
disclose its results of operations and financial position. The 
amount of that information may vary based on the economic 
per formance of the entity in a given period. More profitable 
firms may be more willing to disclose income-statement infor-
mation [Singhvi and Desai, 1971]. Patton and Zelenka [1997] 
and  Raffournier [1995] also find a positive relation between 
profitability and disclosure. However, Alsaeed [2005] finds no 
association between profitability and disclosure. Profitable 
firms have more good information to disclose so may have more 
information within their financial statements. However, this 
increased disclosure may be limited to the income statement 
which focuses on profitability. This study will use return on as-
sets as the measure of profitability.
H6: Firms that have higher return on assets are more 
likely to provide more disclosure within the income 
statement.
Larger firms have been shown in the literature to disclose 
more information [Hawkins, 1963; Singhvi and Desai, 1971; 
Wallace et al., 1994; Meek et al., 1995; Zarzeski, 1996; Ahmed 
and Courtis, 1999]. Stanga [1976] lists possible economic mo-
tivations for larger firms disclosing more information: greater 
public attention, more existing and potential stockholders, less 
competitive pressure, and greater ability to afford increased 
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disclosure. Thus, larger firms are expected to have more 
 financial-statement disclosure.
H7: Firms that are larger (as measured by assets) are 
more likely to issue financial statements and will pro-
vide more disclosure within those statements.
Financing Factors: As a company grows, it needs additional capi-
tal to fund growth. U.S. output of finished goods from 1909-1918 
was $56.4 billion while corresponding output from 1919-1928 
was $83.4 billion [Bean, 1945]. Rajan and Zingales [2003] docu-
ment similar growth in the stock market during this time period. 
Thus, the time period under study was one of considerable eco-
nomic growth. Companies could finance this growth either with 
internal or external sources. Since most firms paid out most of 
their earnings as dividends prior to 1920 [Previts and Merino, 
1979], the companies in this study were probably seeking signifi-
cant sources of external financing. Companies could choose to 
issue either debt or equity to satisfy these needs. The financing 
factors associated with capital-structure choice are measured by 
the existence of a rating for debt or equity securities, the issu-
ance of debt and equity securities, the debt-to-assets ratio, and 
the dividend-payout ratio.
Morrison [1935] states that public information about com-
panies should be directed at investors so that they can make 
buy, sell, and hold decisions. To aid investors in these decisions, 
Moody’s provided ratings for debt and equity securities based on 
public information. To receive a debt rating, 1915 Moody’s re-
quired that the client firm disclose an income statement. While 
an income statement was not required to receive a stock rating, 
one of the components considered in the rating did require an 
income statement. Therefore, a more informed stock rating 
would result from the issuance of an income statement. These 
ratings could be used by investors to help them make investment 
decisions. Obtaining stock and bond ratings could be considered 
a type of social pressure. As noted in Bartlett and Jones [1997], 
meeting social pressure is a motivator for increased disclosure. 
Additionally from the issuers’ perspective, having a rating for 
the company’s stock or debt could then be associated with a 
decreased cost of capital and an easier placement of new issues 
if the rating attracted more interest. Since a lower cost of capital 
and easier placement would be a desire of most companies, ad-
ditional disclosure to acquire that rating would be an artifact of 
obtaining that rating. Thus, firms with rated debt and equity are 
expected to be more likely to disclose financial statements.
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H8: Firms that have ratings associated with existing 
stock and bond issues are more likely to issue financial 
statements and will provide more disclosure within 
those financial statements.
The desire for a rating associated with debt or equity to at-
tract investors at the lowest possible cost of capital is primarily 
a concern of a firm when stock or bonds are issued. It is this is-
suance of new stock, either common or preferred, or bonds that 
would allow a company to obtain additional capital to meet its 
expansion needs. After issuance, ratings help keep the market 
for these securities, but the rating is only directly beneficial for 
attracting additional capital for firms when they issue new se-
curities. Morrison [1935] discusses the importance of providing 
adequate information to attract new investors. Most companies 
did not provide adequate information in the time period under 
study. However, issuing new securities would create an incentive 
for the firm to provide more financial disclosure to attract inves-
tors. Barton and Waymire [2004] report that firms that have 
recently issued equity disclose higher-quality financial informa-
tion. Therefore, firms that have recently issued debt or equity 
are expected to be more likely to disclose financial statements.
H9: Firms that have issued debt or equity securities 
within the past three years are more likely to issue fi-
nancial statements and will provide more disclosure 
within those statements.
The type of external financing used by a company may in-
fluence the amount of disclosure. Debt financing is associated 
with greater risk. One way to measure the relative use of debt 
to finance a company’s resources is the debt-to-assets ratio. 
Financial leverage tends to increase disclosure [Wallace et al., 
1994; Meek et al., 1995; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Barton and 
Waymire, 2004]. This follows from the need of the firm to show 
that it can service this debt level. Thus, firms with a higher debt-
to-assets ratio are expected to be more likely to issue an income 
statement and a balance sheet. 
H10: Firms that have a higher debt-to-assets ratio are 
more likely to issue financial statements and will pro-
vide more disclosure within those statements.
The net income of a company can either be paid as divi-
dends or retained. Companies with a lower dividend-payout ra-
tio are relying more heavily on internal financing. The literature 
provides some documented relationships between dividends 
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and disclosure. Dividends may act as an alternative source of 
information about the amount and timing of future cash flows 
[Miller and Rock, 1985]. Firms that pay dividends may disclose 
less financial information [Barton and Waymire, 2004]. How-
ever, Archambault and Archambault [2003] report that dividend-
paying firms are associated with greater disclosure to allow 
investors to evaluate the ability of the firm to continue dividends 
[Einhorn, 2005]. The literature is mixed concerning the relation-
ship between dividends and disclosure.
Edwards [1989b] notes that, at the turn of the 20th century 
in the U.K., performance of a firm was judged mainly in terms 
of the amount of dividends paid. This view of dividends would 
seem to be more consistent with Einhorn [2005] than Miller and 
Rock [1985]. 
Tax laws in effect during and immediately after World War I 
may also have affected disclosure. Corporate income taxes were 
a function of return on invested capital [Kohler, 1925]. Balance 
sheets may have been more conservative as a result [Montgom-
ery, 1919]. Companies had incentives to write-off assets or recog-
nize liabilities in order to reduce taxable income. These actions 
may increase or decrease the amount of disclosure in financial 
statements.
However, dividends reduce invested capital and, conse-
quently, increased taxable income. Firms that paid dividends 
may have had an incentive to disclose more information in or-
der to justify the dividends. Therefore, in this paper, the positive 
relationship between dividends and disclosure will be used as 
the basis for hypothesis development.
H11: Firms that have a higher dividend-to-net income 
ratio are more likely to issue financial statements and 
will provide more disclosure within those statements.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
To examine which economic factors influence a firm’s volun-
tary disclosure of financial-statement information, those made 
in 1920 were chosen, relating to the 1919 fiscal year financial 
statements. This year was selected because it predated the SEC 
but was late enough into the 20th century that individual indus-
trial firms had achieved economic significance and served as an 
investment alternative for those seeking returns [Baskin, 1988]. 
The disclosures were obtained from a random sample of 
200 industrial firms incorporated in the U.S. that were not whol-
ly owned subsidiaries from the 6,882 companies comprising 
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Moody’s 1920 edition. The sample was limited to industrial firms 
because other types of companies, such as utilities, railroads, 
banks, etc., were generally subject to some form of regulation 
that required certain disclosures.2 The focus of the paper is on 
U.S. companies to keep the economic and cultural environment 
consistent throughout the sample. A number of ownership-
related variables were considered as explanations for voluntary 
disclosure. Therefore, publicly traded companies needed to be 
used because the information disclosures of wholly owned sub-
sidiaries could be much different because of the lack of outside 
shareholders. 
The pages in Moody’s covering each selected company were 
examined to determine whether an income statement and bal-
ance sheet were provided. To calculate the amount of detail pro-
vided in the financial statements, the number of line items in the 
financials was collected. In counting line items, totals and subto-
tals were not considered if previously disclosed items were used 
to generate them. However, if a statement started with a subto-
tal, like net earnings, then the total or subtotal was counted as 
an item since it then represented a distinct disclosure. 
Other data items collected from Moody’s included: total 
debt; total assets; dividends; net income; equity issues, either 
common or preferred, in the past three years; bond issues in the 
past three years; bond and stock ratings; the exchange on which 
common stock is listed; the dates of company origination and 
incorporation; incorporation and headquarters state; existence 
of subsidiaries and/or international operations; number of BD 
members; and the number of officers serving on the BD. Net in-
come was seldom labeled as such. Any subtotal listed on the in-
come statement before dividends were deducted was considered 
net income. The financial-statement disclosure items are used to 
compute the debt-to-assets ratio, the dividend-payout ratio, and 
the return-on-assets ratio. Firm size is measured by total assets. 
The variable used in the study for the age of the company is the 
older of the age of origination or incorporation. The percentage 
of officers on the BD is used to measure the Board’s indepen-
dence. 
For the multiple regressions, a company missing any of the 
data items collected could not be used in the multi-variate anal-
ysis. Because of missing data, the sample was reduced to 191 
companies when the regression did not require data from either 
2 See Archambault and Archambault [2005] for a discussion of the types of 
regulatory disclosures required of railroads and utilities. 
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financial statement, 142 companies when a balance sheet but 
not an income statement was required, 100 companies when an 
income statement was required but not a balance sheet, and 86 
companies when both balance-sheet and income-statement data 
were required for the regression equation. Least-squares regres-
sion was used to examine what factors influence total statement 
disclosure and its extent in each statement. The dependent vari-
able was the number of line items reported. The more line items 
a company reported, the more detail provided by its statements. 
Enhanced detail represents broader information provided by 
companies to statement users.
For examining the existence of the statements, a logit model 
is used. The dependent variable is dichotomous, coded as one if 
the balance sheet or income statement was reported by Moody’s. 
Five sets of regressions resulted in the form as follows:
DISCLOSURE = a +b1EX + b2BO + b3DLNJ + b4SUB + b5INT + 
b6AGE + b7ROA + 
b8TA + b9BR + b10CR + b11BI + b12EI + b13DA + b14DPO + e
where:
DISCLOSURE  one of the five measures of disclosure (income- 
statement existence, balance-sheet existence, 
number of line items in the income statement, 
number of line items in the balance sheet, total 
number of line items in the income statement 
and balance sheet taken together)
EX dichotomous variable where 1 = traded on any 
organized exchange3
BO number of officers on the BD divided by number 
of members on the BD
3 The tests were also run using the NYSE listing coded as one and all other 
companies coded as zero. The significance of the exchange variable was the same 
for all models tested whether it was coded as any exchange or only NYSE. The 
any exchange measure was chosen for reporting in the study for two reasons. 
First, some exchanges other than the NYSE may have had statement disclosure 
requirements for listing and would therefore have the same effect on voluntary vs. 
involuntary disclosure as the NYSE listing. Second, using any exchange as the in-
dependent variable resulted in higher adjusted R2 and F-statistics, indicating bet-
ter statistical fit than only the NYSE. The other exchanges included are New York 
Curb, Boston, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Providence, Chicago, Detroit, Cincinnati, San 
Francisco, Philadelphia, Louisville, Cleveland, Los Angeles, Toronto, Montreal, 
London, and Amsterdam. 
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DLNJ dichotomous variable where 1 = incorporated in 
Delaware or New Jersey
SUB dichotomous variable where 1 = company has a 
subsidiary
INT dichotomous variable where 1 = company has 
international operations
AGE number of years that the company has been in 
existence (using either the date of incorporation 
or date of origin, whichever is longer ago)
ROA net income divided by total assets
TA total assets4
BR dichotomous variable where 1 = company has 
rated bonds
CR dichotomous variable where 1 = company has a 
rated common stock
BI dichotomous variable where 1 = company is-
sued bonds within the past three years
EI dichotomous variable where 1 = company is-
sued equity within the past three years
DA total debt divided by total assets
DPO total dividends divided by net income.
A second multi-variate model was also estimated which 
left out the variables that required statement information (TA, 
DA, DPO, ROA). This was done to allow a multi-variate regres-
sion without requiring the existence of the financial statements. 
This is especially important for the income-statement and 
balance-sheet existence models because with the statement be-
ing required, the companies without a statement would not be 
included in the model estimation. Since this model is trying to 
explain why an income statement or a balance sheet may have 
been disclosed, the dependent variable needs to include some 
observations where the statement did not exist. The full model 
allows a test of the importance of the financial-statement vari-
4 Total assets are used in the study rather than the more commonly used log 
of total assets because using log of total assets caused the goodness-of-fit test to 
fail for some of the regressions. Because of the model-fit issue, total assets in mil-
lions are reported.
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ables considered. Therefore, two multi-variate models are used.
Pearson correlations between the independent and depen-
dent variables are also reported to examine whether a significant 
relationship exists between the independent variables and the 
dependent variable without considering the other independent 
variables.
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample. The N 
column indicates how many of the 200 companies in the sample 
had data for each variable. This table indicates that 56% of the 
sample provided an income statement and 74% provided a bal-
ance sheet. The considerably lower percentage of companies 
providing an income statement relative to a balance sheet is con-
sistent with Skinner [1987] and Buckmaster and Jones [1997]. 
The existence of 26% of the sample that did not report a balance 
sheet is inconsistent with the literature that concludes that 
almost all U.S. firms published a balance sheet [Brief, 1987]. 
The average income statement consisted of just three line items. 
Balance sheets provided considerably more disclosure with an 
average of just over 14 items. This is consistent with findings in 
the literature that few details about income components were 
reported in the early 20th century [Lee, 1979; Morris, 1984; 
Baldwin et al., 1996]. The items in the income statement were 
also more likely to be summary numbers such as gross profit 
with no detail of the components of the subtotal. Only 31% of 
the companies reporting an income statement disclosed gross 
revenues.
Only 30% of the sample companies traded stock on an 
organized exchange. Officers represented 45% of the BD mem-
bers on average. Delaware and New Jersey were successful in 
their efforts to attract incorporations with 26% of the sample 
incorporating in those two states. The majority of companies 
had a subsidiary (59%). International operations existed for 
39% of the sample firms. The median age of a company in the 
sample was 16 years. Thus, new companies do not dominate the 
sample. Return on assets averaged 8%. The size of companies in 
the sample varies considerably as seen by the standard deviation 
of total assets. A bond rating exists for only 37% of the sample, 
and only 18% issued debt in the three prior years. Equity issues 
were more common with 26% of the sample issuing some form 
of equity in the prior three years with 95% having a common-
stock rating. The sample firms were not highly levered with a 
debt-to-asset ratio of 0.19 on average. The dividend-payout ratio 
78
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 37 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/9
71Archambault and Archambault, 1920s Financial Reporting
was high with 51% of profits being paid as dividends on average.
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Median Standard Deviation
Income Statement 200 0.56 1.00 0.50
Balance Sheet 200 0.74 1.00 0.44
Income Statement Items 112 3.37 3.00 1.80
Balance Sheet Items 148 14.16 14.00 4.62
Traded on Exchange 200 0.30 0.00 0.46
Percentage of Board that are Officers 191 0.45 0.43 0.20
Incorporated in Delaware or New 
Jersey 200 0.26 0.00 0.44
Subsidiaries 200 0.59 1.00 0.49
International Operations 200 0.39 0.00 0.49
Age 200 20.17 16.00 18.47
Return on Assets 96 0.08 0.07 0.06
Total Assets (in millions) 148 43.25 10.00 199.69
Bond Rating 200 0.37 0.00 0.48
Common Rating 200 0.95 1.00 0.22
Bond Issues 200 0.18 0.00 0.39
Equity Issues 200 0.26 0.00 0.44
Debt-to-Assets Ratio 148 0.19 0.15 0.15
Dividend-Payout Ratio 104 0.51 0.43 2.32
The sample consists of 200 randomly selected industrial firms included in the 
1920 Moody’s Analyses of Industrial Investments. The variables are defined as 
Income Statement = 1 if the firm issued an income statement and 0 otherwise. 
Balance sheet = 1 if the firm issued a balance sheet and zero otherwise. Income 
Statement Items = the number of non-total line items listed in the income 
statement. Balance Sheet Items = the number of non-total line items listed in the 
balance sheet. Traded on Exchange = 1 if the company trades on any organized 
exchange (see footnote 3 for a list of exchanges) and zero otherwise. Percentage 
of Board that are Officers = number of officers on the Board of Directors dividend 
by number of members of the Board of Directors. Incorporated in Delaware or 
New Jersey = 1 if the company is incorporated in either Delaware or New Jersey 
and zero if it is incorporated in any other state. Subsidiaries = 1 if the company 
has subsidiaries and zero otherwise. International Operations = 1 if the company 
has international operations and zero otherwise. Age = number of years that the 
company has been in existence (using either the date of incorporation or date 
of origin, whichever is longer ago). Return on Assets = net income dividend by 
total assets. Total Assets (in millions) = total assets dividend by 1,000,000. Bond 
Rating = 1 if the company has a bond rating listed in Moody’s and zero otherwise. 
Common Rating = 1 if the company has a common stock rating listed in Moody’s 
and zero otherwise. Bond Issues = 1 if the company issued bonds within the past 
three years and zero otherwise. Equity Issues = 1 if the company issued any form 
of equity within the past three years and zero otherwise. Debt-to-Assets Ratio 
= total debt dividend by total assets. Dividend-Payout Ratio = total dividends 
divided by net income.
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Total Disclosure: To examine which environmental factors are 
related to total voluntary financial-statement disclosure, the 
sum of the number of the income-statement and balance-sheet 
line items was used as the dependent variable. The results of 
this total disclosure test are shown in Table 3. The correlations
TABLE 3
Total Statement Disclosure  
Least-Squares Regression
Part 1 
Correlation 
Part 2 
Multi-variate
Part 3 
Multi-variate
Variable Coeffi- cient
Coeffi-
cient t-Stat
Coeffi-
cient t-Stat
Constant 14.48 4.74*** 13.92 4.70***
Traded on 
Exchange 0.37*** 2.58 2.63*** 2.54 2.47***
Percentage of Board 
that are Officers -0.16 -5.47 -2.14*** -6.03 -2.22**
Incorporated in 
Delaware or New 
Jersey
0.23** -0.15 -0.14 -0.76 -0.70
Subsidiaries 0.47*** 3.64 3.50*** 3.81 3.55***
International 
Operations 0.22** 0.40 0.40 -0.23 -0.22
Age of Company -0.12 -0.03 -0.92 -0.04 -1.11
Return on Assets -0.16 10.37 1.28
Total Assets (in 
millions) 0.41*** 0.01 3.59***
Bond Rating 0.21** 1.48 1.14 0.88 0.64
Common Rating 0.12 3.06 1.08 2.65 1.00
Bond Issues 0.16* 0.88 0.59 -1.60 -0.95
Equity Issues 0.12 1.23 1.17 1.60 1.47
Debt-to-Assets 
Ratio 0.20** 4.96 1.03
Dividend-Payout 
Ratio 0.05 0.19 0.69
Adjusted R2 29.8% 42.2%
F-statistic (p-Value) 5.21 0.000 5.44 0.000
N 100 86
The sample consists of 200 randomly selected industrial firms included in 
the 1920 Moody’s Analyses of Industrial Investments. Part 1 reports Pearson cor-
relations. Parts 2 and 3 report regression results using ordinary least squares. All 
variables are defined in Table 2. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 percent levels 
with results in the predicted direction and one-tailed tests for regressions and 
two-tailed tests for correlations. #, ##, and ### denote significance at the 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 percent levels with the results of the opposite sign from what was 
predicted.
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between the dependent and independent variables are shown in 
part 1 of Table 3. Significant positive correlations exist for trad-
ing on an exchange, incorporating in Delaware or New Jersey, 
having subsidiaries and international operations, being larger, 
having rated bonds, issuing bonds, and being more highly le-
vered. No significant negative correlations exist.
To examine the factors that explain total disclosure when 
all factors are considered together, multi-variate regressions 
were estimated. The results are shown in Parts 2 and 3 of Table 
3. Part 2 is the regression without financial-statement variables 
and Part 3 shows the results for the complete model. The model 
in Part 2, which required the existence of either an income state-
ment or a balance sheet, has an adjusted R2 of 29.8%, indicating 
reasonable explanatory power of the variables considered but 
also implying other significant factors as well. The explana-
tory power increases considerably in the Part 3 regression (R2 of 
42.2%) as more variables are added. The results for both models 
are consistent. Requiring the existence of both an income state-
ment and a balance sheet in the Part 3 model does not signifi-
cantly change the results, adding only total assets as a significant 
variable but not changing the significance of any other variable.
When all variables are considered together, trading on any 
organized exchange, having a subsidiary, and being larger are all 
associated with increased total disclosure. A negative relation-
ship between total disclosure and the percentage of officers on 
the BD is documented. These results indicate that a significant 
relationship exists between total disclosure and at least one vari-
able within two of the three economic factors considered in this 
study – corporate governance and operating. Thus, disclosure is 
a function of various influences. 
Archambault and Archambault [2005] also document a pos-
itive relationship between listing status and a voluntary disclo-
sure of statements. The disclosure of statements was generally 
required by the exchanges by 1920. Thus, documenting this sup-
port for H1 is not surprising. Operations become more complex 
with the existence of subsidiaries and international operations. 
This increased complexity seems to create an incentive to re-
port more voluntary disclosures to help users of the statements 
understand performance. Some companies did report gross or
net revenues from different operating sources separately which 
would increase the amount of disclosure, supporting H4. 
Operations become subject to more public and political 
scrutiny as companies grow larger [Stanga, 1976; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986]. The positive relationship between disclo-
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sure and firm size is consistent with many previously reported 
findings [Wallace et al., 1994; Meek et al., 1995; Zarzeski, 1996; 
Ahmed and Courtis, 1999] and H7. 
Corporate governance is also shown to play a role in the 
amount of total disclosure. Less independent BDs disclose less. 
Bartlett and Jones [1997] note the importance of corporate- gov-
ernance philosophy and voluntary-statement disclosures. These 
results provide support for a relationship between BD member-
ship and statement disclosure as well, consistent with H2.
Some of the variables found to have a significant rela-
tionship with disclosure in the correlations do not end up as 
significant in the multi-variate models. This result could occur 
if variables exhibit multicolinearity. However, standard tests 
for multicolinearity, both correlation matrices and variance-
inflation factors, indicate that no strong multicolinearity exists 
among the independent variables. These differences between 
uni-variate and multi-variate results are similar to those in 
Singhvi and Desai [1971]. That study looked at total disclosure 
for companies in 1965. The uni-variate results showed that dis-
closure was significantly related to size, number of shareholders, 
listing status, CPA firm, profitability, and earnings margin. The 
multi-variate results were reduced to only listing status and 
earnings margin being significant.
This analysis examines total disclosure; however, one or 
more factors may influence a company to report only an income 
statement or a balance sheet. Some factors may influence a 
company to disclose more balance-sheet information and less 
income-statement information at the same time. Looking at 
total disclosure then provides an incomplete understanding of 
the factors that motivate the issuance of each statement. Some 
factors may be important in the reporting of both statements, 
but other factors may strongly influence the decision to disclose 
one statement and have little effect on the decision to report the 
other. The analysis will now examine the two statements sepa-
rately.
Income-Statement Disclosers: Since only 56% of the sample 
reported an income statement, what factors motivated these 
companies to make this disclosure? Table 4 shows the results of 
the correlation between that dichotomous variable and each in-
dependent variable and the regression equations.5 Trading on an 
5 Results for dividend payout and return-on-assets are not reported because 
these two ratios require the existence of an income statement to be reported. 
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exchange, incorporating in Delaware or New Jersey, having sub-
sidiaries and international operations, having a common-stock 
rating, and issuing either bonds or equity within the past three 
years are all positively associated with the likelihood to disclose
TABLE 4
Income-Statement Existence 
Logit Regression
Part 1
Correlation
Part 2 
Multi-variate
Part 3 
Multi-variate
Variable Coeffi- 
cient
Coeffi-
cient t-Stat
Coeffi-
cient t-Stat
Constant -0.96 -0.98 052 0.40
Traded on Exchange 0.38*** 2.08 4.51*** 1.93 2.96***
Percentage of Board 
that are Officers -0.17** -1.69 -1.91** -2.76 -2.19**
Incorporated in 
Delaware or New 
Jersey
0.14** -0.03 -0.07 -0.56 -0.93
Subsidiaries 0.17** -0.19 -0.46 -0.74 -1.30
International 
Operations 0.26*** 1.30 2.82*** 1.18 1.87**
Age of Company -0.08 -0.01 -0.60 0.01 1.09
Total Assets (in 
millions) 0.11 0.06 2.27**
Bond Rating 0.05 -0.36 -0.82 1.43 1.80**
Common Rating 0.12* 1.18 1.37* 2.15 1.87**
Bond Issues 0.17** 1.56 2.67*** -0.30 -0.34
Equity Issues 0.16** 0.56 1.32* 0.39 0.72
Debt-to-Assets -0.04 -2.72 -1.55#
Log-Likelihood -101.4 -60.6
Zero Slopes Test 
(p-Value) 59.30 0.000 19.51 0.000
N 191 142
The sample consists of 200 randomly selected industrial firms included in the 
1920 Moody’s Analyses of Industrial Investments. Part 1 reports Pearson correla-
tions. Parts 2 and 3 report regression results using logit. All variables are defined 
in Table 2. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 percent levels 
with the results in the predicted direction and one-tailed tests for regressions and 
two-tailed tests for correlations. #, ##, and ### denote significance at the 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 percent levels with the results of the opposite sign from what was 
predicted.
Therefore, the equation could not be estimated since only those companies with 
income statements had these variables.
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an income statement. The higher the representation of manage-
ment on the BD, the less likely the company is to disclose an in-
come statement. These results are very similar to the results for 
total disclosure reported in Table 3. Firm size and bond rating 
are shown to be significant determinants of total disclosure, but 
not for presenting an income statement. Disclosing an income 
statement is shown to be a function of having rated common 
stock and recently issued debt and equity.
Parts 2 and 3 of Table 4 examine the multi-variate relation-
ship between these factors and the existence of an income state-
ment. Logit regression is used to see which variables are still 
significant in explaining the provision of an income statement 
when all variables are considered. The model in Part 2 looks 
at companies regardless of which financial statements were re-
ported. The Part 3 results relate to companies that had a balance 
sheet and may or may not have had an income statement. The 
results do vary, indicating that the decision to report an income 
statement is influenced by different factors if the decision to 
report a balance sheet has already been made. The results also 
differ significantly from the results for total disclosure. 
The Part 2 results indicate that corporate-governance (trad-
ing on an exchange and the percentage of officers on the BD), 
operating (international operations), and financing (common 
rating and bond and equity issuance) factors all significantly 
influence the decision of a company to publish an income state-
ment. The variables that explain the existence of an income 
statement when a balance sheet exists (Part 3) differ in that 
additional operating (total assets) and financing (bond rating 
and debt-to-asset ratio) factors gained significance while the 
constructs for issuing debt and equity lost significance.
For a company to achieve broader ownership interest by 
listing on an exchange, the company may have been required 
to publish an income statement as an exchange require-
ment. Also,having this statement would allow easier investor 
analysis, so having the income statement is consistent with 
the desire for broader ownership. This result supports H1. 
Corporate governance through BD membership is again sig-
nificant. A less independent BD results in a lower likelihood 
of reporting an income statement. With fewer shareholder 
representatives on the BD, the needs of shareholders for 
adequate information were not considered, supporting H2.
Having international operations increases the likelihood of 
reporting an income statement in both multi-variate regressions. 
However, having subsidiaries is not significant. Thus, only the 
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complexity factor of international operations motivated compa-
nies to issue an income statement. This result is consistent with 
H4. Firm size is also a significant influence when it was consid-
ered in the model. This positive relationship is consistent with 
H7. These results support the importance of operating factors in 
the decision to report net income.
Having a bond rating only significantly enhances the likeli-
hood of an income statement when a balance sheet is present. 
This variable was significant while issuing bonds was not. In 
a multi-variate model, these two variables may be proxies to 
some extent for one another, conceivably explaining the change 
in significance. Common-stock rating is significant in both 
models, while equity issues are only significant in Part 2. The 
debt-to-asset ratio is significant in Part 3, showing a negative 
relationship. This result is opposite to expectation. However, the 
hypothesis did assume that the companies have the ability to 
service the debt. If highly levered firms seemed unable to service 
their debt, not reporting an income statement would then be one 
way to cover up this issue. All financing variables considered are 
significant in one or both models. Thus, the need for additional 
funds and the make-up of the capital structure seem significant 
motivators in issuing income statements. Overall these results 
show that a number of factors influence a company’s decision to 
report an income statement. When comparing these results to 
others in this study, it becomes clear that income statements are 
issued more frequently when equity ratings and bond issuance 
occur. Income statements are frequently issued when a company 
wants investors to buy its stock or bonds or to continue a mar-
ket in the company’s securities. Firm size is also a significant 
factor. Larger companies may have become large through equity 
and bond issuance, thereby appreciating the need for continued 
disclosure of income to keep shareholders interested in com-
pany securities. With only 56% of the sample issuing income 
statements, it may be hypothesized some form of regulation was 
necessary to encourage wider reporting.
Income-Statement Items: The previous analysis examined 
income-statement disclosure. However, traded companies on 
most exchanges had to provide an income statement. Therefore, 
disclosing an income statement was not totally voluntary for 
some of the 30% of the sample that traded on an organized ex-
change. However, the amount of income-statement information 
disclosed was voluntary.
Least-squares regressions and correlations are used to de-
85
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2010, Vol. 37, no. 1 [whole issue]
Published by eGrove, 2010
Accounting Historians Journal, June 201078
termine which environmental factors help explain the amount 
of income-statement disclosure. Part 1 of Table 5 reports the 
results for the correlation between income-statement items and 
the independent variables. International operations are shown
TABLE 5
Income Statement Disclosure 
Least-Squares Regression
Part 1
Correlation
Part 2 
Multi-variate
Part 3 
Multi-variate
Variable Coeffi- cient
Coeffi-
cient t-Stat
Coeffi-
cient t-Stat
Constant 4.73 4.03*** 4.57 3.57***
Traded on 
Exchange 0.12 0.45 1.18 0.22 0.50
Percentage of Board 
that are Officers -0.14* -1.27 -1.36* -1.47 -1.25
Incorporated in 
Delaware or New 
Jersey
-0.02 -0.45 -1.10 -0.19 -0.40
Subsidiaries 0.04 0.33 0.83 -0.31 -0.67
International 
Operations 0.19** 0.67 1.76** 0.60 1.33*
Age of Company -0.19* -0.03 -2.68*** -0.03 -2.09**
Return on Assets -0.08 1.82 0.52
Total Assets (in 
millions) 0.10 0.00 0.97
Bond Rating 0.08 0.03 0.07 -0.46 -0.78
Common Rating 0.00 -0.46 -0.43 -0.66 -0.58
Bond Issues 0.11 0.41 0.72 -0.07 -0.10
Equity Issues 0.04 0.12 0.78 -0.01 -0.02
Debt-to-Assets 
Ratio 0.11 2.24 1.07
Dividend-Payout 
Ratio 0.05 0.06 0.52
Adjusted R2 5.9% 0.0%
F-statistic (p-Value) 1.63 0.109 0.79 0.680
N 100 86
The sample consists of 200 randomly selected industrial firms included in 
the 1920 Moody’s Analyses of Industrial Investments. Part 1 reports Pearson cor-
relations. Parts 2 and 3 report regression results using ordinary least squares. All 
variables are defined in Table 2. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 percent levels 
with the results in the predicted direction and one-tailed tests for regressions and 
two-tailed tests for correlations. #, ##, and ### denote significance at the 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 percent levels with the results of the opposite sign from what was 
predicted. 
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to have a positive influence on the amount of income-statement 
disclosure. Officers on the BD and company longevity both re-
duce the amount of information in the income statement.
To examine the effect of considering all variables together, 
the multi-variate models are estimated in Parts 2 and 3 of Table 
5. The results in Part 2 are for companies with an income state-
ment regardless of whether a balance sheet exists. Part 3 results 
include the financial-statement variables, so the sample includes 
companies with both statements. Neither of these models is 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Therefore, the 
amount of income-statement disclosure is a function of factors 
other than those considered in this study. The significance of BD 
composition and age may be indicating that entrenched manage-
ment/BD philosophy on reporting may be a key determinant of 
the amount of disclosure as noted in Bartlett and Jones [1997]. 
No variable is included in the model to measure this philosophy 
and, if a sufficiently significant variable does exist, it could ex-
plain the model misspecification indicated by the results.
Balance-Sheet Disclosers: Correlations and regressions are also 
estimated to examine which environmental factors influence 
the existence of a balance sheet.6 Different factors may influence 
why a company chooses to report a balance sheet rather than an 
income statement in the era before SEC requirements. As shown 
in Table 2, 74% of the companies reported a balance sheet. 
The results of the correlation analysis are shown in Part 1 of 
Table 6. These results indicate that being traded on an exchange, 
being incorporated in New Jersey or Delaware, having a subsid-
iary and international operations, and issuing equity within the 
past three years are all associated with issuing a balance sheet. 
Having rated bonds was shown to reduce the likelihood of re-
porting a balance sheet. 
Part 2 of Table 6 shows the results of the multi-variate 
logit regression for the sample of all companies regardless of 
the statements issued. The logit regression for firms issuing 
income statements and a balance sheet or not would not con-
verge. Therefore, results of a second multi-variate model are 
not reported since statistically, no logistic regression model
6 Results for total assets, debt-to-assets ratio, and return-on-assets are not re-
ported because these variables require the existence of a balance sheet, and the 
model needs to consider both firms with and without a balance sheet to explain 
the existence of the statement. 
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TABLE 6
Balance Sheet Existence 
Logit Regression
Part 1
Correlation
Part 2 
Multi-variate
Variable Coefficient Coefficient t-Stat
Constant 0.32 0.35
Traded on Exchange 0.22*** 1.17 2.32***
Percentage of Board that are 
Officers -0.09 -0.77 -0.84
Incorporated in Delaware or New 
Jersey 0.15** 0.53 1.06
Subsidiaries 0.15** 0.04 0.09
International Operations 0.19*** 1.04 1.92**
Age of Company -0.00 0.01 0.66
Bond Rating -0.12# -1.05 -2.39##
Common Rating 0.07 0.40 0.50
Bond Issues 0.06 1.07 1.79**
Equity Issues 0.23*** 1.44 2.46***
Log-Likelihood -90.7
Zero Slope Test (p-Value) 33.99 0.000
N 191
The sample consists of 200 randomly selected industrial firms included in the 
1920 Moody’s Analyses of Industrial Investments. Part 1 reports Pearson correla-
tions. Parts 2 and 3 report regression results using logit. All variables are defined 
in Table 2. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 percent levels 
with the results in the predicted direction and one-tailed tests for regressions and 
two-tailed tests for correlations. #, ##, and ### denote significance at the 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 percent levels with the results of the opposite sign from what was 
predicted.
could be estimated. The model in Part 2 indicates that trading 
on an exchange, having international operations, and issuing 
bonds or equity are positively associated with issuing a balance 
sheet. Rated debt has a negative association with a balance 
sheet. Therefore, corporate-governance, operating, and financ- 
ing  factors are important in explaining a balance-sheet disclo-
sure.
The exchange variable is probably significant because of im-
posed exchange requirements. Complexity of operations again 
encourages firms to issue more financial-statement information. 
However, H4 is only supported with respect to international op-
erations.
The bond and stock issuance variables are again significant 
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for reducing cost of capital and providing potential buyers with 
needed information about financial position and the company’s 
ability to meet its capital needs. These results are consistent 
with H9.
The negative relationship between debt rating and the is-
suance of a balance sheet did not meet the expectation that 
companies with traded debt were doing well financially and 
would issue statements to keep a market in the securities. If the 
company is too highly levered, then the company may not want 
to report a balance sheet showing the true level of debt. H8 is 
not supported by these results.
Balance-Sheet Items: Correlations of the independent variable 
and the number of balance-sheet line items disclosed in Moody’s 
were estimated. The results are shown in Part 1 of Table 7. These 
results show the same significant variables as for total disclosure 
in Table 3 with the exception of a rating on common stock in-
creasing the amount of disclosure and a less independent BD 
lowering the amount of balance-sheet disclosure.
Part 2 of Table 7 estimates a least-squares regression 
of balance-sheet items using all companies with a bal-
ance sheet. The results indicate that corporate-governance, 
operating, and financing factors are all important in ex-
plaining how much balance-sheet disclosure is made. The 
specific significant variables that increase the amount of 
balance-sheet disclosure are trading on an exchange (H1), hav-
ing subsidiaries (H4), and having rated debt and equity (H8).
Once again, expanding the breadth of ownership, having 
complex operations, seeking new capital, or maintaining a mar-
ket in existing capital are all associated with greater disclosure 
in the balance sheet. The positive relationship between the 
amount of disclosure and security ratings is interesting given the 
negative association between debt ratings and reporting a bal-
ance sheet. This combined result seems to indicate that once the 
balance sheet is issued, ratings encourage additional disclosure. 
Part 3 of Table 7 provides the multi-variate results on the 
sample of companies that issue both a balance sheet and an 
income statement. The results are again similar to those for 
total disclosure (Part 3 of Table 3) with the addition of return-
on-assets and equity issuance as variables that lead to greater 
balance-sheet disclosure. 
Overall, the disclosure model presented seems to explain the 
choices concerning total disclosure, the issuance of an income 
statement, and the amount of balance-sheet disclosure. The
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TABLE 7
Balance-Sheet Disclosure 
Least-Squares Regression
Part 1
Correlation
Part 2 
Multi-variate
Part 3 
Multi-variate
Variable Coeffi- cient
Coeffi-
cient t-Stat
Coeffi-
cient t-Stat
Constant 9.86 5.37*** 9.15 3.89***
Traded on Exchange 0.38*** 2.63 3.50*** 2.40 2.94***
Percentage of Board 
that are Officers -0.18** -1.83 -1.01 -4.24 -1.98**
Incorporated in 
Delaware or New 
Jersey
0.25*** 0.61 0.75 -0.52 -0.60
Subsidiaries 0.42*** 2.34 3.04*** 4.16 4.87***
International 
Operations 0.21*** 0.67 0.88 -0.77 -0.92
Age of Company -0.10 -0.00 -0.16 -0.01 -0.25
Return on Assets -0.15 8.60 1.34*
Total Assets (in 
millions) 0.42*** 0.01 3.94***
Bond Rating 0.25*** 1.55 1.59* 1.34 1.23
Common Rating 0.15* 2.44 1.48* 3.20 1.52
Bond Issues 0.19** 0.71 0.62 -1.52 -1.14
Equity Issues 0.07 0.05 0.07 1.43 1.67**
Debt-to-Assets Ratio 0.17** 3.16 0.82
Dividend-Payout 
Ratio 0.09 0.13 0.59
Adjusted R2 26.2% 51.1%
F-statistic (p-Value) 6.12 0.000 7.43 0.000
N 142 86
The sample consists of 200 randomly selected industrial firms included in 
the 1920 Moody’s Analyses of Industrial Investments. Part 1 reports Pearson cor-
relations. Parts 2 and 3 report regression results using ordinary least squares. All 
variables are defined in Table 2. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 percent levels 
with results in the predicted direction and one-tailed tests for regressions and 
two-tailed tests for correlations. #, ##, and ### denote significance at the 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 percent levels with the results of the opposite sign from what was 
predicted.
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models for income-statement disclosure and issuance of a bal-
ance sheet do not perform as well. While some factors are only 
significant in one of these decisions, other factors are generally 
shown to influence all facets of voluntary disclosure. 
Table 8 provides a summary of the results from the other 
tables. To control for potential overfitting of results, a variable
TABLE 8
Results Summary
Table 3 Table 5 Table 7 Table 4 Table 6
Variable Total Disclosure
Income 
Statement 
Disclosure
Balance 
Sheet 
Disclosure
Income 
Statement 
Existence
Balance 
Sheet 
Existence
Corporate-Governance Factors:
Traded on 
Exchange + + + +
Percentage of 
Board that are 
Officers
- - - -
Incorporated 
in Delaware or 
New Jersey
Operating Factors:
Subsidiaries + +
International 
Operations + + +
Age of 
Company -
Return on 
Assets + NA NA
Total Assets + + + NA
Financing Factors:
Bond Rating + -
Common 
Rating + +
Bond Issues + +
Equity Issues + +
Debt-to-Assets 
Ratio - NA
Dividend-
Payout Ratio NA NA
This table summarizes significant results reported in Tables 2-6. A variable 
had to be significant in at least two specifications within a table or significant in 
the only multi-variate model in which it was included to be summarized in this 
table.
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needed to be significant in at least two specifications within a 
table or be significant in the only multi-variate model in which 
it is included to be considered significant in this summary. The 
table shows that trading on an exchange, lack of an independent 
BD, having complex operations, and firm size are important 
variables for total disclosure decisions. Therefore, corporate-
governance and operating factors influence overall statement 
disclosure. Financing factors are shown to influence individual 
statements but not total disclosure. Equity ratings and issuing 
securities are shown to increase the likelihood to report an in-
come statement and securities ratings are associated with more 
disclosure of information in the balance sheet. This seems to 
indicate that financing issues had different influences on the 
two financial statements. Thus, companies wanting to broaden 
ownership and seeking additional equity capital are most likely 
to provide a full set of financial statements with reasonable 
amounts of information. Complexity of operations also shows 
a positive relationship with disclosure. Firms with subsidiaries 
have increased amounts of disclosure, and those with interna-
tional operations tend to issue both statements more frequently. 
Larger companies are also more likely to provide greater state-
ment disclosure. Corporate governance is shown to be related 
to a heightened number of income statements but not balance 
sheets. The volume of disclosure is increased in both.
The summary in Table 8 also shows that the amount of 
disclosure is primarily a function of corporate governance, 
complexity of operations, and firm size, while the issuance of 
statements is a function of corporate-governance, complexity of 
operations, and financing factors. The factors influencing a com-
pany to report either financial statement are very similar with 
the exception of BD independence and securities ratings. This 
finding that BD independence is only influential in the decision 
whether to report an income statement but not in the decision 
of whether to report a balance sheet provides some support for 
the conclusion of Bartlett and Jones [1997] that BD philosophy 
influences the amount of voluntary disclosure. Balance-sheet 
disclosure was a more common practice as noted by the larger 
number of firms issuing a balance sheet both in this study and in 
the literature indicates that their promulgation was a common 
practice of the day [Kittredge, 1901; Sprague, 1901, Gilman, 
1939; Skinner, 1984; Kendig, 1993]. Therefore, balance sheets 
may not have been viewed as voluntary to many companies, 
while income statements were voluntary until they became a re-
quirement for listing on an exchange. Thus, the BD philosophy 
92
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 37 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/9
85Archambault and Archambault, 1920s Financial Reporting
on disclosure could more readily influence whether an income 
statement was published along with a balance sheet. 
The amount of disclosure within the statements is shown 
to be influenced by many more factors for the balance sheet 
than for the income statement. This contrasts with Barton and 
Waymire’s [2004] finding that more factors explain income-
statement transparency than for balance sheets. However, the 
multi-variate models for income-statement disclosure were not 
significant, indicating that variables other than those considered 
here are better explanatory factors of the volume of income-
statement disclosure. The amount of balance-sheet disclosure is 
also shown to be a function of corporate-governance, operating, 
and financing factors. 
This study examined factors that would influence a com-
pany’s decision regarding the voluntary supply of information. 
The results indicate that there are some important factors that 
influence the decision to issue a statement and the amount of 
information contained therein. Corporate-governance, operat-
ing, and financing factors all play a role in the disclosure deci-
sions of companies, but those factors vary in their importance 
in different decisions. The results indicate that disclosure deci-
sions are complex and take multiple factors into account. Since 
various factors were shown to influence the types of statements 
reported and the amount of information conveyed, the results 
confirm the conclusion of Coombs and Edward [1995] that 
regulation is needed to equate the supply of financial-statement 
disclosure provided by companies in response to the demands of 
stockholders.
CONCLUSION
This paper examined financial-statement disclosures by 
industrial companies as reported in the 1920 Moody’s. The pa-
per looked at overall disclosure and disclosure particular to the 
individual statements. The focus of the paper was to determine 
which company-specific factors would affect the corporate 
decision to disclose financial statements and the amount of 
disclosure. By looking at these factors, the motivation of firms 
to disclose voluntarily as in the Coombs and Edwards [1995] 
model can be understood.
The model developed in this paper can be used to explain 
factors that influenced the issuance of an income statement as 
well as the contents of both financial statements. The model 
provides some insight regarding the amount of information in 
93
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2010, Vol. 37, no. 1 [whole issue]
Published by eGrove, 2010
Accounting Historians Journal, June 201086
the income statement and the issuance of a balance sheet, but 
the model did not fit the data as well for these two corporate 
decisions. The results showed that corporate-governance, oper-
ating, and financing factors are important, but that their relative 
importance varied by the specific disclosure decision under con-
sideration.
A company was more likely to issue an income statement if 
it traded shares on an organized exchange, had international op-
erations, was relatively larger, had securities rated by Moody’s, 
and issued bonds and/or equity in the recent past. Having a large 
percentage of officers on the BD and/or a high debt-to-asset ra-
tio reduced the likelihood. The decision to issue a balance sheet 
was positively influenced by trading on an exchange, having 
international operations, and issuing stock and bonds, but not if 
already existing debt was rated.
Factors influencing total disclosure and balance-sheet 
disclosure are similar. Trading on an exchange, possessing sub-
sidiaries, and relatively small size were shown to increase the 
amount of disclosure. Both measures were negatively influenced 
by BD composition. Balance-sheet disclosure was also positively 
influenced by return-on-assets and rated debt and equity. The 
equation used to estimate the amount of information disclosed 
in the income statement was not significant. However, three sig-
nificant coefficients resulted, indicating that income-statement 
disclosures are greater for companies with international opera-
tions and lower for older companies and those with a less inde-
pendent BD.
Seeking broader ownership by trading on an exchange was 
shown to be significant in most types of disclosure decisions. As 
noted earlier, exchanges did impose requirements for issuing 
statements. Therefore, for these traded companies, statement 
disclosure was not entirely a voluntary choice. However, traded 
companies consistently reported more information which shows 
more voluntary disclosure beyond the mere issuance of the 
statement. Also, the choice to list securities for trading would in-
volve consideration of all requirements to list. One requirement 
is statement disclosure. Thus, when a company chose to list 
securities voluntarily, a simultaneous choice to report financial 
statements was also voluntarily made. 
Complex structures with the existence of subsidiary or in-
ternational operations were also important for all disclosure de-
cisions. Such companies consistently reported more statement 
information as is consistent with the literature [Zarzeski, 1996]. 
Corporate governance was also shown to be an important factor. 
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Greater managerial involvement on the BD led to reduced dis-
closure in both statements and a decreased likelihood of report-
ing an income statement. This is also consistent with the litera-
ture [Klein, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Guy and Leung, 2004]. 
The results do indicate that incentives did exist in the pre-
SEC era to encourage companies to disclose financial state-
ments. However, the data and results show that smaller, domes-
tic businesses with a BD controlled by management that neither 
traded on an organized stock exchange nor sought additional 
capital recently were highly unlikely to report an income state-
ment voluntarily. These characteristics would seem to describe 
entrepreneurial firms that were growing rapidly within the econ-
omy of the early 1920s. Many of these small, founder- focused 
companies have grown into large, profitable corporations today. 
The results of this study clearly document that many of these 
companies lacked the incentives to provide the additional disclo-
sure considered typical for an efficient capital market [Senatra 
and Frishkoff, 1984] before regulatory intervention. This varia-
tion in economic factors encountered by firms created a gap 
between the supply and demand for disclosure as modeled by 
Coombs and Edwards [1995]. The economic factors faced by 
some companies encouraged the decision not to disclose a state-
ment or to disclose less then the amount of information wanted 
by market participants [Kohler, 1926]. These results are similar 
to those reported in Murphy [1988], who examined Canadian re-
porting and concluded that regulation was a necessary prerequi-
site for complete disclosure. This paper likewise concludes that 
many companies lacked the incentives to provide full financial 
disclosure without regulatory intervention.
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Abstract: This paper examines the management control-system design 
of mid-19th century U.S. slave plantations using a contingency theory 
framework. Large rice plantations that relied on forced labor and 
tidal-flow agricultural technology were very profitable for their own-
ers. This paper presents a model that links these favorable operating 
results to a close fit between the control-system design and three key 
contingent environmental variables. Absentee owners hired managers 
to provide on-site oversight and periodic operational reporting. These 
managers relied on slave drivers to assign individualized daily tasks to 
the plantation’s field hands and monitor their performance. Produc-
tive field slaves were rewarded with greater free time each working 
day. In addition, many slaves worked cooperatively with their masters 
to obtain better jobs outside the rice fields and cash income. Ultimate-
ly, however, it was the institution of chattel slavery that kept the slaves 
working in the rice fields under oppressive and unhealthy conditions.
INTRODUCTION
This paper extends the existing accounting history literature 
with an analysis of the control systems and practices of U.S. 
ante-bellum slave plantations. This topic has received limited 
coverage in the existing literature. This analysis is couched in 
a perspective of contingency theory. The relationship between 
organizational control and the management of complex organi-
zations has long been a popular topic for accounting research 
[e.g., Otley, 1980; Dent, 1990; Chenhall, 2003]. This paper pre-
sents a study of the managerial control systems and accounting 
practices of 19th century Carolinas Lowcountry rice plantations. 
The commercial success enjoyed by these large rice planters 
reflected a good fit between management control systems and 
Acknowledgments: I would like to offer my sincerest thanks to Diana Berry, 
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key environmental factors. The tidal rice culture was character-
ized by large-scale plantations relying on controlled flooding 
and the forced labor of the descendents of slaves brought to 
achieve commercial rice production for export markets. The 
most profitable of these plantations covered thousands of acres 
and employed hundreds of slaves. As such, they were some of 
the largest and most complex commercial business operations 
in the nation at that time. These business owners utilized an 
integrated set of management and task controls, an integral part 
of a broader framework of social control and culture, to manage 
their agricultural enterprises. Written journals and face-to-face 
reporting from on-site managers provided planters with opera-
tional feedback on the productivity and well being of their slaves 
and land. These managers, in turn, relied heavily upon their 
foremen to make many daily decisions essential for business 
success, to supervise workers in the fields, and to help maintain 
social order in the slave community. Historical scholarship also 
suggests that the African origins of the tidal-flow agricultural 
technology, along with the accompanying tasking system of 
labor organization, evolved in the Carolinas during the 18th cen-
tury as a mechanism to enhance worker productivity. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first 
section presents a discussion on the study’s theoretical frame-
work and a review of the research literature. The second section 
outlines the archival resources that provided the study’s empiri-
cal data, followed by the paper’s main body containing the em-
pirical findings. The final section offers conclusions. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Theoretical Framework: This paper focuses on management and 
task control processes on 19th century U.S. slave plantations. 
Management control describes the process of implementing 
strategy [Anthony and Young, 1999]. Business owners typically 
hire professional managers to run their enterprises on a daily 
basis. Management control describes the relationship between 
business owners and their hired mangers. Owners provide direc-
tion and oversight while managers develop operational plans 
and motivate workers to implement those plans. For this reason, 
management control involves managers and their staffs at all 
levels of the organization [Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998]. 
General controls, formal controls, and a system of compensa-
tion and incentives are the three primary mechanisms for exer-
cising management control. General controls are based upon the 
100
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 37 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/9
93Stewart, Management Control on U.S. Slave Plantations
 organization’s behavioral norms [Goffee and Jones, 1996]. They 
are applied through interpersonal interaction in the workplace 
and the formal direction of subordinates in their activities. Job 
descriptions, periodic formal or informal personnel performance 
evaluations, and formal reporting structures within an organiza-
tion are examples of general controls. Green and Welsh [1988] 
describe formal means of control as a system in which standards 
of performance are determined, measuring systems gauge per-
formance, comparisons are made between standards and actual 
performance, and feedback provides information on variances. 
Financial budgeting systems, periodic responsibility accounting 
reports, and standard cost reporting are formal control systems 
commonly found in contemporary business enterprises. Formal 
controls are supported by and operate through general controls. 
An organization’s compensation and incentive system specifies 
the appropriate financial rewards for desired individual perfor-
mance. Compensation and incentive systems are the tangible 
motivational links between individual work activities and orga-
nizational roles.
Management control practices are applied through an 
organ ization’s task control system to influence daily efforts of an 
organization’s workers. Task control involves the organization 
and direction of workers as they produce the goods or deliver the 
services that form the objective of its operating activities. Task 
control is transaction-orientated; that is, it involves the control 
of individual tasks. Rules to be followed in carrying out these 
tasks are prescribed by the management control process. The 
objective of task control is to assure that specified tasks are car-
ried out efficiently and effectively [Anthony and Govindarajan, 
1998]. Task control involves task specification, programming, 
and quality control. Task specification involves the prospec-
tive definition of the work to be done and its communication 
to workers. Task specification can be expressed alternatively in 
terms of the steps to be followed or the outcome to be realized. 
Where the steps to be followed from start to task completion can 
be fully specified, these steps can best be described as program-
ming. Programming is often embodied in the form of standard 
operating procedures (SOPs). Quality control insures that the 
task performance was effective; that is, task specifications have 
been met or SOPs have been followed. Task control is central to 
the direction of workers in their daily activities by supervisors 
and managers.
Feedback, which is central to the control process, is based 
upon communication [Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998]. 
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 Organizational goals, objectives, and plans are communicated 
down the organization’s chain of command while environmen-
tal intelligence and performance results are communicated up. 
Management control relies on the communication between 
managers and owners. Management accounting systems, which 
convey economic and operating information, are nested within 
these communication channels [Waterhouse and Tiessen, 1978]. 
Managers and owners on Lowcountry rice plantations commu-
nicated with one another by face-to-face contact and/or letters, 
journals, ledgers, and other hand-written reports. Communica-
tion between plantation owners and managers and slaves must 
have been primarily by oral interaction. Thus, task specification, 
programming, and quality control, the core of the task control 
process, must have been exercised via general management con-
trols of supervision and organizational structure.
Contingency theory has been one of the dominant concep-
tual frameworks for research into management control over the 
past two decades [e.g., Otley, 1980; Dent, 1990; Fisher, 1995]. 
Waterhouse and Tiessen [1978] and Otley [1980] reaffirmed 
the role of two key contextual variables, environment and 
technology, in the design of an effective management control 
structure. Technology defines how the work of the organization 
is performed as well as the ways in which organizational par-
ticipants and key stakeholders communicate and interact [Otley, 
1980]. It includes a conversion technology that is the core of 
the organization’s production process. Organizational informa-
tion and communication technologies establish parameters on 
its communications and feedback processes. Meyers and Scott 
[1983] distinguish broadly between two types of organizational 
environments, the technical and the institutional. Technical 
environments are those in which organizations acquire factor 
inputs, apply an appropriate conversion technology to those 
inputs, and deliver the resulting product or service to the mar-
ketplace. These exchanges between the organization and its 
environment occur in markets that reward efficient and effective 
performance. Technical environments foster the development 
of rationalized structures that efficiently coordinate technical 
work. By contrast, institutional environments are characterized 
by the elaboration of rules and requirements to which organiza-
tions must conform in order to receive legitimacy and support 
[Rowan and Meyers, 1977]. In institutional environments, or-
ganizations are rewarded for utilizing the designated structures 
and processes, not for the quality and quantity of their outputs. 
This study draws its primary theoretical framework from 
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managerial accounting research that seeks to develop models 
that link organizational outcomes, contextual variables, and 
management control-system design [Chenhall, 2003]. While an 
organization’s control structures are contingent on its environ-
mental context, its effectiveness and efficiency are measured by 
its performance relative to its goals and objectives [Waterhouse 
and Tiessen, 1978]. This paper proceeds from the notion that 
superior organizational performance, defined operationally as 
cash profits, is a function of the fit between the organization’s 
key contextual variables and its management control-system 
design [Gerdin and Greve, 2004]. Good fit means enhanced per-
formance while poor fit implies diminished performance.
FIGURE 1
A Contingency Theory Perspective on  
Management Control-System Design
Organizational Environment
Institutional Environment
•	 Customs and Language
•	 Political and Legal 
Institutions
Management
Control System
Organizational
Outcomes
Technical Environment
•	 Factor & Product Market
•	 Production & Information 
Technology
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Literature Review: Management control systems and activities 
on slave plantations have received only modest attention in the 
accounting history literature. Fleischman and Tyson [2004] 
reviewed many account books and ledgers produced by 19th 
century slave plantation owners and managers. Their review 
was largely focused on the use of these journals to measure slave 
valuation and productivity. They found that these plantation re-
cords were rarely used to compile the productivity and valuation 
of individual slaves. Instead, they concluded that these journals 
were instruments of social control over slaves rather than a 
means for measuring and reporting the results of operations 
or the financial condition of the enterprise. Vollmers [2003] 
examines the role that hired managers played in supervising 
and reporting on the work activities of slaves in the North Caro-
lina turpentine industry. The drivers’ responsibilities included 
inspecting production output, insuring that each slave met his 
daily output quota. The overseer compiled daily production out-
puts and maintained an account book which contained records 
of slave production, supplies received and purchased, as well as 
miscellaneous cash payments including those to slaves. Tyson et 
al. [2004] focuses exclusively on the task control relationships 
between U.S. and British West Indies planters and their slaves. 
Their research indicates that U.S. plantation owners relied on 
two alternative methods of task control (ganging and tasking) 
for their African work force. However, their work did not seek to 
examine the role played by supervisory personnel and organiza-
tional structures that supported these relationships.
ARCHIVAL RESOURCES
This paper makes extensive use of the Records of Ante-Bel-
lum Southern Plantations: From the Revolution to the Civil War 
[Stampp and Boehm, 1985]. This collection consists of selected 
microfilmed, primary-source material drawn from the University 
of South Carolina Library, the South Carolina Historical Society, 
the Duke University Library, the Maryland Historical Society, 
the Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, the Loui-
siana State University Libraries, and the University of Virginia 
Library. In particular, this paper draws on the Paul D. Weston 
Family Papers 1786-1869, Georgetown District, South Carolina; 
the Thomas Ashton Coffin Plantation Book 1800-1813, Beaufort 
District, South Carolina; and the Richmond Overseer Journal, 
1859-1860, Charleston District, South Carolina. Also used were 
the Robert F.W. Allston Family Papers in The South Carolina 
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Rice Plantation as Revealed in the Papers of Robert F.W. Allston 
[Allston, 1945]. While the selection of these four collections of 
family papers was drawn from geographically diverse locations 
within the Carolinas Lowcountry, they do not reflect a randomly 
selected sample or a complete census of all mid-19th century 
rice plantations. Instead, these sources were chosen because of 
their participation in the tidal rice culture, the breadth of their 
records and correspondence, and their legibility. Hurmence 
[1989] provided a different perspective derived from the recol-
lections of African Americans working as slaves in the Carolina 
rice fields. Hurmence recorded 27 oral histories of former slaves 
gathered during the Great Depression by the Federal Writers’ 
Project. Olmsted [1856] toured the southern states starting in 
1852 and reported on the management and operations of Mr. X’s 
rice plantations in South Carolina. 
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
Organizational Outcomes: This paper’s contingency theoreti-
cal perspective predicts that superior organizational outcomes 
among 19th century tidal rice plantations are associated with 
a management control-system design that efficiently adapted 
to the key features of the organizational environment. Swan’s 
[1973] analysis, based on a sample of 575 rice farms in 1859, 
reported that rice farming was, for most planters, an unprofit-
able venture. Roughly two-thirds of the sample farms reported 
an estimated rate of return below 6%, the assumed opportunity 
cost of capital. Moreover, more than one-third of sample farms, 
mostly small units, had negative net receipts. However, the 
largest 20% of the sample units, those plantations with annual 
production of at least 100,000 pounds of clean rice, accounted 
for 96% of the region’s rice crop. Only this group of plantations 
earned an average rate of return in excess of the opportunity 
cost of capital with over 70% of large plantations at least this 
profitable. 
In the economic and technological context of the mid-19th 
century rice industry, quantity production was possible only 
with the use of tidal-flow agricultural techniques, expansive land 
holdings, and the labor of hundreds of slaves. Robert F.W. All-
ston (1801-1864) was one of the mid-century’s most successful 
rice planters. He owned and operated a network of seven planta-
tions along the Pee Dee River near Charleston, South Carolina. 
His land holdings included more than 4,000 acres in rice land 
and another 9,500 acres of pasture and timber lands [Allston, 
105
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2010, Vol. 37, no. 1 [whole issue]
Published by eGrove, 2010
Accounting Historians Journal, June 201098
1945]. In 1827, Allston resigned as surveyor-general of South 
Carolina to take over full-time management of a large rice plan-
tation, Chicora Wood, which he had inherited from his father. 
Chicora Wood served as a home base for his network of rice 
plantations. Rice production from these plantations exceeded 
840,000 pounds of rice in 1850 and 1,500,000 pounds by 1860. 
Based on prevailing rice prices, his plantations’ annual gross 
receipts generally exceeded $65,000 during the 1850s. The slave 
labor force that produced rice for him increased from 401 in 
1850 to 630 by 1860. 
While financial records documenting the full extent of All-
ston’s operations were not available, Table 1 provides a summary 
of receipts, expenditures, and return on investment for Waverly 
Plantation for 1855-1857 [Allston, 1945, pp. 46-48]. Waverly 
Plantation included 587 acres of which about 150 acres were 
dedicated to tidal-flow rice cultivation. Next to the rice lands 
stood the plantation house, slave quarters, and a rice mill which
TABLE 1
Waverly Plantation Cash Receipts, 
Expenditures, and Capital Investments 
1855, 1856, and 1857
1855 1856 1857
Receipts
Crop Sales $ 14,486.59 $   8,824.56 $ 15,264.92
Mill Earnings 7,325.53 13,382.78 15,786.32
Total Receipts $ 21,812.12 $ 22,207.34 $ 31,051.24
Expenditures
Supplies 4,875.80 4,976.34 5,843.13
Lumber and Fuel 2,747.25 4,839.55 10,076.37
Mill Repairs 878.50 1,792.45 2,410.58
Overseer’s Wages 1,100.00 1,100.00 1,050.00
Miller’s Wages 580.14 800.00 900.00
Slave Hire 780.00 925.00 1,504.31
Medical Services 237.25 6.50 1,514.81
Legal Services 4.00 4.50 10.00
Taxes 231.71 218.31 249.60
Interest on Advances 454.97 42.86
Interest on Bonds 839.47 839.47 1,419.01
Miscellaneous 631.98 188.06
Total Expenditures 13,361.07 15,544.98 25,165.87
Net Receipts $   8,451.05 $   6,662.36 $   5,885.37
Capital Investment
Land $ 62,074.78 $ 62,074.78 $ 62,074.78
Slaves 17,731.76 17,731.76 23,388.76
Other 7,062.13 7,757.26 8,965.16
Total Capital Investment $ 86,868.67 $ 87,563.80 $ 94,428.70
Return on Investment 9.7% 7.6% 6.2%
Source: Allston [1945, pp. 46-48] (adapted)
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“pounded” not only Waverly’s crop but that of many other neigh-
boring plantations. Beyond this area, there were many acres of 
cultivated lands dedicated to growing provision crops such as 
sweet potatoes, corn, and peas. 
These financial records from a single plantation among All-
ston’s larger properties indicate one of two sources of economies 
of scale suggested by Swan’s [1973] broader findings. Larger 
rice producers were able to accumulate the capital needed to 
take advantage of new technologies. Historically, the husking 
and polishing of the rice harvest was one of the most time-
consuming and labor-intensive aspects of its cultivation. By the 
1830s, many of the larger plantations operated pounding and/or 
threshing mills driven by steam engines. Carney [2001] suggests 
that the mechanization of this process early in the 19th century 
greatly improved the productivity and profitability of rice culti-
vation. In addition, mill operations enabled large planters like 
Allston to diversify their revenue streams. Table 1 indicates that 
mill receipts exceeded those from rice sales for two of the three 
years presented. 
The size of its slave labor force and the extent of its culti-
vated lands also provided a large Lowcountry rice plantation in 
that era with considerable economies of scope as well. Like Wa-
verly, most large plantations reserved many acres of cultivated 
lands for provision crops and livestock. Olmsted [1856, p. 426] 
observed that:
Mr. X allotted a half an acre of land to each family of 
negroes for a garden. They are at liberty to sell what ever 
they chose from the products of their gardens, and to 
make what they can by keeping swine and fowls. Mr. X’s 
family has no supply of eggs and poultry than what is 
obtained by purchase from his negroes; they frequently, 
also, purchase game from them. 
In March 1858, Allston executed a contract with his slaves to 
encourage them to raise hogs for his purchase [Allston, 1945, 
p. 350]. The profitability of these large rice plantations was 
 considerably improved by their internal sourcing of produce 
and meat for their free and slave residents. While the bulk of Mr. 
X’s 200 slave residents were “prime hands” who worked in the 
rice fields, Olmsted [1856, p. 426] observed that “Adjoining the 
mill-house were shops and sheds, in which blacksmiths, carpen-
ters, and other mechanics, all slaves belonging to Mr. X, were at 
work.” These skilled mechanics and artisans, such as carpenters, 
who built the irrigation trunks and maintained the houses and 
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fences; a blacksmith or two who did the iron works; coopers 
who made the barrels to contain the rice; and bricklayers, were 
able to produce virtually everything necessary to support the 
plantation’s agricultural operations. These economies of scope 
supported and supplemented the large plantations’ economies 
of scale [Swan, 1973]. The combined impact of these economies 
of scale and scope enhanced the profitability of large rice planta-
tions by creating a largely self-sufficient economic enterprise.
Three Contingent Contextual Variables: This paper’s concep-
tual model predicts that the profitability accruing to Allston and 
many other owners of large Lowcountry rice plantations were 
linked through an efficient management control-system design 
to three key contextual variables. These three contextual factors 
were the natural features of the Carolina Lowcountry, the de-
mographic and cultural aspects of the West-African labor force 
who worked the rice fields, and the institution of chattel slavery. 
These contextual factors offer opportunities and challenges that 
motivated the control system design of the large rice planta-
tions. 
The Geographic Location, Climate, and Topography of the Caro-
linas Lowcountry: The geography, climate, and topography of 
the coastal regions of the Carolinas, Georgia, and northern 
Florida, later know as the Lowcountry, was a key contingent en-
vironmental factor leading to the development of the Carolinas 
tidal-rice culture and the plantation economy it nurtured. Rice 
was first grown successfully in South Carolina about 1680 when 
Henry H. Woodward planted seed given him by the captain of 
a Madagascar ship [Clifton, 1981b]. By the early 18th century, 
it became a major export crop of the lower South. Rice exports 
rose from 10,000 pounds in 1698 to over 20 million by 1730. The 
cultivation of rice with the tidal-flow method transformed the 
coastal southeast between 1783 and the early 19th century [Car-
ney, 2001]. This highly productive method was practical only 
on the lower stretches of a few rivers from Cape Fear in North 
Carolina to the St. Johns in north Florida. Moreover, many of 
these rivers, primarily the Ashley, the Pee Dee, and the Wacca-
maw, served as highways for the bulk movement of agricultural 
produce and other goods to Charleston. Charleston became one 
of the leading seaports in the Western Hemisphere in the early 
18th century. This major seaport gave local rice planters ready 
access to their customers in northern Europe and their slave 
laborers from West Africa and the West Indies. 
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The climate of coastal South Carolina and Georgia also 
proved equally suitable for the spread of tropical diseases such 
as malaria and yellow fever, diseases that thrived on the swampy 
coastal plain, especially around the flooded rice plantations. 
Early in the 18th century, the white planters adopted the custom 
of leaving their farms altogether during the rainy summer and 
autumn months when fever ran rampant. The white population 
in the region stayed relatively low, but the importation of Afri-
can slaves increased as the rice plantations expanded. By 1708, 
there was a black majority in South Carolina, a unique situation 
among the North American colonies. In some coastal areas, 80-
90% of the population was enslaved [Wood, 1974, p. 60].
The geography of South Carolina, together with the region’s 
black majority, also encouraged the foundation and continuing 
existence of maroon communities of runaway slaves [Lockley, 
2005]. The swampy topography offered many areas of refuge to 
maroons where they could carve out their lives free from white 
control. The dense woods between the swamps were impassible 
to slave hunters on horseback, forcing them to deploy them-
selves on foot in small groups where they were more vulnerable 
and less effective [Stroyer, 1898]. Yet, no maroon community 
could survive completely cut off from the outside world. While 
food could be grown, water was abundant, and shelter readily 
fashioned, maroon communities could not make metal goods 
or replenish shot and powder for guns [Lockley, 2005]. In short, 
these communities needed regular clandestine commerce either 
with plantation-based slave communities or white merchants 
for their long-term survival. However, these small communities 
could only survive by maintaining a modest size and shadowy 
existence. The bulk of the Lowcountry’s slaves was forced to 
live on the plantation. Nevertheless, the presence of these com-
munities reflected the limits of the planters’ control over their 
workforce. They dared not press too hard lest their workers and 
valued property would simply walk away into the swamps to 
these communities [Olmsted, 1860].
A West-African Labor Force: The creation of a tidal rice planta-
tion required a substantial capital investment and a tremendous 
amount of back-breaking labor. Clifton [1981b, p. 278] reports 
from contemporary sources that acquiring the necessary slave 
force constituted more the half of the £2,000 cost of establish-
ing a typical 1,000 acre rice plantation in the 18th century. In a 
world before modern earth-moving machinery, men with shovels 
and other hand equipment cleared riverside swamps of timber 
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and undergrowth, surrounded them with earthen levees, and 
then constructed an intricate system of dams, dikes, floodgates, 
ditches, and drains. Moreover, rice cultivation was an extremely 
labor-intensive activity, requiring continual labor inputs from 
many workers throughout the year. This enormous need for 
labor greatly encouraged the introduction of a slave labor force. 
South Carolina was a slave colony from its inception in the 16th 
century. Although the first Africans arrived in 1526 as part of 
a large Spanish expedition from the West Indies, planters who 
later emigrated from Barbados established large-scale slavery 
in the Carolinas on indigo and rice plantations. The Atlantic 
slave trade was at its height and agricultural laborers from West 
Africa were available in great numbers. Clifton [1981b] reports 
that the slave trade increased from an average annual importa-
tion of 390 slaves for the years 1721-1725 to almost 2,100 for the 
years 1731-1738. 
From the earliest times, there was a close relationship be-
tween the technical skills of the African slaves imported into the 
region and rice cultivation. The South Carolina planters were, 
at first, completely ignorant of rice cultivation, and their early 
experiments with this specialized type of tropical agriculture 
were mostly failures. On the other hand, Carney [1996] noted 
that rice cultivation in West Africa dates back to at least 1500 
B.C., and the methods of planting and processing the crop were 
already known to thousands of slaves brought to South Carolina 
with the onset of the transatlantic slave trade late in the 17th 
century. These African slaves brought knowledge from their 
homelands of different modes of rice cultivation, soil and water 
management, and milling, which they adapted to Lowcountry 
rice plantations. The Carolina planters soon recognized the 
advantage of importing slaves from the traditional rice-growing 
region of West Africa. Wood [1974, p. 60] reported that the 
prominent 18th century Carolina merchant Henry Laurens 
wrote: “…the Slaves from the River Gambia are preferr’d to all 
others with us [here in Carolina] save the Gold Coast.... next to 
Them the Windward Coast are preferr’d to Angolas.” As a result, 
the Lowcountry rice planters largely adopted a system of rice 
cultivation that drew heavily on the labor patterns and techni-
cal knowledge of their African slaves by the late 18th century. In 
South Carolina and Georgia, the slaves simply continued with 
many of the methods of rice farming to which they were accus-
tomed in Africa [Clifton, 1981b]. 
Wood [1974] noted that writers of the period remarked that 
there was no harder or unhealthier work possible than rice cul-
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tivation. Working under a semi-tropical sun and standing knee 
deep in periodically flooded fields, Lowcountry slaves worked 
under brutal conditions and were regularly exposed to a host of 
water-borne diseases. Moreover, the high population density of 
the large rice plantations also meant these infectious diseases 
spread rapidly. These conditions helped to create mortality rates 
three times higher than those of slaves elsewhere in North Amer-
ica [Fogel and Engerman, 1974]. In addition, Dusinberre [1996] 
estimated that nearly two out of every three African-American 
children on rice plantations failed to reach their sixteenth birth-
day, and over a third of all slave children died before their first 
birthday. This high level of infant mortality and morbidity was 
probably the result of the mothers’ chronic malaria and fatigue 
from the rigors of rice cultivation. Under these conditions, it is 
not surprising that few if any people, white or black, would free-
ly chose to work in the Carolina rice fields. Carney [2001] noted 
that the large Carolina tidal rice plantations which produced 
great wealth for their owners for a century and a half completely 
disappeared two decades after the abolition of slavery.
Chattel Slavery – “America’s Peculiar Institution”: Slavery was 
therefore an essential ingredient in the successful establishment 
of cash-crop plantations in 18th century South Carolina. Slave 
traders in Africa soon learned that South Carolina was an espe-
cially profitable market for slaves. The rice planters there were 
willing to pay higher prices for slaves from the Rice Coast, the 
Windward Coast, Gambia, and Sierra Leone. In the second half 
of the 18th century, Bance Island was one of the major slave-
trading operations on the Rice Coast of West Africa [Opala, 
1986]. Richard Oswald was the principal partner in the London 
firm that operated Bance Island. Circa 1756, Oswald established 
a close personal and business relationship with Henry Laurens, 
one of the wealthiest rice planters and slave dealers in the South 
Carolina Colony. Laurens advertised the slaves and then sold 
them at auction to local rice planters for a 10% commission. For 
example, the Charleston Evening Gazette of July 11, 1785 adver-
tised “a choice cargo of Windward and Gold Coast Negroes, who 
have been accustomed to the planting of rice” [Wood, 1974, p. 
60].
The legal institution of chattel slavery in British North 
America became the basis of social control over African-Amer-
ican slaves. South Carolina passed a new slave code in 1740, 
more commonly known as the “Negro Act” [Sirmans, 1962]. The 
code, which was passed in response to the Stono slave rebel-
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lion of 1739, remained largely unaltered until emancipation in 
1865. The act also served as a model for the Georgia slave code 
of 1755. The new code reduced slaves to the status of chattel 
property. They were further denied any kind of protection under 
the law. Punishment for the murder of a slave by a white, for 
example, was reduced to a mere misdemeanor punishable by a 
fine. Moreover, much of the Negro Act was devoted to control-
ling minute aspects of a slave’s life. For example, slaves were not 
allowed to dress in a way “above the condition of slaves.” Blacks 
were prohibited from learning how to read and write and were 
not permitted to assemble. Blacks in violation of these provi-
sions were subject to flogging or any other punishment that their 
owners deemed appropriate. Moreover, these oppressive laws 
were aggressively enforced, backed by the local law enforce-
ment, state militia, and private slave catchers [Henry, 1913].
Management Control Structures and Practices in the Tidal Rice 
Culture: A century and a half of evolution of the Carolina tidal 
rice culture served to make the 1850s the zenith of the Low-
country’s large rice plantations. It is this time period that forms 
the temporal context for this study. The establishment of large-
scale rice plantations on the tidewater regions of the Carolinas 
and Georgia required a massive engineering effort that was sup-
ported by an enormous investment in well-organized labor to 
achieve and maintain [Stewart, 1996]. The 18th century African 
slave trade brought thousands of slaves who formed this labor 
force and the majority of the region’s population after the first 
decade of the 18th century. Many of these slaves possessed the 
expertise that facilitated a transfer of the tidal-flow rice culti-
vation technology from West Africa to the Carolinas [Carney, 
1996]. Carney [2001] concluded that the task labor system was 
probably of African origin as it was already a feature of African 
slavery along the Upper Guinea Coast and its hinterlands during 
the transatlantic slave trade. Moreover, she also found evidence 
that some slaves possessed a special expertise that their masters 
lacked, enabling them to negotiate the customary patterns of 
work and reciprocity that evolved into the task labor system. Lit-
tlefield [1981] observed that this system initially evolved on the 
rice plantation of the Carolinas beginning in the 18th century. 
In addition, unlike tobacco which required continual attention 
from closely supervised workers throughout its cultivation, rice 
is a relatively hardy plant whose successful cultivation required 
only a few readily observable operations [Morgan, 1982]. Large-
ly in place by the middle of the 18th century, the task system 
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on the Lowcountry’s rice plantations prescribed specific daily 
expectations for each type of labor [Trinkley, 2005]. 
Work and Task Control in the Carolinas Rice Fields: By the mid-
19th century, the daily tasks assigned to field hands were well 
defined by custom and practice. Olmsted [1856, pp. 435-436) 
observed that:
All ordinary and regular work is performed by task: that 
is to say, each hand has his labor for the day marked 
out before him, and can take his own time to do it in…
In hoeing rice, a certain number of rows, equal to one-
half or two-thirds of an acre, according to the condi-
tion of the land; in sowing rice (strewing in drills), two 
acres; in reaping rice (if it stands well), three-quarters 
of an acre… 
Sylvia Cannon recalled that on the plantation where she lived 
and worked, “All the fields were named and the driver just had 
to call on the horn and tell you what field to go work in that day” 
[Hurmence, 1989, p. 124]. A slave would be expected to weed, 
sow, or harvest that size field in one day. The daily assignment of 
tasks to individual slaves was based on their age, sex, and physi-
cal strength. James Sparkman, a Georgetown District planter, 
allocated tasks to each slave on his plantation based upon their 
physical strength, age, and health. Field hands were rated as 
one-quarter, one-half, three-quarters, or full hands. While the 
size of the task would remain fixed, allowances could be made 
for the individual and the work that he or she could be expected 
to complete on a given day. For example, a young woman who 
was ordinarily classified as a full-task hand might be reclassified 
as a quarter-task hand during the period of her convalescence 
from childbirth [Sparkman, 1945, p. 346].
Incentives and Punishment in the Carolina Rice Fields: The task 
labor system provided 19th century Lowcountry planters with a 
mechanism for rewarding productive field hands. Upon complet-
ing the day’s task, field hands could effectively earn the opportu-
nity to perform other work. They had the free time necessary to 
cultivate their own garden crops or perform plantation labor for 
which they were to be monetarily compensated. Olmsted [1856, 
p. 426] observed: 
As the negroes finished the labor required of them by 
Mr. X, at three or four o’clock in the afternoon, they 
can employ the remainder of the day in laboring for 
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themselves, if they choose. Mr. X allotted a half an acre 
of land to each family of negroes for a garden. They are 
at liberty to sell whatever they chose from the products 
of their gardens, and to make what they can by keeping 
swine and fowls.
This capability afforded by the tasking system to gain greater 
control over their own lives and time was a powerful incen-
tive for productivity and cooperation. Sam Polite, a Beaufort 
County field hand, recollected: “When you knock off work, you 
can work your land. Maybe you might have two or three tasks 
(a quarter acre) of land round your cabin what Master gave you 
for planting. You can have chicken, maybe hog. You can sell egg 
and chicken to store and Master will buy your hog. In that way, 
slave can have money for buy thing like fish and whatever he 
wants” [Hurmence, 1989, p. 78]. Beyond the half days of release 
the task system provided, a vacation of several days was given 
to all the plantation hands following the harvesting period (six 
to eight weeks), the one time of the crop season when the task 
system was not followed. Here, the entire plantation work force 
was busy from dawn to dusk and even on Sundays if the condi-
tion of the crop necessitated such a schedule [Trinkley, 2005]. 
Lowcountry planters supplemented the task-based incen-
tives with a system of corporal and capital punishment to sanc-
tion those who failed to meet their daily tasks. Unlike free labor-
ers of other times and places, the Lowcountry slaves could be 
brutally beaten legally, could not move about freely, or assert any 
economic rights. Sam Polite recalled further: “If a slave don’t 
do task, they get licking with lash on naked back. The driver 
give the licking, but Master most always been there. Sometime 
maybe a slave [would] steal a hog or run away to the wood, then 
he get licking, too” [Hurmence, 1989, p. 77]. The punishment of 
slaves for their failure to meet their productivity objectives was 
not limited to whipping and corporal punishment. Slaves, after 
all, constituted a material proportion of their masters’ net worth 
whose value would fall from extreme physical abuse. Roswell 
King [1828, p. 1], a planter and overseer, observed: “When I pass 
sentence myself, various modes of punishment are adopted; 
the lash, least of all – Digging stumps, or clearing away trash 
about the settlements, in their own time; but the most severe is, 
confinement at home six months to twelve months, or longer....” 
Prince Smith [Hurmence, 1989, p. 89] recalled that his master 
relied on three types of punishment to discipline unproduc-
tive or disobedient slaves. One method included confinement 
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to a small, unventilated room called the “sweat box.” A second 
method was confinement to an open-air restraint called the 
“stock.” Finally, a slave would be restrained with leg shackles for 
a period of several days. 
Field hands had to do much more than meet their task pro-
ductivity standards. Corporal punishment was also an integral 
part of an oppressive system of social control. Whippings were 
also administered for offenses such as theft, illicit slave meet-
ings, or being off the plantation without a pass. The harshest 
punishments were reserved for attempting to run away. Elijah 
Green, a Charleston County house servant, recalled: “When 
slaves run away and their masters catch them, to the stockade 
they go, they’d be whipped every other week for a number of 
months. And for God’s sake, don’t let a slave be catch with pencil 
and paper. That was a major crime” [Hurmence, 1989, p. 63]. 
Joyner [1984] reported that one plantation owner sold each of 
his would-be runaways to different slave masters, ensuring that 
these men would be permanently separated from their wives 
and families. The rituals of whippings and other publicly admin-
istered forms of punishment were as much a part of the planta-
tion compensation and incentive system as the rewards for faith-
ful, productive service. When a master personally supervised or 
administered punishment, no less than when he distributed gifts 
or favors, he did so in rituals that emphasized his dominant po-
sition over his slaves.
Functional Diversity and its Implications for Organizational 
Control: African-American slaves held a remarkable diversity of 
the jobs within the Lowcountry plantation economy. The black 
majority population and a physical climate that facilitated the 
spread of such diseases as malaria and yellow fever drastically 
limited the supply of free white skilled labor. Table 2 below sum-
marizes the occupational distribution found on two Lowcountry 
rice plantations [Joyner, 1984]:
This diverse occupational structure had two major implica-
tions of interest. First, it drew a high level of productivity from 
the plantation’s slave labor force. All slaves worked, men and 
women of all ages as well as children from age seven. While 
most slaves toiled in the rice fields, many others worked in work-
shops surrounding the fields and in the planter’s residence. All 
these jobs either directly or indirectly contributed to the size of 
the annual harvest which, in turn, contributed to the plantation’s 
profitability. Second, the presence of these non-field occupations 
offered opportunities for those slaves who were willing to work 
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TABLE 2
Distribution of Occupations among Slaves 
Laurel Hill and Hagley Plantations, 1854
Occupation Laurel Hill Plantation Hagley Plantation
Field Hand 115 61
Drivers 3 1
Carpenters 10 3
Coopers 4 1
Carters 1 1
Bricklayers 1 0
Coachman 0 2
Engineer 3 0
Mill Hands 2 0
Mill Watchman 6 0
Cook 5 5
House Servant 6 9
Animal Minder 9 0
Stableman 1 0
Trunk Minder 1 1
Source: Joyner [1984, pp.61-62]
hard, not make trouble, or run away. Many advantages accrued 
to the few slaves who became skilled artisans. For example, Mr. 
X made it a practice to apprentice promising slave youngsters 
for training as skilled workmen [Olmsted, 1856, p. 427]. Mr. X 
relates the following brief biography of one of his favorite slave 
artisans:
Being the son of a favorite house-servant, he had been, 
as a child, associated with the white family, and re-
ceived by chance something of the early education of 
the white children. When old enough, he was allowed to 
learn the blacksmith’s trade, in the plantation shop. Fi-
nally, his owner took him to a steam engine builder, and 
paid him $500 to have him instructed as a machinist. 
After he had become a skilled workman, he obtained 
employment as an engineer; and for some years con-
tinued in this occupation, and was allowed to spend his 
wages for himself. Mr. X eventually brought him, much 
against his inclinations, back to the plantations. Being 
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allowed peculiar privileges, and given duties wholly 
flattering to his self-respect, he soon became contented; 
and, of course, was able to be extremely valuable to his 
owner.
This brief biography highlights many of the advantages that ac-
crued to the few slaves who were able to become skilled artisans. 
First and foremost, they were largely able to avoid the unhealthy 
environment of the rice fields. Moreover, their command of 
these skills enabled slave mechanics to have greater autonomy 
over their work, the ability to travel unsupervised, and the op-
portunity to earn hard cash for their services [Olmsted, 1856]. 
As a consequence, black artisans commanded considerable sta-
tus and prestige in the social hierarchy of the plantation’s slave 
community. The continual striving for these relative advantages 
by some slaves reflected their determination to make the best of 
their subservient role under the slave regime.
The Lowcountry rice plantation was also a residential fa-
cility for the owner’s family as well as for hundreds of slaves. 
Consequently, a number of slaves worked as cooks, domestics, 
and child-care attendants. Olmsted [1856, p. 421] observed 
that working in the “big house” offered many tangible rewards 
to the domestic slave as well: “The labor required of them was 
light, and they were treated with much more concern for their 
health and comfort than is usually given to free domestics. They 
live in brick cabins, adjoining the planter’s house and stables, 
and one of these into which I looked, is neatly and comfortably 
furnished.” Eating some of the food intended for the master’s 
plate gave the domestic slave a better and more varied diet than 
his field counterpart. Domestic servants were also better dressed 
either as a function of their job duties or paternalistic hand-me-
downs from the master to “his favorite gal” or “uncle.” Finally, 
sleeping in a mansion or adjoining brick structures was usually 
warmer and drier than a night in the rudely constructed and 
maintained “Negro houses.”
The Role of the Slave Driver: The position of driver was the 
highest position of authority and responsibility open to the rice-
culture slaves [Clifton, 1981a]. The drivers’ primary work activi-
ties involved the personal supervision of the field hands under 
their charge. Olmsted [1856, p. 432] accompanied Mr. X on daily 
rounds of his holdings and observed that, “We found several 
other gangs of negroes at work; one entirely of men engaging 
in ditching; another of women, and another of boys and girls, 
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listing an old corn-field with hoes. All of them were working by 
tasks, and were overlooked by negro drivers.” P.C.J. Weston’s 
[1786-1869, call #11/453] specimen overseers’ contract included 
the following job description for his drivers: “Drivers are, under 
the Overseer, to maintain discipline and order on the place. They 
are to be responsible for the quiet of the negro houses, for the 
proper performance of tasks, for bringing out the people early in 
the morning, and generally for the immediate inspection of such 
things as the Overseer only generally superintends.” As such, the 
drivers constituted the primary link between the management 
and task control systems on large rice plantations. The driver 
would get the hands to the fields in the mornings, organize the 
work gangs for the day, assign tasks, and excuse them upon the 
satisfactory completion of the day’s labor. These slave drivers 
were also the primary means through which work quality and 
productivity standards were enforced upon the work activities of 
the field hands in the Lowcountry rice fields. Olmsted [1856, p. 
437] observed: 
Before any field of work is entered upon by a gang, the 
driver who is to superintend them has to measure and 
stake off the tasks. To do this accurately, in irregular-
shaped fields, must require considerable powers of 
calculation. A driver, with a boy to set stakes, I was told, 
would accurately lay out forty acres a day, in half-acre 
tasks. The only instrument used is a five-foot measuring 
rod. When the gang comes to the field, he [the driver] 
points out to each person his or her duty for the day, 
and then walk about among them, looking out that each 
proceeds properly. 
The driver was also the primary mechanism through which 
general controls were applied to ensure that task productivity 
and quality standards were achieved by the field hands. Olmsted 
[1856, p. 436] noted that, “It is the driver’s duty to make the 
tasked hands do their work well. If, in their haste to finish it, 
they neglect to do it properly, he ‘sets them back,’ so that care-
lessness will hinder more than it will hasten the completion of 
their tasks.” Moreover, the driver’s responsibilities extended be-
yond the fields into the slave quarters and community. It was the 
driver’s duty to maintain order among the field hands and other 
slaves during their leisure hours, functioning as a policeman 
and magistrate. Finally, the drivers provided the planter and his 
hired manager with informational feedback on conditions in the 
rice fields as well as the slave community. A Santee River, South 
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Carolina, overseer reported that he required each of his three 
drivers to report to him each evening. During these meetings, 
each driver would report the work of the day just ended and 
learn what undertakings were scheduled for the next day [Rich-
mond Overseer Journal, 1859-1860, call #34/184]. 
The region’s generally unhealthy conditions and the small 
size of its white population played a major role of limiting free 
white participation in the drivers’ ranks. It is also possible that 
the African origin of the tidal-rice technology and the support-
ing task labor system may have established a tradition of Afri-
can slaves as labor supervisors or drivers on the rice plantations 
[Clifton, 1981a]. In any event, the qualities for which a driver 
received the greatest praise from a planter were intelligence, 
managerial skills, and practical knowledge of the intricacies of 
farming [Allston, 1945]. Olmsted [1856, p. 437] observed that 
Mr. X went even further on his plantations:
Having generally had long experience on the planta-
tion, the advice of the drivers is commonly taken in 
nearly all the administration, and frequently they are, 
de facto, the managers. Orders of the important points 
of the plantation economy, I have heard given by the 
proprietor directly to them, without the overseer’s be-
ing consulted or informed of them; and it is often left 
with them to decide when and how long to flow the rice 
grounds – the proprietor and overseer deferring to their 
more experienced judgment.
Clearly, the driver’s job conveyed considerable status and 
power. The drivers were often invested with their powers pub-
licly amid great pomp and circumstance by their masters. For 
example, Daniel, Benjamin Allston’s driver, was confirmed by 
a local bishop [Allston, 1945]. A Santee River, South Carolina 
overseer [Richmond Overseer Journal, 1859-1860, call #34/184] 
always required that his Negro driver dress better than the other 
slaves. He felt that his better clothes “caused him to maintain a 
pride of character before them which was highly beneficial. In-
deed, I constantly endeavored to do nothing which would cause 
them to lose their respect for him.” Consequently, if this over-
seer felt a need to discipline or reprimand one of his drivers, it 
was done in private. In summary, access to the power and status 
conveyed by the position of driver helped motivate many slaves 
to work hard and cooperatively with their masters. 
The Overseer as COO and Managerial Accountant: Each year, 
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at the end of May, fearing malaria (“country fever”), the Low-
country rice planters and their families with their entourage of 
domestic servants moved away from their plantations, not to 
return until the first week in November [Boyle, 2005]. The over-
seer was the pivotal figure who managed the planter’s properties 
during the cultivation and harvesting seasons. Scarborough 
[1984] observed that the typical Lowcountry overseer was em-
ployed to provide absentee planters with on-site oversight and 
routine operational reporting during the cultivation and harvest-
ing seasons. Key measures of overseer performance included 
births and deaths among the plantation population, the number 
of persons in the plantation’s hospital, and the size and qual-
ity of the plantation’s rice and provisions crop. Consequently, 
many overseers provided their employers with periodic written 
reports about the plantation’s cultivation and harvesting activi-
ties as well as regular updates on their slaves’ general health and 
mortality. Moreover, the Negro Act of 1740 required that a white 
man be present for “each assembly of 10 or more negroes” and 
more than 2,000 acres of land. 
The relationships between plantation owners and their hired 
managers were routinely governed by a management contract. 
Allston retained William Thompson to work as his overseer from 
1822 to 1839. While Thompson’s tenure as overseer extended 
over 17 years, ended only by his death in 1838, his employment 
relationship with Allston was governed by a series of one-year 
contracts. According to his 1822 contract [Allston, 1945, pp. 245-
247], Thompson was to oversee Allston’s two plantations “and 
the negroes, stock, barns, and every species of property thereon, 
in a planter like manner….” While the contract enjoined Thomp-
son “to exert himself to the utmost of his power for the interest 
of his employer with care, skill, fidelity, sobriety, and ability,” as 
overseer he was expected to act “with moderation and humanity 
to the negroes.” Thus, the first duty of the overseer was to take 
care of the slaves and the stock. Moreover, the phrase “planter 
like manner” suggests the overseer’s primary duty was to be ex-
ercised in the spirit of the benevolent plantation owner with an 
eye to the long-term well being of the slaves and stock. Specifi-
cally, the overseer was explicitly forbidden by his contract from 
“striking a negro with a stick,” and he could only administer any 
form of corporal punishment after first seeking and obtaining 
permission from the plantation owner or his family. Failure to 
do so would be grounds for dismissal. Next, he was to see to 
it that enough food was produced for use on the plantation to 
feed its human and animal population. Planters sought to have 
120
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 37 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/9
113Stewart, Management Control on U.S. Slave Plantations
their plantations self-sufficient through the growing of com and 
raising livestock. While the overseer was expected to maximize 
plantation production of its cash crop, rice, it is interesting to 
note that Thompson’s contract contains no provisions related 
to that issue or the size of its seasonal agricultural output. His 
compensation was fixed at “the full sum of Five Hundred Dollars 
to be paid at the end of the term (year), & to allow him for the 
year, a negro woman to cook & wash, & a negro boy to wait on 
him.” 
Where Allston offered his overseer a concisely written con-
tract consisting of three paragraphs, P.C.J. Weston [1786-1869, 
call #11/453] offered his overseers a contract consisting of 17 
paragraphs. The contract specified the overseer’s duties and 
obligations to his employer in very explicit and detailed terms. 
The first provision of the contract states that the overseer’s pri-
mary objective “is to be, under all circumstances, the care and 
well being of the negroes.” This state of well being, however, is 
explicitly defined paternalistically in terms of “obedience, order, 
and discipline.” His secondary objective was to maintain the 
plantation’s physical plant and livestock. His tertiary objective 
was to produce the largest possible crop of rice and provisions. 
The contract goes on to describe the nature, timing, amount, 
and appropriate mode of distributing the slaves’ food rations 
in extensive detail. The overseer was to enforce a work holiday 
schedule including “Good Friday, or Christmas day, or any Sun-
day.” Work was permitted on these days only as a punishment 
for some criminal offense or the failure to complete an assigned 
task. The contract also specified the appropriate timing and ad-
ministration of punishment. Specifically, “it is desirable to allow 
24 hours to elapse between the discovery of the offense and the 
punishment. No punishment is to exceed 15 lashes…Confine-
ment is to be preferred to whipping.” Finally, the overseer was 
expected to prepare weekly reports “from which the Proprietor 
[owner] will obtain most of the facts he desires….” 
While the overseers’ periodic plantation activities and sta-
tus reports have shared common topics, they varied greatly in 
their form. Franklin Collins, an overseer on the Chicora Woods 
Plantation, sent Allston a series of weekly reports summarizing 
plantation activities during 1858 [Allston, 1945, p. 262]. These 
weekly reports were a collection of seven summaries of daily 
activity. These brief summaries covered such diverse activities 
as the distribution of the slaves’ food rations (always done on 
Sunday), the conduct of regular Sunday worship services, a 
listing of sick slaves (always done on Saturday), a description 
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of a whipping (e.g., “Punished Jacob, 39 strips”), a description 
of food production activities (e.g., “Sam Picking Potatoes”), as 
well as a description of the day’s cultivating activities (e.g., “All 
Hands Hoeing rice”). E.W. Rose, an overseer on Thomas Cof-
fin’s [1800-1813, call #34/199] rice plantation in the Beaufort 
District of South Carolina kept a day book in which daily tasks 
and Sunday ration distributions were recorded. Dr. Benjamin 
Huger owned 155 slaves on the Richmond Plantation on the 
Cooper River near Charleston, South Carolina. His overseer, 
whose name is not noted in the archival record, maintained an 
exhaustive journal on plantation activities from 1859 to 1860 
[Richmond Overseer Journal, 1859-1860, call #34/184]. A typical 
daily journal entry would routinely include a reference to the 
day’s weather (e.g., “The weather was fine”), a description of 
the day’s work activities (e.g., “All hands thrashed rice”), and a 
roll call of sick slaves (e.g., “three sick”). His daily journals also 
chronicled the production of food for the plantation such as the 
cultivation of corn and potatoes or the care and slaughter of pigs 
and chickens. The distribution of rations (e.g., “gave allowance 
of potatoes and ‘small’ rice to the hands”) was also noted. Within 
the year’s chronicles, only one instance of corporal punishment 
(e.g., “Stanley was beat”) was noted. His journals also provided 
an accounting of the Richmond Plantation’s November 1859 
rice harvest between the barrels of “market” rice, “seed” rice (for 
next year’s planting) , and “negro” or “small” rice (rations for the 
slaves). 
A review of these three plantations’ correspondence did 
not reveal any form of quantitative objective setting, financial 
budgeting, or formal operational planning that are fundamental 
elements of contemporary management control systems. The 
planters’ normative expectations represented the standards 
against which the overseers’ performance would be judged. For 
example, P.C.J. Weston’s [1786-1869, call #11/453] specimen 
overseers’ contract included the following paragraph:
The Proprietor wishes particularly to impress on the 
Overseer the criterions by which he will judge his use-
fulness and capacity. First – by the general well being 
of the negroes; their cleanly appearance, respectful 
manners, active and vigorous appearance; their comple-
tion of their tasks well and early; the small amount of 
punishment; the excess of births over deaths; the small 
number of persons in the hospitals, and the health of 
the children. Secondly – the condition and fatness of the 
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cattle and mules; the good repair of all the fences and 
buildings, harness, boats, flats, and ploughs; more par-
ticularly the good order of the banks and trunks, and the 
freedom of the fields from grass and volunteer. Thirdly – 
the amount and quality of the rice and provision crops.
Figure 2 below graphically summarizes the application of 
this study’s conceptual model of management control-systems 
design for large 19th century Carolinas Lowcountry rice planta-
tions.
FIGURE 2
A Contingency Theory Model of Management Control 
Design for Large Mid-19th Century Carolinas Tidal-Rice 
Slave Plantations
Plantation Management Control System
General Controls
Supervision by Hired Oversees and Enslaved Drivers
Reporting & Feedback
Overseers’ Day Journals and Oral Reports
Compensation & Incentives
Cash Compensation, Occupational Status and Free Time
Corporal Punishment and Confinement
Institutional Environment
•	 Chattel Slavery
•	 Maroon Communities
 Technical Environment
•	 The geography of the Carolinas 
lowcountry
•	 The hard labor and knowhow of 
the West African work force
Organizational Outcomes
Cash & Economic Profitability of Large Rice Plantations
Plantation Task Control System
Task Specification and Programming
The Tasking System for Organizing Agricultural Activities
Diverse Functional Structure outside the Rice Fields
Quality Control
On Site Evaluation by Overseers and Drivers
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The overseers’ periodic reports provided the bottom-up com-
munications necessary to close the feedback cycle of the control 
process. The plantations’ absentee owners used this feedback 
to obtain a view of their plantation’s productive activities and 
the state of its physical and human resources. These journals 
and narrative reports also helped the planters to assess their 
managerial stewardship. Generally, the content of these reports 
focused on non-financial metrics of agricultural cultivation, 
crops harvested, or measures of human activities (slave births, 
death, etc.). A review of several overseers’ reports revealed very 
limited attempts at labor cost accounting. Monetary metrics of 
costs and revenues do not appear to be a part of the overseers’ 
operational reporting activities. Reports from factors and sales 
agents appear to be the planters’ primary sources of financial 
information about their plantations’ productivity [Allston, 1945, 
pp. 357, 409]. The findings suggest that rice planters relied on 
the general controls of personal supervision by their overseers 
and drivers and the feedback of written and face-to-face reports 
from their white and black managers to maintain control of 
their agricultural operations.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a model of management control-
systems design whose fit to three key contextual factors explains 
the favorable organizational outcomes that demonstrate the 
design’s effectiveness. These three key contextual variables – the 
natural features of the Carolinas Lowcountry, the hard labor and 
agricultural knowhow of the West-African slaves who worked 
the rice fields, and the institution of chattel slavery itself – de-
scribed the work to be done and the technology to be employed. 
Large ante-bellum rice plantations utilized a characteristic 
control design that enabled them to be very profitable economic 
enterprises. The South Carolina Lowcountry planters’ control 
was characterized by a hierarchical organizational structure, the 
tasking system of labor organization, a diverse functional struc-
ture, and an elaborate system of positive and negative incentives 
to motivate their slave workers. Plantation owners typically del-
egated operating authority to overseers and drivers during the 
crucial cultivation and harvesting seasons. The overseers pro-
vided the owners with periodic reports summarizing the planta-
tion’s agricultural operations and regular written updates on 
the health and social status of the plantation’s slave population. 
Most overseers delegated considerable supervisory authority to 
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the drivers in order to control the plantation’s agricultural and 
supporting activities. The drivers established daily performance 
standards for the plantation’s field hands and measured their 
performance relative to these standards to complete the task 
control cycle. The use of the tasking system offered the agricul-
tural workers with a clear short-term incentive for productivity. 
The expedient completion of a field hand’s daily task offered a 
brief but welcome respite from the brutal Carolina sun or the 
opportunity to earn cash income from growing staple crops or 
raising livestock. Other slaves performed key roles in these com-
plex manufacturing, residential, and agricultural enterprises. 
While there were no good jobs for a slave under chattel slavery’s 
regime, skilled slave artisans and domestics enjoyed generally 
better lives than those toiling in the fields. Consequently, many 
slaves worked cooperatively with their masters to achieve these 
opportunities. Ultimately, all slaves were men and women who 
were aggressively denied the most basic human rights. As such, 
those who failed to meet task performance standards, racist be-
havioral expectations, or tried to run away were subject to brutal 
punishment such as confinement, whippings, or hanging. 
This paper makes two major contributions to the account-
ing history literature through its focus on the organizational 
control structure of a group of large ante-bellum slave planta-
tions. Existing accounting history literature pays only passing 
attention to the management control process of large slave plan-
tations which were among the largest commercial enterprises in 
the mid-19th century U.S. This paper closely examines both the 
relationship between plantation owners and managers as well as 
the communication that closed the control feedback loop. Addi-
tionally, this paper departs from the current focus of contempo-
rary accounting history literature on American slavery solely as 
unskilled laborers and inert objects of their masters’ activities. 
The West-African origins of tidal-flow agricultural technology 
and the tasking labor-control system were major contextual fac-
tors in the control systems of these large rice plantations. The 
activities of slave drivers were central to managerial, task, and 
social control on the plantation. Though backed fully by the 
overwhelming power of the state and a dominant culture of 
white supremacy, white planters were not all powerful. They 
needed to elicit the active cooperation of their slave workers and 
managers if their agricultural holdings were to run efficiently 
and effectively. The planters in the Lowcountry rice culture used 
both the crushing oppression of ante-bellum chattel slavery as 
well as an integrated system of controls and incentives to obtain 
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the managerial talents and skilled labor from their enslaved 
workers. Their hard labor, skills, and talents were an integral 
factor in the profitability of large mid-19th century rice planta-
tions.
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MONUMENTAL MISTAKE?
Abstract: We critically evaluate Sprouse’s 1966 Journal of Accountancy 
article, which prodded the FASB towards a balance-sheet approach. 
We highlight three errors in this article. First, Sprouse confuses 
necessary and sufficient conditions by arguing that good accounting 
systems must satisfy the balance-sheet equation. Second, Sprouse’s 
insinuation that financial analysts rely on balance-sheet analysis is 
contradicted by contemporary and current security-analysis text-
books, analysts’ written reports, and interviews with analysts. Third, 
and most crucially, Sprouse does not recognize that the primary role 
of accounting systems is to help managers discover and exploit profit-
able exchange opportunities, without which firms cannot survive. 
INTRODUCTION
“Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are 
distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of 
a few years back” [Keynes, 1936, p. 383].
“If man is not to do more harm than good in his efforts 
to improve the social order, he will have to learn that in 
this, as in all other fields where essential complexity of 
an organized kind prevails, he cannot acquire the full 
knowledge which would make mastery of the events 
possible” [Hayek, 1975, p. 442]. 
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Soon after it was established, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) adopted an asset-liability approach 
supplanting the previous revenue-expense approach summa-
rized by Paton and Littleton [1940]. Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts No. 6 [FASB, 1985a] begins by defining 
assets and liabilities and discusses income measurement only 
secondarily as reflecting changes in assets and liabilities. Many 
FASB standards are strongly influenced by this balance-sheet 
primacy perspective. Storey and Storey [1998, p. 76], who claim 
that the asset-liability approach is “the most controversial, and 
the most misunderstood and misrepresented, concept in the en-
tire conceptual framework,” argue that (p. 83): 
The revenue and expense view is still deeply ingrained 
in many accountants’ minds, and the first reaction to an 
accounting problem is to think about ‘proper matching 
of costs and revenues.’ Time will be needed for them to 
become accustomed to thinking first about effects of 
transactions or other events on assets or liabilities (or 
both) and then about how the effect on assets and lia-
bilities has affected revenues, expenses, gains, or losses. 
Many will be able to make that adjustment only with 
difficulty, and a significant number simply will make no 
attempt to do so, clinging instead to the revenue and ex-
pense view. The FASB’s experience suggests that a long 
tradition of ad hoc accounting principles has fostered 
a propensity to resist restraints on flexibility, especially 
those that limit an enterprise’s ability to decide what 
can be included in income for a period. (emphasis in 
original)
While a decade has passed since Storey and Storey penned these 
words, the revenue-expense view has not disappeared from the 
accounting lexicon [Barth, 2008, pp. 1,166-1,169]. 
The FASB’s asset-liability approach stems from an influen-
tial article by Robert T. Sprouse, titled “Accounting for What-
You-May-Call-Its” [Storey and Storey, 1998, pp. 51-69].1 Dr. 
Sprouse was an original member of the FASB (1973-1985), its 
 
1 Dr. Sprouse’s 2007 obituary noted that his “work had an enormous impact 
on the development of the board’s conceptual framework. His 1966 article, “Ac-
counting for What-You-May-Call-Its,” in the Journal of Accountancy, laid the 
groundwork for the FASB’s asset-liability approach.” Dr. Sprouse’s obituary can 
be found at www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/headlines/sprouseobit.html. Dr. Sprouse 
was president of the American Accounting Association (1972-1973) before joining 
the FASB.
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longstanding Vice Chairman (1975-1985), and his ideas shaped 
the FASB’s vision. The unanimous passage of SFAS 2 [FASB, 
1974] and SFAS 5 [FASB, 1975a] signaled the FASB’s commit-
ment to the primacy of the “asset-and-liability view” over the 
traditional “revenue-and-expense view” [Zeff, 2005, p. 20]. The 
FASB Conceptual Framework that was largely written during 
Dr. Sprouse’s FASB tenure enshrined this view for future U.S. 
standard setting. Because Sprouse [1966] was a formative factor 
in the current “asset-liability” approach to recognition and the 
“fair-value” approach to measurement, we re-evaluate its core 
arguments.2
Sprouse [1966, p. 45] makes two specific claims. First, ac-
counting’s foundation lies in the traditional balance-sheet iden-
tity that Assets = Liabilities + Equities. Second, if the balance-
sheet identity is valid, it implies that balance-sheet accounts that 
are inconsistent with specific definitions of assets and liabilities 
are fallacious. Sprouse’s key assertion is an “if-then” proposition 
that acceptance of the balance-sheet equation implies that it is 
the starting point for identifying a valid accounting system. To 
support his claim that investors emphasize the balance sheet, 
Sprouse cites the importance given to a “safety” measure in a 
recent edition of Graham and Dodd’s Security Analysis.
Sprouse’s claims have been widely, although not universally, 
accepted. Despite several recent critiques of the asset-liability 
approach [e.g., Benston et al., 2007; Penman, 2007; Dichev, 
2008; O’Brien, 2009; Palmrose, 2009], it pervades the new Con-
ceptual Framework project of the FASB and the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and if left unchallenged, 
will likely shape U.S. and international accounting standards 
for decades to come.3 We revisit Sprouse’s original paper and
 
2 Soon after Sprouse [1966] was published, the Accounting Principles Board 
(APB) began a project in September 1968 to have marketable securities reported 
at fair value on the balance sheet. Intense lobbying against the proposal by finan-
cial firms led to the SEC rapidly distancing itself from the APB’s position (during 
September 1971 to March 1972), which contributed to the APB’s demise [Horn-
gren, 1973, pp. 63-64]. Early FASB standards such as SFAS 8 [FASB, 1975b] re-
suscitated the fair-value approach by requiring unrealized gains and losses from 
foreign currency transactions and translations to flow through earnings, provok-
ing strong opposition from firms and rapid modification of standards [e.g., SFAS 
52, FASB, 1981].
3 Although our focus is on the FASB, the IASB has advocated the balance-sheet 
approach more forcefully in recent years. The IASB maintains a webpage for the 
new Conceptual Framework at www.iasb.org/Current+Projects/IASB+Projects/
Conceptual+Framework/Conceptual+Framework.htm.
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develop three critiques (in ascending order of importance): (1) 
Sprouse commits a logical error by not distinguishing between 
necessary and sufficient conditions; (2) the evidence Sprouse 
cites actually supports the claim he seeks to refute; namely, that 
readers of financial statements place primary emphasis on the 
income statement; and (3) the asset-liability approach leads to 
an accounting system based on classificational double-entry, 
which erodes the direct link between accounting by double-entry 
and the economic function of a profit-seeking firm.4
In making his claims, Sprouse confuses necessary with 
sufficient conditions. He correctly states that a double-entry 
system that violates the balance-sheet identity is fallacious since 
a violation of the identity implies that the sum of all debits does 
not equal the sum of all credits. But, this merely restates the 
long-recognized value of double-entry as a recording system 
with built-in accuracy checks for a given classification of assets, 
liabilities, and equities [e.g., Ijiri, 1975]. However, Sprouse’s 
proposition can say nothing about whether one classification 
scheme is better than another. So long as accountants follow 
double-entry when journalizing and posting transactions, the 
balance-sheet identity must hold for any asset, liability, and 
equity definitions. Furthermore, it is far from self-evident that 
the balance sheet should comprise exactly and only these three 
categories.
Sprouse commits a second interpretational error when he 
suggests that investors primarily demand balance-sheet informa-
tion. Sprouse [1966, p. 45] quotes a definition of “safety” from 
Graham and Dodd’s Security Analysis to support his claim that 
some investors seek information on assets and liabilities. How-
ever, Sprouse simply misreads this classic text when he infers 
that investors’ interest in investment “safety” warrants greater 
accounting emphasis on the balance sheet. Graham and Dodd 
measure “margin of safety” using earning power, which they 
derive without using the balance sheet. Furthermore, a broader 
reading indicates that Graham and Dodd emphasize income-
statement analysis over balance-sheet analysis. In other words, 
Sprouse’s claim of balance-sheet primacy is roundly rejected 
by the very text he quotes to support his argument. Even more 
4 We use the term financial-statement “readers” because we have in mind peo-
ple who actually read financial statements and disclosures and then act upon that 
information. This stands in contrast to some prototypical “user” that has been 
self-constructed by standard setters and bears little resemblance to economic ac-
tors who make decisions in markets [Young, 2006].
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damning, Horngren [1955b] had previously documented that 
financial analysts overwhelmingly focused on the income state-
ment in their investment analyses. 
A third issue is subtler but of far greater significance. 
Sprouse’s balance-sheet primacy view essentially proposes an 
 accounting framework based on classificational double-entry. 
Such a system ignores the causality recognized when resource 
increments and decrements associated with exchange are simul-
taneously linked through the debit and credit of a journal entry 
[Ijiri, 1975, pp. 80-84]. A classificational, double-entry system 
does not align accounting measurement with a firm’s economic 
function, which is to discover profitable exchange opportunities 
in a world of uncertainty and costly knowledge [Coase, 1937; 
Hayek, 1945, 1968]. The historical-cost accounting system with 
an income-measurement focus has evolved over centuries to 
help firms make better decisions when competing with other 
firms and other economic institutions [Mises, 1952; Ball, 1989]. 
Emphasizing balance-sheet measurement rather than the 
value created through profit-seeking exchange transactions is a 
monumental mistake because it undermines each firm’s survival 
in competition with other organizations. While an immediate 
result is that the accounting system will not reflect a firm’s “busi-
ness model” [Dichev, 2008], the far bigger problem is that the 
accounting system no longer facilitates successful exchange and 
productive division of labor, which support successful market 
economies [Smith, 1776].
Mr. Sprouse’s legacy is now forever linked with the ultimate 
success of the FASB-IASB Conceptual Framework. We believe 
several legacies are possible. One is that the asset-liability ap-
proach will survive over the long haul and will eventually be 
viewed as having improved the quality of financial reporting 
worldwide. In this case, Sprouse [1966] will be hailed, in spite 
of its limitations, for persuasively articulating an important 
view of accounting that beneficially redirected standard setting. 
An alternative legacy is that the FASB will not survive, in part 
because the asset-liability approach lessens financial-reporting 
quality. In this case, Sprouse will be remembered as a progeni-
tor of what we view as dysfunctional accounting. A third pos-
sibility is that accountants are condemned to cycling between 
balance-sheet and income-statement approaches, evidenced by 
the income-statement approach of the 1930s itself supplanting 
an earlier balance-sheet focus [Hendriksen, 1970; Waymire and 
Basu, 2007]. Yet another alternative is that the debate will turn 
out to be moot because future financial-reporting improvements 
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will lead to a radically different reporting environment where 
readers can customize financial statements using any approach 
they want. We, of course, cannot distinguish these possibilities 
absent a crystal ball that allows us to peer into the future. None-
theless, since old ideas are frequently revived as times change, 
we advise accountants to preserve their copies of Paton and 
Littleton [1940] in case the income-statement approach is again 
resurgent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We detail 
Sprouse’s claims in the next section, and then discuss the is-
sues of necessary versus sufficient conditions, evidentiary 
support, and problems associated with classificational double-
entry in the following three sections respectively. A final sec-
tion contains our concluding thoughts on the legacy of Sprouse 
[1966]. 
A BRIEF REVIEW OF SPROUSE’S CLAIMS
The opening paragraph of Sprouse [1966] claims that Amer-
ican accounting students start their education with the balance-
sheet identity:
For most of us, among the very first subjects we were 
exposed to in the study of accounting was the funda-
mental accounting equation and the nature of its com-
ponents – assets, liabilities and owners’ equity. Slightly 
different terminology may have been used or it may 
have been stated in a slightly different way, but there 
never has been any doubt about the substance or the 
fundamental importance of the accounting equation: 
Assets equal liabilities plus owners’ equity. Indeed, the 
accounting equation is a truism – yet it is an extraor-
dinarily meaningful and useful one. The statement of 
financial position lists the entity’s resources and the 
claims against those resources; the difference is the 
owners’ equity. If one accepts the validity of the funda-
mental accounting equation, every account necessarily 
falls into one of those three categories – assets or liabili-
ties or owners’ equity – and an accounting analysis that 
ends up with anything that does not fit any of those 
three categories is necessarily fallacious. (emphasis in 
original) 
We critically examine Sprouse’s “if-then” proposition that if 
we accept that the balance-sheet identity as universally valid (at 
least under double-entry bookkeeping [DEB]), then accounting 
systems that fail to maintain the balance-sheet identity must be 
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fallacious.5
After recognizing that mid-1960s accounting practice em-
phasized income measurement, Sprouse [1966, p. 45] argues 
that attaching primary importance to income measurement 
could have negative consequences for financial statement users:
If this were only a matter of assuaging accounting theo-
reticians’ sensibilities, it could be chalked up as merely 
another conflict between what teachers teach and what 
practitioners do. On the other hand, if one is prepared 
to admit that users of financial statements often attach 
importance to the reported relationship between liabili-
ties and assets and to the reported earnings per share, 
this is a matter of considerable significance to both 
practitioners and academicians. 
Sprouse [1966, pp. 45-46] quotes the concept of “safety” 
from the most recent edition of Security Analysis [Graham et al., 
1962] to support this latter claim, saying:
We may reasonably assume that those who are con-
cerned with the relationship of liabilities and assets (or, 
stated another way, the relationship of debt and equity) 
are interested in liabilities as obligations to convey as-
sets or perform services – obligations representing a 
future demand on assets. This is the essence of finan-
cial position. For example, a leading reference in secu-
rity analysis presents the following ‘principle’: ‘Safety 
is measured not by a specific lien of contractual rights, 
but by the ability of the issuer to meet all its obliga-
tions.’ Accordingly, where what-you-may-call-its appear 
among the liabilities, the analyst is forced to do the ac-
countant’s job of determining whether such accounts 
are actually contra assets or an element of stockholders’ 
equity. Unfortunately, the analyst’s reclassification is 
almost certain to be based on less information than was 
available to the accountant.
In other words, Sprouse unilaterally assumes that some 
users are interested in a balance-sheet approach to valuation, 
and then further insinuates that some such users are financial 
analysts using the quotation as evidence. Sprouse next discusses 
5 One definition of a “fallacy” from Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary is 
“a false or mistaken idea.” We infer that Mr. Sprouse used the term fallacious to 
communicate the idea that accurate, high-quality accounting would not result 
when the balance-sheet identity was not maintained. 
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three contemporary accounting controversies where amortiza-
tion of poorly defined balance-sheet components resulted in 
artificially smoothed income. Sprouse [1966, p. 52] concludes by 
recommending development of a conceptual basis for account-
ing consistent with the asset-liability approach:
The emergence of the three kinds of what-you-may-call-
its discussed here underscores the crucial need for the 
kind of fundamental analytical framework the Account-
ing Principles Board was created to provide and utilize. 
In the absence of established fundamentals – funda-
mentals such as the nature of assets and the nature of 
liabilities, fundamentals that hopefully would lead logi-
cally and consistently to sound solutions to accounting’s 
many problems – one is forced to predict that, as new 
accounting problems arise, the number of what-you-
may-call-its will tend to increase. 
To summarize, Sprouse asserts that a balance sheet contain-
ing only well-defined assets, liabilities, and owners’ equity is the 
hallmark of a valid accounting system since the balance-sheet 
identity is a fundamental accounting relation. Quoting Graham 
and Dodd’s Security Analysis, Sprouse next infers that at least 
some users and analysts demand information on assets and 
liabilities and that effective security analysis requires better bal-
ance sheets. To achieve this, he recommends the development of 
a conceptual framework that starts by defining what he regards 
as the fundamentals – assets and liabilities.
SPROUSE’S CONFUSION BETWEEN  
NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS
In this section, we consider the implications of the claim 
that if an accounting system fails to maintain the balance-sheet 
identity, then the resultant system is fallacious. This statement 
is true in that it establishes a necessary condition for account-
ing under double-entry, but it is not a sufficient condition. The 
balance-sheet equation can hold for any number of classifica-
tional, double-entry systems with fundamental differences in 
how assets, liabilities, and equities are defined. For instance, the 
balance-sheet equation can hold regardless of whether convert-
ible debt is classified as all equity, all liability, placed in a mezza-
nine equity section, or arbitrarily allocated between equity and 
liabilities.
DEB requires that the sum of debits is equal to the sum of 
credits for each transaction or event recorded by a journal entry, 
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and that this identity extends to the sum of debits and credits 
for multiple transactions. Thus, a trial balance struck among 
existing accounts will maintain the total debits = total credits 
identity so long as all individual entries and postings maintain 
this identity. Further, this identity holds regardless of which spe-
cific “nominal” accounts are pulled into the income statement. 
The balance-sheet identity will hold for a system where all R&D 
expenditures are immediately expensed as in SFAS 2 [FASB, 
1974], one where research costs are expensed but development 
costs are capitalized as in SFAS 86 [FASB, 1985b] for software 
costs, or one where all R&D costs are capitalized as assets.
The balance-sheet equation will hold even if incorrect 
measures are used. Consider a firm that pays $10,000 cash to ac-
quire a machine that is expected to last five years. Assume also 
that other firms purchased identical assets at the same time, 
but did not pay identical prices, perhaps because of differences 
in negotiating skill or information acquired through market 
search.6 For simplicity, assume that transaction prices in this 
asset market are uniformly distributed between a minimum of 
$10,000 and a maximum of $14,000. That is, the firm bought the 
machine for $2,000 less than the average price of $12,000 at the 
same point in time. 
The standard journal entry for this transaction would in-
volve a debit to a Long-Term Asset and a credit to Cash. After 
this entry, the balance sheet identity is maintained since assets 
are increased by $10,000 for the machine but reduced $10,000 
for the decrease in cash.
Suppose instead that this transaction had been recorded as 
follows:
Long-Term Assets (A) 12,000
 Gain on machine acquisition (OE) 2,000
 Cash (A) 10,000 
This journal entry would establish the long-term asset at its fair 
value of $12,000 (i.e., the average of exchange prices in market 
transactions consummated at the same time) with part of the 
offset going to an equity account for the gain. This entry would 
increase total assets by $2,000 (the difference between the long-
term asset increase and the cash decrease) and owners’ equity 
would increase by $2,000. 
Both treatments for this transaction maintain the balance-
sheet identity even though the totals of assets and equities differ. 
6 Price heterogeneity can persist under competition when buyers have hetero-
geneous information on the distribution of offer prices [Stigler, 1961].
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We cannot evaluate whether one treatment for the asset acquisi-
tion is more appropriate than the other by merely comparing 
consistency with the balance-sheet identity. Rather, that evalu-
ation requires separate definitions of asset, liability, and equity, 
and the definitions of these terms (along with definitions of in-
come) will determine whether the specific classifications applied 
within DEB are sensible. 
The balance-sheet identity will hold even if every alternate 
transaction is not recorded and even if fictitious transactions 
are recorded. Both a cash-basis accounting system and the U.S. 
tax-accounting system meet the balance-sheet equation. Put 
differently, there is nothing magical about a balance sheet that 
balances so long as DEB is being applied, and Sprouse’s balance-
sheet primacy would not ensure good accounting.
THE EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR SPROUSE’S  
CLAIMS OF BALANCE-SHEET PRIMACY
We next evaluate Sprouse’s evidence for his claim that some 
investors demand information primarily about assets and li-
abilities. Sprouse quotes Security Analysis, “Safety is measured 
not by a specific lien of contractual rights, but by the ability of 
the issuer to meet all its obligations,” to insinuate that at least 
some analysts focused primarily on the balance sheet. Sprouse 
is correct that Graham and Dodd considered “safety” to be of 
first-order importance in financial analysis, but he incorrectly 
 projects on to the second half of the quoted sentence his belief 
that security analysts use the balance sheet to measure safety. 
We claim that Sprouse misreads Security Analysis because 
Graham and Dodd measure “ability to meet obligations” using 
“earning power” rather than net-asset values. 
Unfortunately for Sprouse, Graham and Dodd’s primary 
“margin of safety” measure makes no reference to the balance 
sheet. In The Intelligent Investor, Graham [1973, pp. 277-287] 
summarizes the margin of safety as indicative of an investment-
grade security. In describing this concept in connection with 
bonds and preferred stocks, Graham states:
All experienced investors recognize that the margin-of-
safety concept is essential to the choice of sound bonds 
and preferred stocks. For example, a railroad should 
have earned its total fixed charges better than five times 
(before income tax), taking a period of years, for its 
bonds to qualify as investment-grade issues. This past 
ability to earn in excess of interest requirements consti-
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tutes the margin of safety that is counted on to protect 
the investor against loss or discomfiture in the event of 
some future decline in net income. (emphasis in origi-
nal)
Graham [1973, pp. 278-279] advocates a similar approach 
for common stocks by stating that a common stock’s margin of 
safety “lies in an expected earning power considerably above the 
going rate for bonds.” Graham’s primary measure of “safety” for 
both bondholders and stockholders is a coverage ratio calculated 
using income statement data and requires no data from the bal-
ance sheet. Sprouse’s suggestion that an investment’s “safety” 
is better measured by balance-sheet analysis than income-
 statement analysis is clearly inconsistent with Graham’s views. 
The idea that margin of safety should be measured primar-
ily in terms of net-asset values instead of earning power is gen-
erally absent in the original edition of Graham and Dodd [1934]. 
Graham and Dodd cite “margin of safety,” “safety,” or “risk” on 
39 separate pages, according to the book’s index. None of these 
citations make sole reference to corporate net assets or other 
balance-sheet measures, eight make reference only to corporate 
earnings, and three make reference to both earnings and net-
asset measures. Graham [1973, p. 278] does describe an alterna-
tive measure of margin of safety for a bond or preferred stock 
based on market values of securities, but this clearly is labeled 
as an alternative measure and is reported only after discussion 
of the income-based measure of margin of safety.
A broader review of Security Analysis is also inconsistent 
with a greater emphasis on the balance sheet than the income 
statement. Table 1 tabulates data on the contents of Graham 
and Dodd [1934]. Panel A indicates that the book runs 729 total 
pages with the core of the book conveyed in 52 chapters. Panel 
B indicates that Graham and Dodd devote roughly equal parts 
of the text to an analysis of bonds and preferred stocks (39% of 
total pages) and common stocks (40% of total pages). Within the 
chapters on common stocks, income-account analysis precedes 
balance-sheet analysis, and income analysis commands more 
than double the space (135 pages for the income statement, 57 
for the balance sheet).7 
7 After noting an earlier historical emphasis on net tangible asset book value, 
Graham and Dodd [1934, pp. 491-494] recognize that book value plays an impor-
tant, but secondary, role to earnings: “Before we discard completely this time-
honored conception of book value, let us ask whether it may ever have practical 
significance for the analyst. In the ordinary case, probably not. But what of the 
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TABLE 1
Description of Contents for Security Analysis  
by Graham and Dodd [1934]
A: Page Counts for Book Components in Security Analysis
Component Number of Pages
Preface & Table of Contents 5
Introduction 13
Main Text (in 52 Chapters) 603
Appendix 83
Index 25
TOTAL 729
B: Chapter and Page Counts for Parts of Main Text in Security Analysis
Title # Chapters # Pages
I. Survey and Approach 5 50
II. Fixed-Value Investments 16 173
III. Senior Securities with Speculative Features 5 62
IV. Theory of Common-Stock Investment: The 
Dividend Factor
4 51
V. Analysis of the Income Account: The Earnings 
Factor in Common-Stock Valuation
11 135
VI. Balance-Sheet Analysis: Implications of Asset 
Values
4 57
VII. Additional Aspects of Security Analysis, 
Discrepancies between Price and Value 7 75
TOTAL 52 603
Similarly, Graham and Dodd [1934] ascribe greater im-
portance to earnings and its coverage of interest than net-asset 
position in evaluating bonds and preferred stocks. As regards 
industrial bonds, Graham and Dodd [1934, p. 85] state that 
“the investor would seem to gain better protection against 
adverse developments by confining his industrial selections to 
companies which meet the two requirements of (1) dominant 
size, and (2) substantial margin of earnings over bond interest.” 
extraordinary or extreme case?....Book value deserves at least a fleeting glance by 
the public before it buys or sells shares in a business undertaking…Let the stock 
buyer, if he lays claim to intelligence, at least be able to tell himself, first, how 
much he is actually paying for the business, and secondly, what he is actually get-
ting for his money in terms of tangible resources.” (emphasis added)
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This statement is generalized subsequently as the “present-day 
investor is accustomed to regard the ratio of earnings to interest 
charges as the most important specific test of safety” [Graham 
and Dodd, 1934, p. 105]. The emphasis on coverage of capital 
charges applies also to preferred stocks [see Graham and Dodd, 
1934, pp. 158, 168].8
Our re-examination of Graham and Dodd’s text is inconsis-
tent with Sprouse’s inference that financial analysts should or 
actually do place greater emphasis on the balance sheet than 
the income statement. Nor were Sprouse’s views consistent with 
prevailing security analysis. For his Ph.D. dissertation, Horn-
gren [1955a] surveyed the investment analysis literature, scru-
tinized 123 written analyst reports, and interviewed 51 financial 
analysts to understand the information use of financial analysts. 
American financial analysts behaved largely as Graham and 
Dodd recommended. Horngren [1955b, p. 576] reported: 
The income statement is regarded as the most impor-
tant reflector of the operations of the firm. There is a 
definite tendency to think in terms of ‘normal earning 
power,’ but all components of the statement are exam-
ined carefully…The most important ratio is considered 
to be the percent of net operating profit before income 
taxes to sales. 
Previts et al. [1994] apply content analysis to more recent 
sell-side U.S. financial analysts’ reports and find that income-
statement-related terms or phrases appear three times as often 
as combined references to balance-sheet and cash-flow terms.9 
Francis et al. [1997] find that at corporate presentations to 
the New York Society of Security Analysts, management most 
8 As with common stocks, Graham and Dodd assigned a clearly secondary 
role to balance-sheet analysis for other securities like industrial bonds. Graham 
and Dodd [1934, p. 151] state: “For reasons already explained, a company’s state-
ment of its fixed assets will not ordinarily carry much weight in determining the 
soundness of its bonds. But the current-asset position has an important bearing 
upon the financial strength of nearly all industrial enterprises, and consequently 
the intending bond purchaser should give it close attention. It is true that indus-
trial bonds which meet the stringent tests already prescribed will in nearly every 
instance be found to make a satisfactory working-capital exhibit as well, but a 
separate check is nevertheless desirable in order to guard against the exceptional 
case.” (emphasis in original)
9 Breton and Taffler [2001] find that U.K. analyst reports are four times as 
likely to include profitability information as balance-sheet information, and ana-
lyst stock recommendations are significantly positively associated with the profit-
ability information but not with the balance-sheet information. 
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 frequently discusses revenues and earnings, and security 
analysts ask most frequently about sales revenues, earnings, and 
output prices. During conference calls, security analysts most 
frequently request data on recent operating performance com-
ponents such as revenues and costs and forecasts of future rev-
enues and costs [Tasker, 1998a].10 Chen et al. [2002] report that 
only about one-third of firms voluntarily disclose balance sheets 
in their quarterly earnings announcements, suggestive of lower 
demand for balance-sheet data.
Furthermore, analysts prefer earnings computed without 
a balance-sheet focus.11 As Black [1980, p. 19] trenchantly ob-
serves:
Users of financial statements – analysts, stockholders, 
creditors, managers, tax authorities and even econo-
mists – really want an earnings figure that measures 
value, not change in value. Analysts, for example, want 
an earnings number they can multiply by a standard 
price-earnings ratio to arrive at an estimate of the firm’s 
value. Accordingly, the ideal set of accounting rules is 
one that makes the price-earnings ratio as constant as 
possible. The main thing lacking in present accounting 
practice is the recognition that this has been the goal all 
along.
Consistent with this claim, Philbrick and Ricks [1991], Gu 
and Chen [2004], and others report that in constructing “street 
earnings,” financial analysts routinely discard non-recurring, 
income-statement items (called special items by Compustat) that 
are generated by GAAP attempts to measure the balance-sheet 
accurately.12 Demirakos et al. [2004] analyze the contents of ana-
lysts’ reports and find that the most common valuation models 
are based on price-earnings multiples, whereas book-value-of-
10 Tasker [1998b] summarizes the transcripts of two typical quarterly confer-
ence calls which clearly show that analysts usually focus on recent operating per-
formance and prospects for future revenues and costs.
11 Gilman [1941] surveyed 300 bank credit analysts to determine the impor-
tance of the lower-of-cost-or-market inventory valuation rule for credit analysis. 
Of the 176 respondents (58.7% of 300), 131 (74.4% of 176) replied that they would 
be satisfied with both balance sheet and income statement reported at cost if 
the lower-of-cost-or-market inventory valuation number was also disclosed paren-
thetically on the balance sheet or in a footnote. The survey results appear incon-
sistent with a single-best, balance-sheet format.
12 Financial analysts also state that they are unlikely to find the capitalization 
of intangible assets on the balance sheet to be useful despite the FASB’s and the 
IASB’s claims that analysts want this information [e.g., Elwin, 2008].
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equity multiples or asset multiples are rarely used. Asquith et al. 
[2005] find that members of Institutional Investor’s All-American 
Research Team are far more likely to use models based on earn-
ings, cash flow, or sales (99%) than market-to-book (25%). 
In short, both Graham and Dodd’s textbook and analysis of 
contemporary security-analyst behavior suggest that Sprouse’s 
evidence provides a very shaky foundation for balance-sheet pri-
macy in the current conceptual framework.
THE ASSET-LIABILITY APPROACH AND 
CLASSIFICATIONAL DOUBLE-ENTRY
We now discuss how classificational double-entry inherent 
in the asset-liability approach is likely misaligned with the eco-
nomic function of accounting. Our argument derives from the 
frequently overlooked importance of causal double-entry in the 
discovery and exploitation of profitable exchange transactions, 
which is the most important reason that firms even exist. We 
trace the economic arguments for a focus on income measure-
ment from modern economists like Ijiri [1975] and Hicks [1939] 
back to the writings of Adam Smith and his contemporaries. We 
discuss historical research showing that earnings power was 
used for valuing firms even earlier. Finally, we draw on Coase 
[1937], Mises [1949], and others to explain why a historical 
transaction-based income-statement approach is vital for entre-
preneurial decision making. 
Ijiri [1975, pp. 51-69] identifies three concepts inherent 
to economic performance measurement under double-entry 
accounting (DEA). Control represents the extent to which an 
organization has economic control over the use of resources, 
and quantities refer to an ability to quantify differing degrees to 
which resources exist. The third, and most important, concept 
is exchanges, which includes “not only exchanges in a market, 
but also exchanges in production which may be considered ex-
changes between the entity and nature” [Ijiri, 1975, pp. 60-61]. 
Exchanges is a foundational concept in accounting because of 
“the perceived cause-and-effect relationship between a sacrifice 
(a decrement) and a benefit (an increment), namely the benefit 
cannot be obtained without the sacrifice.” While a classification-
al, double-entry system is built with only the control and quanti-
ties concepts, a causal double-entry system also incorporates the 
powerful exchanges concept.
Ijiri [1975, pp. 81-84] argues that the causal relation be-
tween benefit and sacrifice inherent to reciprocal exchange, 
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manifested in debit and credit, is the essence of DEA and is as-
sociated with powerful cognitive forces that alter how we view 
exchange:
There are two entirely different reasons why debit 
should equal credit. One is that both are based on dif-
ferent classifications or descriptions of the same object. 
We call this type of double-entry classificational double-
entry. For example, the double-entry bookkeeping sys-
tem is often taught by starting with the fundamental 
equation assets = equities, because the two are consid-
ered to be different classifications of the same set of re-
sources, one based on the types of assets and the other 
based on claims upon them.
The other type of double-entry is what we may call 
causal double-entry, where the value of an increment 
(debit) is set equal to the value of a decrement (credit), 
as in (Dr.) Inventories $100: (Cr.) Cash $100. Here the 
same set of resources is not classified from two view-
points. This entry clearly involves two different re-
sources, cash and inventories. They are tied together 
because of the cause-and-effect relationship between 
the increment and the decrement…. 
Apparently, double-entry can enormously affect our 
perception of economic events. Under a so-called 
single-entry system, a cashier can keep his record quite 
independently from a warehouse bookkeeper who 
records inventories and inventory changes. But an 
accountant who is trained in double-entry bookkeep-
ing cannot treat a decrease in cash or an increase in 
inventories independent of each other. A decrease in 
cash alone cannot be recorded unless he finds a proper 
debit account. In doing so, he is led to recognize the 
cause-and-effect relationship of changes in resources. 
Eventually, he acquires the habit of always looking at a 
change in relation to other changes rather than in iso-
lation…. Thus, it should be remembered that the real 
significance of double-entry bookkeeping compared to 
single-entry bookkeeping is not in dual classification or 
the computational double-check (what a triviality!), but 
in the power of double-entry to make us look into the 
cause-and-effect relationship among the changes in the 
resources controlled by the entity. 
In contrast, economic exchange is, at best, a secondary ele-
ment of the asset-liability approach. This approach starts by de-
fining and measuring assets and liabilities with the resultant re-
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sidual being equity; i.e., wealth. Income is the change in wealth 
that arises from either an exchange transaction or another event 
that alters the store of wealth. Thus, income measurement un-
der the asset-liability approach must capture both the effects of 
exchange transactions as well as holding gains and losses. This 
measure appears superficially consistent with a theoretical view 
of income posited by Hicks [1939], and has been cited as a basis 
for the FASB and the IASB conceptual frameworks [Schipper 
and Vincent, 2003; Barth, 2008, p. 1,168].
Hicks’ [1939, p. 173] first measure of income (“Income No. 
1”) is “the maximum which can be spent during a period if there 
is to be an expectation of maintaining intact the capital value 
of prospective receipts (in money terms).”13 However, Hicksian 
income is defined only for a world of complete and perfect mar-
kets and is less useful for a firm operating in costly incomplete 
markets. Hicks [1939, pp. 193-196] describes a firm’s decision as 
the “establishment of a production plan,” with an optimal pro-
duction plan maximizing the “surplus of receipts over costs,” or 
the capitalized value of all future expected surpluses in a multi-
period setting. Within this context, Hicks defines business profit 
as surplus of receipts over costs less charges from prior com-
mitments less depreciation (or plus appreciation). Thus, Hicks 
posits that the firm chooses production plans to increase profits 
which arise from interactions in product and factor markets.14 
Hicks [1939, pp. 179] specifically excludes unrealized gains 
and losses from such planning, saying: “The income which is 
relevant to conduct must always exclude windfall gains; if they 
occur, they have to be thought of as raising income for future 
weeks (by the interest on them) rather than as entering into any 
effective sort of income for the current week. Theoretical confu-
sion between income ex post and ex ante corresponds to practi-
cal confusion between income and capital.” Hicks explains that 
decisions should be based on real rather than nominal income, 
13 In considering complications from interest rate and consumption price 
changes, he also developed two other income constructs. Hicks [1939, p. 174] 
defines “Income No. 2” as “the maximum amount the individual can spend this 
week, and still expect to be able to spend the same amount in each ensuing week” 
and “Income No. 3” as “the maximum amount which the individual can spend 
this week, and still expect to be able to spend the same amount in real terms in 
each ensuing week.” (emphasis in original)
14  Bromwich et al. [2010] and Jameson [2005] critique the application of 
Hicks [1939] to practical matters of income measurement, and point out that 
Hicks advocated an earnings power focus in practice. Klamer [1989, pp. 179-180] 
points out that Hicks himself was uncertain as to how income should be mea-
sured.
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implying that variations in prices should be excluded from cal-
culation of capital values, which is exactly opposite to the FASB/
IASB fair-value measurement approach.
A concern with Hicks [1939] and neoclassical economics 
more generally is that it does not explain the nature and role of 
accounting within profit-seeking firms that operate in markets 
that are themselves dependent on complex economic institu-
tions. The balance-sheet approach takes market values as given 
rather than resulting from the interaction of profit-seeking indi-
viduals. Kohn [2004, p. 314] summarizes limitations of the “val-
ue paradigm” that relies on neoclassical economics as follows:
The approach of the value paradigm, like that of tradi-
tional mathematical theory in the natural sciences, is a 
special approach that is valid only in a subset of cases. 
We can be more specific if we divide the domain of 
economic theory according to the three basic questions 
addressed by Adam Smith: How are relative prices de-
termined? How is economic activity coordinated? What 
are the causes of economic growth? The special ap-
proach of the value paradigm is reasonably successful 
when applied to the first of these questions. It is not un-
realistic to think of the forces that determine prices, at 
least in the short run, as being relatively powerful and 
rapid, relying as they do primarily on trading and arbi-
trage. In these circumstances, the assumption of trad-
ing equilibrium is a fruitful simplification – fruitful be-
cause it permits the greater precision and logical clarity 
of mathematical reasoning. However, when applied to 
questions of coordination and growth the assumption 
of trading equilibrium is not at all realistic….
To reiterate, there is nothing wrong with the theory of 
value as a theory of value. Indeed in many ways it is 
the crown jewel of economics. The problem is with the 
value paradigm – that is, with the attempt to extend as-
sumptions that are appropriate to the theory of value 
to areas of economics where they are not appropriate. 
The theory of value is a special or partial theory, not a 
general theory. 
Kohn [2004] suggests that Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations 
is a useful starting point for thinking about economics. Smith’s 
[1776, p. 17] hypothesis is that specialized division of labor, 
coupled with opportunities for market exchange, generates hu-
man wealth [Kimbrough et al., 2008]. This foundational insight 
helps us better understand why economic institutions emerge to 
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foster favorable performance outcomes (e.g., higher total out-
put) [Stigler, 1951; Buchanan, 1964; North, 2005; Smith, 2008]. 
Accounting is likely one such institution that has evolved to 
facilitate mutually beneficial exchange that increases the wealth 
of the transacting parties [Waymire and Basu, 2007; Basu et al., 
2009; Waymire, 2009].
The Wealth of Nations was a seminal event in the develop-
ment of economics as a scientific discipline [Samuelson, 1948, p. 
136]. It is thus interesting to consider what Smith thought about 
valuation and performance measurement. Smith asserted that a 
nation’s economic progress was measured by productive activity 
that enabled greater consumption. Smith [1776, p. 1] states his 
view, which was contrary to prevailing orthodoxy, in his opening 
sentence: 
The annual labor of every nation is the fund which sup-
plies it with all the necessaries and conveniences of life 
which it annually consumes, and which consist always 
of either in the immediate produce of that labor, or in 
what is purchased with that produce from other na-
tions.15 
The Wealth of Nations provides a conceptual basis for eco-
nomic performance measures such as Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) [Samuelson, 1948, p. 11].16 GDP is directly measured 
using a “product approach” by summing the “values added” by 
each enterprise in the society after adjusting for taxes and subsi-
dies.17 The “value added” by a given enterprise is the sales of its 
final goods or services less the cost of intermediate goods used 
to produce final output [Samuelson, 1948, pp. 232-234]. In other 
words, Smith [1776] argued for an income-statement approach 
whose focus was on wealth creation in place of a balance-sheet 
approach focused on wealth storage.
Robert Hamilton, a contemporary of Adam Smith, intro-
15 Smith’s purpose in writing The Wealth of Nations was to discredit the con-
temporary economic orthodoxy of mercantilism [Sowell, 2006, pp. 5-13]. Mercan-
tilism advocated the accumulation of wealth as reflected in the store of monetary 
assets such as gold, and can be viewed as a distant precursor of the balance-sheet 
approach.
16 The argument favoring total output as a macroeconomic performance mea-
sure predates Smith; e.g., William Petty suggested this measure in the 17th cen-
tury (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Petty). 
17 A summary of GDP measurement is available at en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Gross_domestic_product, and the national income accounts used by the U.S. gov-
ernment are described in BEA [2009]. Marcuss and Kane [2007] provide a review 
of the historical development of the U.S. national-income accounts.
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duced the idea of residual income (but not the term itself) by 
arguing that a firm must earn more than its cost of debt and eq-
uity capital to create wealth [Mepham, 1983]. Hamilton [1777, 
Part V, Chapter III, Section 8] states:
In all commercial countries there is a fixed rate of inter-
est, and the merchant’s gain should only be estimated 
by the excess of his gross profits above the interest of 
his stock. The latter may be obtained with little risk or 
trouble; the former alone is the reward of his industry 
and the compensation for his hazard. And, if the profit 
of his trade be less than his stock would have yielded at 
common interest, he may properly account it a losing 
one.
Hamilton [1777, Part V, Chapter V, Section 27] emphasizes 
the relevance of income measurement for managerial decision 
making, saying: “When a person is engaged in several branches 
of manufacture, whether on different materials, or on the same 
materials through successive stages, he should keep his books in 
such a manner as to exhibit the gain or loss on each.” This rec-
ommendation is explained by modern economic analyses.
A firm adds value by generating greater net gains from spe-
cialized labor than could be attained solely through a set of pro-
duction decisions executed via a series of market transactions. 
Coase [1937, pp. 390-391] states this proposition as: 
The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm 
would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price 
mechanism. The most obvious cost of ‘organizing’ pro-
duction through the price mechanism is that of discov-
ering what the relevant prices are…. (i)t is important 
to note the character of the contract into which a fac-
tor enters that is employed within a firm. The contract 
is one whereby the factor, for a certain remuneration 
(which may be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the 
directions of an entrepreneur within certain limits. (em-
phasis in original)
The entrepreneur thus performs a discovery function that 
includes developing products, identifying customers, and orga-
nizing production.18 These functions are performed within the 
18 Cheung [1983] suggests that the costs of using the market to coordinate 
production include the number of heterogeneous transactions required, the costs 
to consumers of knowing all attributes of a product, the costs of measuring those 
attributes, and the problem of defining prices in a joint task involving collabora-
tion between two factors.
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context of a competitive process that creates strong incentives 
to exploit knowledge pertinent to the firm’s local circumstances 
[Hayek, 1945, 1968]. Consequently, the defining event in a com-
petitive process where transactions result from the entrepre-
neur’s actions is the successful consummation of exchange with 
a customer. Accounting facilitates discovery of consumer prefer-
ences and more efficient means for satisfying those preferences 
[Vatter, 1950; Demski and Feltham, 1976; Kaplan and Norton, 
1996]. Causal DEA can thus be an extraordinarily powerful tool 
for identifying and quantifying the consequences of exchange 
interactions between a firm, factor suppliers, and the eventual 
consumers of the firm’s output.
Surviving historical records shows that entrepreneurs and 
financiers for the last several centuries have evaluated firms us-
ing variants of earning power [e.g., Bryer, 2000; Toms, 2010]. 
Merchants in feudal England frequently computed gross profits 
on individual transactions to decide their prices [Grassby, 1995, 
p. 236]. Robert Loder of Romney Marsh calculated the rate of 
return on capital using a single-entry bookkeeping system, and 
by 1611 was calculating residual income [Bryer, 2000]. In 1654, 
the East India Company reported the rates of return on capital 
for all of its early voyages to its stockholders [Chaudhuri, 1965, 
p. 209]. Several examples of similar computations in agricul-
ture, coal, textiles, and mining have been documented over the 
next two centuries [e.g., Toms, 2010]. Thomas Hall in 1834-1835 
was discounting forecasted profits using a 12.5% interest rate, 
an early example of discounted cash-flow analysis [Fleischman 
and Parker, 1997]. To summarize, there is a long English history 
of computing profits using historical cost to aid in running the 
business and for investors to evaluate the firm. 
The “fatal flaw” in classificational double-entry is that it 
expands the set of conditions that call for entries to the books of 
account. This cuts the link between the accounts and the causal 
forces that generate transactions. A classificational system per-
mits changes to the accounts for a broad range of counterfactual 
circumstances beyond the set of consummated transactions. In 
other words, “fair value” measurements reflect gains that may 
never be realized because the assumed transactions will never 
occur.
To clarify, a journal entry resulting from a consummated 
transaction encodes several simultaneously determined attri-
butes of a transaction. Obvious attributes include the price and 
quantity for which a transaction is consummated. A less obvious 
but far more important attribute of any consummated transac-
149
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2010, Vol. 37, no. 1 [whole issue]
Published by eGrove, 2010
Accounting Historians Journal, June 2010142
tion is the underlying decision to transact. This decision is of vital 
importance in a world where it takes skill and effort to discover 
favorable opportunities to transact with customers and factor 
suppliers. Stated differently, the decision to transact reflects an 
entrepreneur’s decision to “cause” the consummation of a spe-
cific transaction, when the firm’s raison d’être is to identify and 
transact value-increasing exchanges.19
The accountant’s focus on consummated transactions, with 
an emphasis on objective, verifiable evidence of arm’s length 
exchange, is the likely “reason for the persistent use of histori-
cal cost in accounting over many centuries” [Ijiri, 1983, p. 79]. 
The need for objective and verifiable evidence of consummated 
transactions is a guiding feature of the framework of Paton and 
Littleton [1940, pp. 18-21; see Ijiri, 1980, pp. 622-623]. Paton 
and Littleton [1940, p. 10] assert the primacy of historical-cost-
based income measurement derived from repeated application 
of the revenue-realization and expense-matching principles. 
These principles applied to objective verifiable evidence align 
recognition of “effort and accomplishment” [Paton and Little-
ton, 1940, pp. 14-18; Ijiri, 1980, p. 623; Ball, 1989].
So, what do we believe is lost by eroding the foundation of 
double-entry built on causality in exchange? Over the centuries, 
various scholars have written of the interdependent changes 
wrought by double-entry accounting on human cognition and 
the development of modern capitalist organizations [Sombart, 
1919; Weber, 1927; Schumpeter, 1942; Mises, 1949; Ijiri, 1975, 
pp. 81-84].20 The notion that double-entry reflects the causality 
of action in exchange was reinforced over 450 years after Pacioli 
[1494] by Mises [1949, p. 231] when he stated:
It was economic calculation that assigned to measure-
ment, number, and reckoning the role they play in our 
quantitative and computing civilization….Monetary cal-
19 When the FASB and the IASB proposed removing stewardship as an objec-
tive of financial reporting in their Preliminary Views [FASB, 2006] consistent with 
their focus on balance-sheet valuation, an overwhelming majority of respondents 
preferred to retain stewardship or accountability, consistent with a contracting 
perspective.
20 Pacioli noted such effects when he wrote of the need for accurate records 
and accounts “so that one may get, without loss of time, all the particulars as to 
the debit and also the credit of all of them, as business does not deal with any-
thing else. This is very useful, because it would be impossible to conduct business 
without due order of recording, for without rest, merchants would always be in 
great mental trouble” [Pacioli, 1494, p. 1, quoted by Carruthers and Espeland, 
1991, p. 36].
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culation reaches its full perfection in capital account-
ing. It establishes the money prices of available means 
and confronts this total with the changes brought about 
by action and by the operation of other factors. This 
confrontation shows what changes occurred in the 
state of acting men’s affairs, and the magnitude of those 
changes; it makes success and failure, profit and loss as-
certainable….Our civilization is inseparably linked with 
our methods of economic calculation. It would perish if 
we were to abandon this most precious intellectual tool 
of acting. Goethe was right in calling bookkeeping by 
double entry ‘one of the finest inventions of the human 
mind.’ 
Thus, a classificational system like that advocated by 
Sprouse severs the link between accounting and economic ex-
change, which is the fundamental focus of economic activity. 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON THE LEGACY 
OF THE ASSET-LIABILITY APPROACH
Sprouse [1966] is important neither because of its conceptu-
al insights nor because of its unpersuasive evidence. Rather, the 
article matters mainly because it shaped the FASB’s rhetoric and 
subsequent standard-setting approach and today’s international 
standard-setting agenda. Sprouse’s misinterpretation of Graham 
and Dodd’s Security Analysis foreshadows the FASB and IASB 
misinterpretation of Hicks [1939]. Sprouse and the two Boards 
are equally culpable in ignoring actual security-analyst behavior 
when advocating their preferences, relying instead on made-up 
“users” [Young 2006]. Thus, the current FASB/IASB Conceptual 
Framework [FASB, 2006] is justifiably seen as a direct descen-
dant of Sprouse [1966]. 
Sprouse and the two Boards ignore the implications (or 
are unaware) of one of the major stylized facts of U.S. financial 
reporting history – the shift from a balance-sheet approach to 
an income-statement approach during 1900-1930. The shift to 
an income-statement approach is usually attributed to the in-
formation needs of a massive influx of individual investors into 
U.S. equity markets during this era [e.g., Hendriksen, 1970, pp. 
51-55].21 If individual equity investors are primarily interested 
in balance-sheet information, then this shift should not have oc-
curred when it did. Sprouse and the two Boards never address 
21 U.S. shareholders more than tripled in number between 1900 and 1923 with 
greater middle-class participation [Warshow, 1924].
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this salient historical evidence that contradicts their core as-
sumption of investor information needs. More broadly, Sprouse 
and the two Boards ignore the historical development of the 
revenue-expense approach, both in theory and practice, which 
we survey in this paper. If financial accounting has emerged over 
many generations to maintain consilience with the biologically 
evolved human brain [Dickhaut et al., 2010], then an abrupt 
change to a fair-value-based, asset-liability approach might well 
make financial reports less useful to actual human readers.
Contrary to the theoretical ruminations of Sprouse, security 
analysts to this day rely primarily on earnings forecasts in valu-
ing firms. However, today’s analysts can construct their earnings 
forecasts only after adjusting for many more non-recurring 
items that the FASB has introduced into the income statement. 
Although SFAS 130 [FASB, 1997] introduced a broader, compre-
hensive income concept that includes even more non-recurring 
items, analysts show no interest in forecasting it or using it in 
their analyses. We believe that the FASB’s shift in focus to the 
balance sheet has created bigger problems than merely whether 
financial analysts have to adjust for new income statement 
“thingamajigs” instead of balance sheet “what-you-may-call-its.” 
We claim that the lack of analyst interest in the FASB-mandated, 
non-recurring items is symptomatic of a monumental mistake 
in the asset-liability approach; specifically, it is misaligned with 
the reasons that firms exist and the resulting demand for causal 
double-entry accounting as an economic institution.22 In other 
words, while the asset-liability approach is constructively ratio-
nal, i.e. deduced from assumptions that work in a theoretical 
model, it is unlikely to be ecologically rational in the sense of 
improving firms’ survival prospects in the complex real world 
[Sargent, 2008; Smith, 2008]. 
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149Announcements
THE ACADEMY OF ACCOUNTING HISTORIANS
2010 VANGERMEERSCH MANUSCRIPT AWARD
In 1988, The Academy of Accounting Historians established 
an annual manuscript award to encourage scholars new to the 
field to pursue historical research. An historical manuscript on 
any aspect of the field of accounting, broadly defined, is appro-
priate for submission.
ELIGIBILITY AND GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSIONS
Any accounting faculty member, who holds a full-time appoint-
ment and who received his/her masters/doctorate within seven 
years previous to the date of submission, is eligible to be con-
sidered for this award. Coauthored manuscripts will be consid-
ered (if at least one coauthor received his/her master/doctorate 
within the last seven years). Manuscripts must conform to the 
style requirements of the Accounting Historians Journal. Previ-
ously published manuscripts or manuscripts under review are 
not eligible for consideration.
Each manuscript should be submitted by August 1, 2010 in a 
Word file as an e-mail attachment to the chair of the Vanger-
meersch Manuscript Award Committee, Dr. Gary Giroux (g-
giroux@tamu.edu).
A cover letter, indicating the author’s mailing address, the date 
of the award of the masters/doctoral degree, and a statement 
that the manuscript has not been published or is not currently 
being considered for publication should be included in the sub-
mission packet.
REVIEW PROCESS AND AWARD
The Vangermeersch Manuscript Award Committee will evalu-
ate submitted manuscripts on a blind-review basis and select 
one recipient each year. The author will receive a $500 (U.S.) 
award and a plaque to recognize his/her outstanding achieve-
ment in historical research. In the case of coauthored manu-
scripts, only the junior faculty member(s) will receive prizes. 
The winning manuscript will be published in the Accounting 
Historians Journal after an appropriate review. The award will 
be given annually unless the Manuscript Award Committee de-
termines that no submission warrants recognition as an out-
standing manuscript. 
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The 2nd EIASM workshop on 
Imagining Business
Reflecting on visuality, performances and materialities  
in practices of management, organising and governing
IE University Business School 
Segovia, 19-20 May 2011 
Guest speakers
Mario Biagioli
History of science
Harvard University
Jacques Fontanille
Semiotics
Université de Limoges
Nigel Thrift
Geography
University of Warwick
Following the success of the 1st Imagining Business Workshop (Oxford, 2008), 
this second event seeks to explore in further detail the impact of images, pictures, 
and signs on everyday organizational life. Inspired by the principle that any social 
activity results from how various organisational actors are tied together (Latour’s 
idea of ‘socie-ties’), this workshop intends to examine how various organisational 
performances and material objects of all kinds (e.g. information technologies, 
forms, charts, plans, models, etc.) help to construct unstable although durable 
links between organizational actors. This includes exploring how they contribute 
to the creation of business visions, images and visualizations in ways which allow 
organizings and organizations to ‘succeed’ (i.e. to happen), as well as ‘fail’. 
This workshop thus provides an interdisciplinary arena in which academics and 
practitioners from a wide range of subject areas can come together to debate is-
sues of imagining.  For instance, some examples where a study of imagining busi-
ness has or would provide interesting reflections and contributions include (but 
should by no means be limited to): 
 the role of images, standards and visual management in the organizing process 
and how this links to ideas of relational entities and distributed action; 
 the role of management practices in creating visions of organization and strat-
egy;
 the role of Information & Communication Technologies in prompting action 
and accountabilities; 
 The role of educative and pedagogical discourses in the creation of entrepre-
neurial mindsets; 
 ways of mapping controversies in science, technology and policy making; 
 The role of images, signs and icons in policy making and governmental deci-
sion making…
We welcome abstracts (1,500-2,000 words), extended abstracts and draft papers. 
The format for discussion will include both traditional paper presentations and 
alternative forums (e.g. performance, exhibition, panel, discussion group, etc).
Deadline for submissions: 27th September 2010
Acceptance: 20 th December 2010
Full paper: April 2011
The organising committee: 
Paolo Quattrone
Paolo.Quattrone@ie.edu
François-Régis Puyou
frpuyou@audencia.com
Christine McLean 
Chris.Mclean@man-
chester.ac.uk
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22nd Cardiff Business School 
ACCOUNTING & BUSINESS HISTORY RESEARCH UNIT
ANNUAL CONFERENCE
at Cardiff University, 6-7 September 2010
ANNOUNCEMENT OF CONFERENCE AND CALL FOR PAPERS
Guest Speaker - Marcia Annisette (Schulich School of Business, York Uni-
versity, Canada)
Theoretical, empirical and review papers are welcomed in all areas of accounting, 
business and financial history.
The conference provides delegates with the opportunity of presenting and dis-
cussing, in an informal setting, papers ranging from early working drafts to fully 
developed manuscripts. The programme allows approximately 35 minutes for 
presentation and discussion in order to help achieve worthwhile feedback from 
those attending. In the past, many papers presented have subsequently appeared 
in print in a range of international, refereed academic accounting, business and 
economic history journals.
The 2010 conference, organised by Malcolm Anderson, will be held at Cardiff 
University. It will commence at lunchtime on Monday, 6 September 2010 and 
conclude in the late afternoon of Tuesday, 7 September 2010.
The conference fee will include all conference materials and the following meals: 
Monday - lunch, afternoon tea, wine reception and the conference dinner; Tues-
day: morning coffee, lunch and afternoon tea). Details of university accommoda-
tion and a list of nearby hotel options can be found on the conference website 
– www.cf.ac.uk/carbs/conferences/abfhc10/index.html. 
Those wishing to offer papers to be considered for presentation at the con-
ference should send a one page abstract (including name, affiliation and 
contact details) by 1st June 2010 to: Beth Green, Cardiff Business School, 
Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF10 3EU. Tel +44 (0)29 2087 5731. Fax +44 (0)29 2087 
5129. Email. Carbs-Conference@cf.ac.uk
Following the refereeing process, applicants will be advised of the conference or-
ganisers’ decision by 21st June 2010. 
The ongoing financial support of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales’ 
charitable trusts is gratefully acknowledged. The Centre for Business Performance of the 
ICAEW manages all grant applications.
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September 30, 2010 to October 2, 2010
The Blackwell Inn 
Columbus, OR
The theme of the 2010 conference is “Accounting in 
Economic Recovery and Re form.” Concurrent paper 
sessions will address both historical and public policy 
is sues related to recent and continuing economic recov-
ery and its regulatory and mar ket environment, both in 
the United States and around the world.
In addition to Concurrent Paper Sessions, the program 
includes speeches by Mary E. Barth (Joan E. Horngren 
Professor of Accounting, Stanford University) and Greg-
ory J. Jonas (Managing Director of Research, Morgan 
Stanley) plus panel dis cussions chaired by Robert Swi-
eringa (Cornell University), William Kinney (University 
of Texas at Austin), Andrew Bailey (Grant Thornton), 
and Stephen Penman (Columbia University).
The panel discussion will provide perspectives on ac-
counting standard setting, judg ment in auditing and 
financial reporting, regulatory oversight of auditing, and 
user perspectives on financial reporting and auditing.
Silent Auction
Do you have accounting books, monographs, pam-
phlets, or other materials that you would donate to 
a silent auction? We are looking for older accounting 
materials that would be useful to accounting schol-
ars, especially accounting historians. We are general-
ly not interested in runs of journals or old textbooks. 
For more information, please visit the website and 
click on Upcoming Events.
Conference Announcement
The Blackwell Inn
2110 Tuttle Park Place
Columbus, OR 43210
At the corner of Tuttle Park Place and Woodruff.
For More 
Information and  
to Register:  
Go to  
www.aahhq.org  
and click on 
Upcoming Events
Call for Papers 
Deadline:
July 15th
See website for 
more info!
Questions?
Contact Dan Jensen 
at (614) 292-2529 or 
Jensen.7@osu.edu.
Presented: by Academy of Accounting Historians
&
Accounting Hall of Fame
2010 Research Conference
“Accounting in Economic Recovery and Reform”
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THE ACADEMY OF ACCOUNTING HISTORIANS
APPLICATION FOR 2010 MEMBERSHIP
Individual Membership: $45.00
Student Membership: $10.00
Name:  (please print)
Mailing Address:
City: State:
Zip Code: Country:
Accounting History Area of Interest:
Phone: Fax:
E-mail:
  ____
Method of Payment: /___/ check enclosed
  ____  ____
 /___/ Mastercard /___/ VISA
 Card Number:
 Expiration Date:
 Signature:
Mail to: Ms. Tiffany Welch
 Case Western Reserve University
 Weatherhead School of Management
 10900 Euclid Avenue
 Cleveland, OH 44106
 USA 
The Accounting Historians Journal
Volume 37, Number 1
June 2010
2010 OFFICERS
2010 TRUSTEES
Esteban Hernandez-Esteve (Madrid, Spain), Chairman, 2008-2010
Eugene H. Flegm (Bonita Springs, FL), Emeritus, Honorary
Malcolm Anderson (Cardiff University), 2009-2011
C. Richard Baker (Adelphi University), 2010-2012
Salvador Carmona (Instituto de Empresa, S.L.), 2010-2012
Dale Flesher (University of Mississippi), 2010-2012
Yannick Lemarchand (Université of Nantes), 2010-2012
Marta Macias (Carlos III University of Madrid), 2009-2011
Cheryl McWatters (University of Alberta), 2010-2012
Hiroshi Okano (Osaka City University), 2009-2011
Christopher Poullaos (University of Sydney), 2008-2010
Gary J. Previts (Case Western Reserve University), 2010-2012
Stephen Walker (Cardiff University), 2008-2010
Charles Wootton (Eastern Illinois University), 2009-2011
Henri Zimnovitch (Université Paris-Sud 11), 2010-2012
Mary S. Stone (University of Alabama), Corporate Agent
In addition to publishing the Accounting Historians Journal, the Academy 
publishes The Accounting Historians Notebook, sponsors research events 
and conferences, including the World Congresses of Accounting Historians, 
and maintains a comprehensive website. Annual membership dues include 
subscriptions to both publications, special conference pricing, and full access to 
the website and are $45 (U.S.) for individuals, $30 (U.S.) for retired individuals, 
$100 (U.S.) for institutions and libraries, and $10 (U.S.) for students. Inquiries 
concerning membership, publications, and other matters relating to the 
Academy (other than submission of manuscripts to the Accounting Historians 
Journal) should be addressed to Tiffany Welch, The Academy of Accounting 
Historians, Weatherhead School of Management, 10900 Euclid Avenue, 
Cleveland, OH, USA 44106-7235.
E-Mail: acchistory@case.edu Website: http://www.aahhq.org
Vice-President - Partnerships
Robert Colson
Grant Thornton
PH: (212) 624-5300
Email: bob.colson@gt.com
Secretary
Stephanie Moussalli
University of West Florida
PH: (850) 863-6586
Email: smoussalli@uwf.edu
Treasurer
Jennifer Reynolds-Moehrle
University of Missouri-St. Louis
PH: (314) 516-6764
FAX (314) 516-6420
Email: jreynolds.moehrle@umsl.edu
President
Gregory Waymire
Emory University
PH: (404) 727-6589
FAX: (404) 727-6313
Email: gregory_waymire@bus.emory.edu
President-Elect
James McKinney
University of Maryland
PH: (301) 588-3266
Email: jim@mckinneycpa.com
Vice-President - Communication
Yvette Lazdowski
Plymouth State University
PH: (603) 253-9339
Email: yjlazdowski@plymouth.edu
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